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I. INTRODUCTION
While some regions of the world still do not have supranational
structures for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Europe has two systems that are competing on some levels and
complementary on others.1 The European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg is the guardian of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and accepts complaints by individuals alleging a breach of one or more Convention articles by acts or
omissions of the authorities of one of the forty-seven Contracting
Parties of the Council of Europe, provided certain conditions of admissibility are met.2 The Court of Justice of the European Union, based in
Luxembourg, is the guardian of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
and decides in specific cases whether acts or omissions of the EU
institutions and/or certain acts or omissions of the authorities of one of
the twenty-eight Member States of the European Union are in
conformity with the guarantees provided in the Charter. While there are
differences in geographic coverage and in the substantive scope of

1. According to Karen Alter, when the Cold War ended, there were only six permanent
international courts while today there are more than two dozen that have collectively issued
almost forty thousand binding legal rulings. See KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014). Thus, Europe is not the only place
where some level of forum shopping may be possible. See also Karen J. Alter, The Multiplication
of International Courts and Tribunals after the End of the Cold War, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 63 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Karen J. Alter, &
Yuval Shany eds., 2014); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial
Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 INT’L LAW & POLITICS 709-51 (1999).
2. See Eur. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUR., BRINGING A CASE TO THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE ON ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA (3d.
ed., 2014).
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protection, some cases can and have been brought before both
supranational courts.3
Supranational structures are important, in particular, if and when
the protection at the national level is inadequate. Problems at the
national level can and will occur from time to time even in mature
democracies with functioning systems of rule of law. This is evidenced
by some of the cases that come to the European Court of Human Rights
3. An example are the well-known cases revolving around the controversy between prochoice and pro-life proponents in Ireland. In 1983, after a popular referendum, Ireland added a
clause to the constitution stipulating that the “[t]he state acknowledges the right to life of the
unborn and, with due regard to the right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect
and as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.” Constitution of Ireland
1937 8th amend. (amended 1983). This has generally been interpreted as a far reaching
prohibition of abortion. It forces women seeking an abortion to travel abroad, generally to
Northern Ireland, where medically induced abortions are relatively freely available. Several
organizations were providing information about these services inside the Irish Republic. The
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (“SPUC”) brought lawsuits against these
organizations to prevent them from disseminating information about abortion services in the
United Kingdom. One case eventually made it to the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”). In Case of Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, the ECtHR, in a plenary
decision, held that restrictions on counseling services to pregnant women were incompatible
with the Freedom of Expression protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. See generally Case of
Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Application No. 14234/88, Judgment, (Oct. 29,
1992), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-57789"]}. A parallel case
went before the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in Luxembourg. In its judgment of October
4, 1991, the ECJ held that while medical termination of pregnancy is a service (and thus, EU
law should protect the right to receive this service in another Member State), the court further
held that “. . . it is not contrary to Community law for a Member State in which medical
termination of pregnancy is forbidden to prohibit student associations from distributing
information about the identity and location of clinics in another Member State where voluntary
termination of pregnancy is lawfully carried out . . .” The Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan and others, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-4686,
Judgment ¶ 32. The explanation for the latter decision is that the ECJ took a narrow view
analyzing exclusively the free movement of services dimension and not (also) the human rights
dimension of the case. EU law only protects the freedom to provide or receive cross-border
services. Thus, if Irish organizations provide informational services to Irish women, the matter
is one of purely internal dimensions, as long as the organizations are not working for the foreign
medical service providers. It is difficult to say whether the ECJ would uphold this decision today,
after the entry into force of the European Charter. However, it is worth noting in this context,
that the ECtHR more recently held that the ECHR does not as such provide a right to an abortion,
in spite of the fact that “there is indeed a consensus amongst a substantial majority of the
Contracting States of the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion on broader grounds than
accorded under Irish law.” Case of A, B and C v. Ireland, Application No. 25579/05, Judgment
of the Grand Chamber (Dec. 6, 2010) ¶ 235.
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in Strasbourg from countries like the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, Sweden, etc. It is also evidenced by the occasional failure of
a highly developed legal system in a mature democracy like the United
States, where every now and then we sorely miss a functioning
supranational system that would catch and correct most, if not all cases,
where the national system has failed to provide adequate solutions.4
Obviously, the more problems a country has with rule of law and
effective legal remedies at the national level, the more important the
supranational systems become, provided the supranational decisions
are respected and executed in these countries. In the European context,
one indicator of this connection is the number of cases that are brought
to Strasbourg from Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and a handful of other
countries that struggle to provide a high level of protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms for their people or at least for certain
groups under their jurisdiction. Indeed, of the forty-seven Contracting
Parties of the Council of Europe, just five or six are producing between
two thirds and three quarters of all complaints brought to the attention
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) every year.5
Since the parallel existence of two supranational catalogs of
human rights and two supranational courts for their interpretation and
enforcement is quite unique, this article will compare some of the
strengths and weaknesses of each of the two systems and attempt some
proposals for the future development of both of them. For the benefit
of less specialized readers, however, we shall first recall the history and
evolution and some of the most important features of each of the two
systems.
4. Examples are provided in Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law
Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 327 (2000). See also Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking
Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights, 14:2 EUR. J. L. REFORM 241-64.
5. At the end of 2016, the total number of cases “pending before a judicial formation” was
79,750. Of these, 18,171 were against Ukraine; 12,575 against Turkey; 8,962 against Hungary;
7,821 against Russia; 7,402 against Romania; and 6,180 against Italy. Thus, a total of 61,711 or
77.4 percent of all cases pending at the end of 2016 originated in just six of the forty-seven
Member States. By comparison, the number of cases pending against other large Member States
was much smaller: 403 against France; 213 against Germany; and 231 against the United
Kingdom. See EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUR., ANNUAL REPORT 2016, 19192 (2017), http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/annualreports&c=.
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II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION SYSTEM
“A conscience must exist somewhere which will sound the alarm to the minds of a nation
menaced by this progressive corruption, to warn them of the peril and to show them that they are
progressing down a long road which leads far, sometimes even to Buchenwald or to Dachau.”
– Pierre-Henri Teitgen 6

A. Background
The Council of Europe (“the Council”) is an intergovernmental
organization established after World War II by ten European States in
order to promote human rights, European unity, and social and economic progress.7 Membership in the Council of Europe has since risen
to forty-seven countries and today encompasses the entire continent
with the sole exceptions of Belarus and Kosovo. On November 4,
1950, the members of the Council signed the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the ECHR”, or “the
Convention”) to further their mission. The Convention came into force
three years later and has since developed into the present-day European
Bill of Rights.8 The Convention’s primary intent is to protect civil and
political rights, which limits it ratione materiae, as opposed to

6. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Address to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe
(Sept. 1949) (attempting to sway the Assembly in favor of constructing a supranational system
of human rights protections). Teitgen was an influential member of the French resistance during
World War II and subsequently served in the French Parliament as Minister of Information,
Minister of Justice, Minister of Defense, and Deputy Prime Minister. During his time as Minister
of Justice, he oversaw the trials of French politicians who had collaborated with the Nazi
Regime. He was not only one of the “Founding Fathers” of the European Convention system
but also played an instrumental role in the creation of the European Community, the predecessor
to the European Union.
7. Some say that the person most responsible for the creation of the Council of Europe was
Joseph Stalin. The post-war fear that spread across Western Europe is arguably what led to the
creation of the Convention, as leaders sought to prevent the rise of yet another totalitarian
regime. Maybe one day we will similarly look back at Donald Trump as the trigger that finally
induced the United States to ratify the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights?
8. The Convention was signed in Rome, Italy, on November 4, 1950. See Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
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protecting economic, social, or cultural rights.9 Its acceptance and
almost instant success was a feat primarily achieved by the
Convention’s founding fathers: Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe10 and PierreHenri Teitgen.
The European Convention initially established a two-part enforcement system consisting of the (part-time) European Commission of
Human Rights and the (part-time) European Court of Human Rights
(‘the Court’, ‘the Strasbourg Court’, or the ECtHR).11 Prior to Protocol
9, individuals were not entitled to bring their cases directly before the
Court.12 Instead, the individual only had a right to file an application
with the Commission. The Commission then acted as a filter by
deciding the admissibility of complaints and determining which cases
were worthy of reference to the Court.13

9. See PHILIP LEACH, TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 5
(2d ed. 2001); JEAN-PAUL COSTA, EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUR., TEN
YEARS OF THE “NEW” EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (2009),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/10years_NC_1998_2008_ENG.pdf.
10. Sir David was a British MP and had served as a prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials.
This had persuaded him of the importance of international oversight of national protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
11. The European Commission of Human Rights was established in 1954. Five years later,
the European Court of Human Rights was created in 1959. See EUR. CT. HUM. RTS, THE COURT
IN BRIEF, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf (last
visited Apr. 16, 2017). Pierre-Henri Teitgen wanted a special court to “raise the alarm” for
Europe upon the threat of totalitarianism.
12. Originally, the question whether an individual should have the right to directly petition
the Court was only touched upon by a few members of the drafting “Committee on Legal and
Administrative Questions” of the Council of Europe. The idea of such an entitlement continued
to develop and was met with resistance. The committee worried of “abuses and dangers,” as
evident in the statement that only Member States should have the right “to bring another Member
State before an international tribunal for the violation of any one of the recognised fundamental
freedoms. This solution would . . . obviate the abuses and dangers which might arise from
proceedings instituted by private individuals.” Preparatory Commission of the Council of
Europe, Committee of Ministers, Consultative Assembly (May 11 – Sept. 8, 1949) – The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1975 [hereinafter Travaux Préparatoires, Vol. I]. Ultimately, the Committee
agreed “[t[hat any person after exhaustion of national remedies should be allowed to present his
claim before a Committee which will examine the complaint, hearing any legal representative.”
See id. at 162. Protocol 9 is discussed in note 39 and accompanying text.
13. The Commission was eliminated in 1998, after the entry into force of Protocol 11. See
Rudolf Bernhardt, Reform of the Control Machinery under the European Convention on Human
Rights: Protocol No. 11 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 145 (1995).
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Early on, the Strasbourg system seemed weak and incapable of
prolonged success, predominantly due to its optional clauses and world
powers such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom refraining from
accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the Court or the individual’s right
to petition.14 Furthermore, the Court and Commission treaded carefully
so as not to infringe upon, in actuality or in spirit, the sovereignty of
the Contracting Parties. As a consequence, the Court handed down only
twenty judgments in the period from 1959 to 1975.15
In the 1980s, a new geopolitical atmosphere of human rights
promotion and steady growth in the number of Contracting Parties led
the Commission to refer more and more cases to the Court, which in
turn made it increasingly difficult to manage the case load and keep the
length of proceedings in check. The surge of cases burdened the parttime Court so heavily that the average duration of proceedings
skyrocketed to somewhere between five and six years. As a consequence, the future of the entire Strasbourg system seemed dim unless a
remedial overall were to occur.16 In 1994, out of the disorder, emerged
Protocol 11, which comprehensively restructured the control
machinery of the Convention. The European Commission of Human
Rights as a filter mechanism was abolished and individuals were
granted direct access to the Court, which became a full-time court. The
condition of prior unsuccessful exhaustion of domestic remedies
remained. Importantly for the Contracting Parties, acceptance of the

14. See Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, The Evolution of the Right of Individuals to Seise the
European Court of Human Rights, 12 J. HIST. INT’L L. 267 (2010).
15. See id. The reluctance of the Contracting States to accept individual complaints is also
illustrated by the fact that only Germany was willing to do so from the start. The United
Kingdom followed in 1966 and France only in 1981. See also Christian Walter, History and
Development of European Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in EUROPEAN
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 1, 5 (Dirk Ehlers ed. 2007).
16. The number of applications rose from 404 in 1981 to 4,750 in 1997. See Donald W.
Jackson, Increasing Caseload and Protocol 11 Reforms, in DAVID P. FORSYTHE,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 175 (Vol. I, 2009). For further analysis see also MIKAEL
RASK MADSEN, FROM COLD WAR INSTRUMENT TO SUPREME EUROPEAN COURT: THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE CROSSROADS OF INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY (2007), Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 137-159.
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jurisdiction of the Court became compulsory.17 Unsurprisingly, this
restructuring did not miraculously resolve the issue of the Court’s tremendous caseload, but nonetheless helped it to remain intact despite
the number of applications increasing every year.18
B. Widening of the Convention via Geographic Expansion
There are currently forty-seven Contracting Parties that make up
the Council of Europe – a number that continues to grow.19 About 820
million citizens of these forty-seven states are protected by the
Strasbourg system. Non-citizens are also protected by the ECHR if they
are refugees, temporary residents, or otherwise come under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party. This explains, in part, why the Court is
so overburdened today. However, as stated above, of the forty-seven
Contracting Parties, five or six countries produce between two-thirds
and three-quarters of all complaints brought to the Court every year.
Otherwise, the Court would be able to handle the caseload quite easily.
Initially, there were twelve Contracting Parties to the Convention,
which by and large shared the same post-World War II history, had
functioning democracies, and had respect for the rule of law.20 The
number of Contracting Parties did not increase significantly until the
fall of the Soviet Union. The end of the cold war, however, led to a rush
of accessions by the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)

17. See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, May 11,
1994, E.T.S. No. 155 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998).
18. For further analysis see Paul Mahoney, New Challenges for the European Court of
Human Rights Resulting from the Expanding Case Load and Membership, 21 PENN STATE INT’L
L.REV. 101-14 (2002).
19. A comprehensive list of member states is available. See Chart of Signatures and
Ratifications of Treaty 005, Council of Eur., http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-memberstates (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
20. The original Contracting States were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. See
generally Frank Emmert & Siniša Petrović, The Past, Present, and Future of EU Enlargement,
37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1349 (2014).
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seeking to integrate with the rest of Europe.21 Since 1990, twenty-one
countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union or controlled by
it have joined the Council of Europe.22
The accession of the CEECs posed a unique and significant challenge for the ECtHR not only due to the rapidly increasing number of
cases brought to it, but also because of an inevitable ideological shift.
The largely like-minded group of Western European countries, which
all had a particular aim when establishing the Strasbourg system, now
had to accommodate former Soviet countries and, like all Contracting
Parties, they have the right to send judges to the Strasbourg Court. The
greater adjustments, however, were imposed on the CEECs. In order to
comply with the Convention it was not only necessary to
comprehensively revise domestic laws. Paper is patient after all but
human rights and fundamental freedoms have to be respected in practice and not in theory alone. The biggest challenge, it turned out, was
the comprehensive reform of the justice systems, from legal education
all the way to the methods and policies of the highest courts.23
In 1996, yet another former Communist country joined the Council. Russia applied for accession in 1992, had it granted four years later,
and has since wavered on the edge of expulsion and withdrawal.24 The
21. Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia,
Bulgaria, and Albania. See Emmert & Petrović, supra note 20.
22. The Western member states’ rationale for promoting the early accession of former
CEECs, as opposed to strict adherence to the requirements of membership and consequential
alienation, can be attributed to the prevalent idea that human rights, democracy, and European
identity would propagate in an inclusive Council of Europe. As we can say in hindsight, this
worked quite well in some but certainly not in all of the new Member States. See Emmert &
Petrović, supra note 20.
23. See, Frank Emmert, Rule of Law in Central and Eastern Europe, 32 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 551 (2009); Zdenek Kühn, Worlds Apart: Western and Central European Judicial Culture
at the Onset of the European Enlargement, 52 AM. J. COMP. L.. 531 (2004); EAST EUROPEAN
FACES OF LAW AND SOCIETY: VALUES AND PRACTICES (William B. Simons ed. 2014); see also,
Frank Emmert & Siniša Petrović, The Past, Present, and Future of EU Enlargement, 37
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1349 (2014); EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AS A CHALLENGE FOR
DEMOCRACY 2017 (Elzbieta Kuzelewska et al. eds., 2015) (regarding the Expansion of the
European Union).
24. Russia sought to join the Council of Europe for multiple reasons, including to
strengthen trade ties with Europe and overall relations with the European Union and CEECs.
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acceptance of Russia aroused criticism from those who believed the
Council was exceeding its geographical scope. More importantly, the
critics feared the continuous expansion of the Council into the former
Communist world, with a rather lax interpretation of the criteria for
admission, undermined the system’s “moral authority.”25 Conceivably,
the following quote by a rapporteur, proceeding Russia’s accession,
somewhat confirms the critic’s reservations as merited: “Russia does
not yet meet all Council of Europe standards. But integration is better
than isolation; cooperation is better than confrontation.”26 To ensure
See Pamela A. Jordan, Russia’s Accession to the Council of Europe and Compliance with European Human Rights Norms, 11 J. DEMIKRATIZATSIYA 281 (2003) for details as to Russia’s
accession experience. Regarding (some) of the problems with Russia’s compliance, see, e.g.,
Bill Bowring, The Russian Federation, Protocol No. 14 (and 14bis), and the Battle for the Soul
of the ECHR, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 589 (2010); Julia Lapitskaya, ECHR, Russia, and
Chechnya: Two is Not Company and Three Is Definitely a Crowd, 43 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL.
479 (2010).
25. Walter Schwimmer, Timid Moral Policeman, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 1999, at 56,
http://www.economist.com/node/326818 (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
26. Eur. Consult. Ass., Russia’s Request for Membership of the Council of Europe, Doc.
No. 7443 (Jan. 2, 1996). The accession procedure had been suspended in 1995 after Russian
armed forces intervened in Chechnya to crush the independence movement there. However, the
negotiations resumed soon enough and, after the endorsement by the Political Affairs Committee
under Mühlemann and several other experts, the Parliamentary Assembly voted by a two-thirds
majority to admit the Russian Federation. This was done in spite of more than cautious remarks
by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights:
The Committee . . . thinks the only conclusion that can be drawn from the above
considerations is that, for the time being, considerable deficits remain in the
application of laws and regulations and the observance of human rights. In this
respect, the Russian Federation cannot be regarded as a State based on the rule of law.
Neither is the full observance of human rights guaranteed - the documented human
rights abuses in Chechnya are the best example, but violations of human rights are
not restricted to that Republic. While the freedom of expression and the freedom of
association are relatively well-protected, the freedom of movement is restricted and
basic rights of those suspected accused of and/or detained for criminal or
administrative offences are painfully missing. Progress towards the rule of law and
the observance of human rights has been made in the last few years, but it is often
frustratingly slow, and sometimes even goes into reverse (as the events in Chechnya
and the powers of the Federal security services demonstrate).
From a legal affairs and human rights point of view, applying strict criteria, the
Committee must thus conclude that the Russian Federation does not yet fulfil the
conditions of membership as laid down in Article 3 and 4 of the Statute of the Council
of Europe. Having come to this conclusion the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights has fulfilled the instructions of the Assembly. The question could,
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Russia’s compliance with the Council’s objectives, specific
membership criteria containing twelve agreements and twenty-five
commitments were produced.27 Subsequent events have shown that this
was not really successful.28
Perhaps the most profound accession attempt yet is one that has
been discussed for decades – the accession of the European Union to
the Convention. The European Union was set to become the fortyeighth Contracting Party to the Convention. Although all EU Member
States are already members of the Council of Europe and Contracting
Parties to the European Convention, accession of the EU itself would
permit individuals to apply to the Court in Strasbourg for review of acts
however, be asked whether the accession of the Russian Federation might in itself
help to create conditions in conformity with Council of Europe standards, on the one
hand through the commitments to be entered into by Russia upon accession and the
subsequent monitoring procedure, and on the other hand, as a result of the mandatory
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. This consideration and other
political arguments might speak in favour of Russia’s accession to the Council of
Europe at this point in time. Thus the final decision would depend on whether a
critical assessment of the current legal and human rights situation or a political
evaluation of the chances and perspectives for improvement of this situation
following the admission should prevail.
Eur. Consult. Ass., Russia’s Application for Membership in the Council of Eur., Doc. No. 7463
(Jan. 18 1996), https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=7397&lang=EN. See also Mark Janis, Russia and the ‘Legality’ of Strasbourg Law, 1 EJIL
93-99 (1997).
The reports illustrate nicely the conundrum between allowing for early accession in the
hope that membership will have a positive effect on human rights and rule of law versus denying
early accession and using leverage to insist upon better performance with regard to human rights
and rule of law at the risk of alienation.
27. The criteria included things such as “agreement to bring to justice human rights
violators in Chechnya; agreement to improve conditions of criminal detention,” etc. See Parl.
Ass., Council of Eur., Application By Russia For Membership Of The Council Of Europe,
OPINION NO. 193 (1996), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=13932&lang=EN.
28. For a differentiated analysis see, for example, Anatoly I. Kovler, Russia: European
Convention on Human Rights in Russia: Fifteen years after, in THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON
DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE – JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES 351-72
(Iulia Motoc & Ineta Ziemele eds., 2016). For the argument that the large number of cases from
Russia may be caused by the fact that Russian judges are particularly ECtHR friendly, in
particular since they do not see enough movement toward rule of law and protection of human
rights otherwise, see Alexei Trochev, All Appeals Lead to Strasbourg? Unpacking the Impact of
the European Court of Human Rights on Russia, 17 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 145-78, (2009).
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of EU institutions as well.29 The legal basis for such a groundbreaking
move can nowadays be found in Article 59(2) ECHR, as amended by
Protocol No. 14, which states, “the European Union may accede to this
Convention.”30 However, the European Union Court of Justice (‘the
ECJ’) gave a negative opinion on the draft accession agreement out of
concern that accession would upset the balance of the EU and affect
the autonomy and effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure.31
This will be expanded below. In spite of the ECJ’s opinion, both the
2016 and 2017 Work Programmes of the CoE announced the
continuing pursuit of EU accession.
C. Evolution of the Convention via Protocols
The Convention has been amended numerous times since its
inception in 1950. These amendments came in the form of protocols
added to the Convention. Some protocols have generated important
updates of the Convention by adding fundamental rights and freedoms
not previously contemplated by its founders. Other protocols have
focused on changes to the mechanical structure of the Strasbourg
system. Finally, some have dealt with the relationship between the
Strasbourg system and national systems of human rights protection by
introducing or amending the concepts of subsidiarity and the margin of
appreciation.32 In sum, it can be said that the origin of each protocol
chiefly stemmed from efforts to make the Strasbourg system more
29. EU institutions interact with millions of individuals. As the law currently stands, EU
institutions are not directly bound by the ECHR or the ECtHR’s decisions. The Lisbon Treaty,
as of December 1, 2009, commits the Union to accede to the ECHR. “The Union shall accede
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.” However,
the Lisbon Treaty also upgraded the European Charter of Fundamental Rights from a statement
of intent to a binding agreement, arguably making accession to the ECHR at least less urgent, if
not entirely redundant. Nevertheless, the idea of EU accession is furthered by the recent article
in Protocol 14, discussed in section 3. See infra note 43.
30. ECHR, supra note 8, art. 59, note 2.
31. Draft International Agreement - Accession of the European Union to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Compatibility of
the draft agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties, Opinion 2/13, [2014] E.C.R. I-2454.
32. See generally Luzius Wildhaber, The European Convention on Human Rights: The
Past, The Present, The Future, 22 AM. INT’L L. REV. 4 (2007).
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efficient and resilient and to recognize the evolution of human rights at
the regional and international level. Using protocols, rather than actual
amendments of the Convention, provides a measure of flexibility, since
most of them do not have to be ratified and applied by all Contracting
Parties. An exception applies, however, to those protocols that change
the institutional structure or working methods of the Strasbourg system.
The following section aims to summarize each protocol’s purpose,
while also discussing the rationale for the most noteworthy changes.
1. 1950s to 1970s
The First Protocol to the Convention entered into force on May
18, 1954 and added fundamental rights to those already protected under
the Convention, including the right to education, the right to free
elections by secret ballot, and the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s
property.33 Protocol 2 gave the Court competence to issue advisory
opinions pursuant to requests by the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, and Protocols 3 and 5 modified Articles 22, 29, 30,
and 34 of the Convention dealing with the Commission pre-screening
procedure. Protocols 2, 3, and 5 were subsequently replaced by
Protocol 11, which completely restructured the Strasbourg system and
is discussed below. Finally, Protocol 4 added fundamental rights and
freedoms not previously listed in the Convention, namely the
prohibition of imprisonment for debt, the right to liberty of movement
and the freedom to choose one’s residence, the prohibition of expulsion
of a State’s own nationals, and the prohibition of collective expulsion
of aliens.34

33. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). The First Protocol has been ratified
by 45 of the 47 Contracting Parties, with Monaco and Switzerland abstaining so far.
34. Protocol 4 entered into force on May 2, 1968. See Protocol 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing certain Rights
and Freedoms other than those already included in the Convention and in the First Protocol
thereto, Sept. 16, 1963, ETS No. 46. Protocol No. 4 has been ratified by 43 of the 47 Contracting
Parties, with Greece, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom abstaining so far.
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2. 1980s to 1990s
As mentioned previously, changing sentiments in human rights
law have motivated changes at both the national and regional level in
Europe. A good example is Protocol 6, which entered into force on
March 1, 1985 and abolished the death penalty during peacetime.35
This addition to the Convention mirrored sentiments and actions of
most European States that had contemplated abolishing capital punishment for quite some time. Protocol 7 emerged three years later with the
purpose of updating the scope of rights under the Convention to the
scope of rights envisaged by the new International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (‘the ICCPR’) adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations. By adding procedural safeguards relating to
expulsion of aliens (Article 1), a right of appeal in criminal matters
(Article 2), a right to compensation for wrongful conviction (Article 3),
a right not to be tried or punished twice (Article 4), and a right to
equality between spouses (Article 5), the Council of Europe wanted to
avoid conflicts between the Convention and the Covenant.36
Protocol 11 entered into force in 1996 as an answer to an influx
of applications from the new member states in Central and Eastern
Europe, where the European Convention applied for the first time, as
well as a growing number of complaints by individuals from the old
Western member states, where the Convention was finally becoming
more widely known and appreciated. In light of these problems and in
consideration of the Council of Europe’s expected further growth,
Protocol 11 established a mechanical overhaul of the Strasbourg
system and replaced Protocols 8, 9, and 10.37 By merging the two-organ
35. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty was opened for signature on April 28,
1983. See ETS No. 114. Protocol No. 6 has been ratified by 46 of the 47 Contracting Parties,
with only Russia abstaining so far.
36. Explanatory Report to the Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 117, Nov. 22, 1984. Protocol No. 7 has
been ratified by 44 of the 47 Contracting Parties, with Germany, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom abstaining so far.
37. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was signed on May 11, 1994 and entered into force on November 1, 1998,
after ratification by all 47 Contracting Parties. See ETS No. 155. Since the protocol caused
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system of the part-time European Commission and part-time Court of
Human Rights, a single, full-time Court was created. This
consolidation was done with the intent to “shorten the length of
Strasbourg proceedings” and simultaneously to “maintain the authority
and quality of the case-law in the future.”38 Furthermore, Protocol 11
retained the important feature that originally emerged from Protocol 9,
which allows individuals to directly petition the Court after
unsuccessful exhaustion of domestic remedies.39 Additionally, it kept
the ability of the Court to issue advisory opinions when requested by
the Committee of Ministers, as originally seen in Protocol 2.
3. 2000s to Present
In recent years, both procedural and fundamental rights were
added to the Convention. Protocol 12 developed after concerns that the
original non-discrimination provision was too limited, since discrimination was only prohibited in the enjoyment of one of the other rights
guaranteed by the Convention.40 To remedy this, Protocol 12 entered
into force on April 1, 2005 and provides for a much wider, general
prohibition of discrimination by any public authority.41

important changes to be made to the Convention itself, it required unanimous approval. See also
Bernhardt, supra note 13, at 145-55.
38. Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 11 to the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 11, 1998, ETS No. 155 at 6.
39. The battle for giving individuals direct access to the Court was ongoing since the
Court’s inception. Protocol 9 finally awarded such a right. The ideology for doing so is found in
the Explanatory Report. See Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 9 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 6, 1990, ETS No. 140 at 3. It is
stated that “. . . [t]he situation whereby the individual is granted rights but not given the
possibility to exploit fully the control machinery provided for enforcing them, could today be
regarded as inconsistent with the spirit of the Convention, not to mention compatibility with
domestic-law procedures in State Parties.”.
40. One of many voices criticizing the limits of Article 14 of the Convention is Oddný
Mjöll Arnardóttir. See ODDNÝ MJÖLL ARNARDÓTTIR, EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2003).
41. Protocol No. 12 was opened for signature on November 4, 2000, and entered into force
on April 1, 2005. It has so far been ratified by twenty Contracting Parties. See Protocol 12 to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
2000, ETS No. 177.
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Another bold move was Protocol 13, which took Protocol 6’s
abolishment of the death penalty further by abolishing capital punishment in all circumstances, including for crimes committed in times of
war and imminent threat of war. The Protocol does not permit any
derogation or reservation.42
Eight years later, Protocol 14 entered into force with the aim of
establishing new admissibility criteria (Article 12), empowering a
single judge to declare an application inadmissible (Article 7), empowering the Committee of Ministers in circumstances where States
fail to execute judicial decisions (Article 16), and changing the judicial
term of office to a single, nine-year term (Art. 2). Most interestingly,
Protocol 14 includes a short but powerful addition which states “The
European Union may accede to this Convention” (Article 17).43 As we
know, actual accession by the European Union to the Convention has
thus far not occurred.
Protocols 15 and 16, both of which have yet to enter into force,
have the ability to alter the Court’s relations with Contracting Parties.44
Protocol 15 amends the Convention in order to add references to the
principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation
to the preamble. It also reduces the time within which an applicant may

42. The increased protection found in Protocol 13 emerged in recognition of the right to
life as “an inalienable attribute of human beings” worth the utmost respect. Protocol No. 13 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the
Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, opened for signature on May 3, 2002, and
entered into force on July 1, 2003. It has been ratified by 44 of the 47 Contracting Parties, with
only Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia abstaining so far. See Protocol 13 to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the
Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, May 3, 2002, ETS No. 187. Compliance
will be tested if President Erdogan of Turkey follows through with his recent announcement that
he wants to re-introduce the death penalty in his country.
43. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention, opened for signature on
May 13, 2004, entered into force on June 1, 2010, after ratification by all 47 Contracting Parties.
See ETS No. 194. Article 17 of the Protocol added a new paragraph 2 to Article 59 of the
Convention regarding the EU.
44. For further analysis see Noreen O’Meara, Reforming the ECtHR: The Impacts of
Protocols 15 and 16 to the ECHR, iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 31, (Sept. 1 2015),
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2654205.
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file a case with the Court from the current six months to four months.45
Protocol 16 permits the highest courts and tribunals of a State to request
advisory opinions from the Court on interpretation questions related to
the rights and freedoms in the Convention or Protocols.46 Requests are
entirely optional and the opinions issued by the Court following a
request are non-binding.47
As can be seen, the Protocols have added new fundamental rights
and freedoms to the Convention that have to be respected by the
Contracting Parties, and they will continue to do so as human rights
standards progress. However, it is important to remember that most
Protocols are only binding upon the States that ratify them.
D. Deepening of the Convention via Case Law
“The essence of human rights protection under the Convention is to be
found in the principles of democracy and rule of law.”
– Jean-Paul Costa

The idea that a supranational institutional system for the protection and promotion of human rights could hold States liable was initially a radical concept. More significantly, the capability of an individual to challenge a State’s actions (or inactions) as violations of her
human rights and fundamental freedoms in an international court was
45. Protocol No. 15 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was opened for signature on June 24, 2013. It requires ratification by all
Contracting Parties to enter into force. As of July 2017, it has been ratified by 35 of the 47
Contracting Parties. See ETS No. 213.
46. Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was opened for signature on October 2, 2013. It requires ten ratifications to
enter into force. As of July 2017, it has been ratified by Albania, Armenia, Finland, Georgia,
Lithuania, San Marino, and Slovenia. Eleven other Contracting Parties have signed and entry
into force can be expected soon. However, the right to request advisory opinions will only be
open for courts designated by the governments of Contracting Parties who have ratified the
Protocol. See Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Oct. 2, 2013, ETS No. 214.
47. The Explanatory Report views advisory opinions as beneficial to both the Contracting
Parties and the Court. We will return to this issue below. See Explanatory Report on Protocol
No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS
No. 214.
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unprecedented. It is this system that has led to some of the most important human rights decisions of our time, and has provided a regional
conscience that protects over 820 million people, warranting its description as “the most effective human rights regime in the world.”48
Rejecting the so-called “originalist” approach favored by jurists
like the late Justice Antonin Scalia of the American Supreme Court, the
ECtHR has continuously recognized the European Convention on
Human Rights as “a living instrument which must be interpreted in the
light of present-day conditions.”49 This evolutive interpretation has
allowed the Court on occasion to recognize new rights not explicitly
found in the Convention.50 In many other cases, the Court expanded
rights that are explicitly mentioned but were originally interpreted
more restrictively.51 Any attempt at outlining the entire body of rights

48. Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal
Orders, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS,
3 (2008). The chapter is also available online in the Faculty Scholarship Series 89, available at:
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/89.
49. See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, No. 5856/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978). See Marckx v.
Belgium, No. 6833/74, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1979). See also Loizidou v. Turkey, No. 15318/89, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (1996). There, the Court held even more specifically:
[t]hat the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of
present-day conditions is firmly rooted in the Court’s case-law . . . . Such an approach,
in the Court’s view, is not confined to the substantive provisions of the Convention,
but also applies to those provisions, such as Articles 25 and 46 (art. 25, art. 46), which
govern the operation of the Convention’s enforcement machinery. It follows that these
provisions cannot be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of their
authors as expressed more than forty years ago.
See Application No. 15318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995). For further analysis, see George Letsas,
The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy (Mar. 14, 2012), available at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021836.
50. See Jean-Paul Costa, The European Court of Human Rights and its Recent Case Law,
38 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 455, 458 (2003). After authoring this article, Jean-Paul Costa would later
become the President of the European Court of Human Rights. Costa’s interpretive philosophy
is similar to that of Justice Douglas of the United States’ Supreme Court in the opinion Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where Douglas held that the Right to Privacy comes from
penumbras that emanate from the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights.
51. For a critical analysis of the ECtHR’s “consensus methodology”, i.e. the Court’s
expansion of rights once “a certain measure of uniformity” has evolved among the Contracting
States with regard to “the existence of rights-enhancing practices and policies” see Laurence R.
Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 133, 133-165 (1993).
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and freedoms currently protected under the Convention and its
Protocols, therefore, requires space and time not available here.52 Any
attempt at making predictions for the future is even more difficult since
rights and freedoms continue to emerge based on the general spirit of
the Convention with the passing of time, the evolution of societies, and
the updates undertaken by the Contracting Parties.53 Nevertheless, in
the remainder of this section, some important and mostly recent
decisions of the ECtHR shall be presented, as examples of the Court’s
approach.

52. Instead, the reader should refer to THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
- A COMMENTARY (Christoph Grabenwarter ed., 2014); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS – A COMMENTARY (2015); D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (3d ed., 2014); and/or BERNADETTE RAINEY,
ELIZABETH WICKS & CLARE OVEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (6th ed.,
2014).
53. At the same time, not every right is considered inviolable. The Court has used the
following three-part test: Is the inference (1) prescribed by law; (2) in furtherance of a legitimate
aim; and (3) necessary in a democratic society? In determining whether the infringement in
“necessary in a democratic society”, the Court explained in a case concerning the control of
inmate mail by prison authorities that:
(a) the adjective ‘necessary’ is not synonymous with ‘indispensable’, neither has it
the flexibility of such expressions as ‘admissible’, ‘ordinary’, ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’
or ‘desirable’ [(see the Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, at
22, § 48)]; (b) the Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of
appreciation in the matter of the imposition of restrictions, but it is for the Court to
give the final ruling on whether they are compatible with the Convention [(see id. at
23, § 49)]; (c) the phrase ‘necessary in a democratic society’ means that, to be
compatible with the Convention, the interference must, inter alia, correspond to a
‘pressing social need’ and be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ [(see id.
at 22-23, §§ 48-49)]; (d) those paragraphs of Articles of the Convention which
provide for an exception to a right guaranteed are to be narrowly interpreted [(see the
above-mentioned Klass and others judgment, Series A no. 28, at 21, § 42)].
See Application no. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75, and 7136/75, Silver
and others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, (March 25, 1983). See also infra, notes 90 et seq.
and accompanying text.
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1. Article 1 Obligation to Respect Human Rights
Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom (2011)54
In July of 2011, the Court decided Al-Skeini, which has become
the leading ECHR authority on extraterritorial application of the Convention.55 The case concerns the extraterritorial application of the
ECHR under Article 1, which states that the High Contracting parties
“shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” found in the Convention. After six Iraqi civilians were killed at
the hands of British troops on patrol in Bosra, Iraq, the UK government
argued that the killings occurred outside the jurisdiction of the UK, and
therefore the Convention’s obligation of an independent and thorough
investigation of the matter did not apply.
Although the House of Lords agreed with the UK government’s
position in Al-Skeini, the Court differed under the principle of territoriality. The Grand Chamber’s unanimous opinion, issued in favor of
the six applicants, held that “whenever a State, through its agents,
exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that
individual the rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention .
. . .”56 Holding Member States liable for their actions, even if committed in non-contracting States outside of the Convention’s territory,
confirms principles established in Soering and more recent cases like
Paposhvili (see below).
El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2012)57
One year after the Al-Skeini decision, the Court in El-Masri held
on December 13, 2012 that Member States could be liable for Convention breaches committed within their jurisdiction by another State, if
the Member State was aware of the acts. In 2003, Macedonian officials
54. Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).
55. See generally Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J.
INT’L L., 121-39 (2012).
56. Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 54, at 136-37. Furthermore, the
Court noted that solely because previous precedent said the Convention would apply when the
army of one signatory occupied the territory of another signatory (espace juridique), this did not
mean that occupation in a non-signatory’s territory could not trigger jurisdiction under the
Convention. Id.
57. El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, No. 39630/09, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2012).
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detained German citizen Khaled el-Masri upon arrival at Skopje
airport. He was then held for twenty-three days, during which time he
was interrogated by Macedonian agents about potential Al-Qaeda connections and denied access to a lawyer or a consular agent of the
German embassy. Although he was told that he would be returned to
Germany, he was subsequently transferred to a special CIA rendition
team. Macedonian officials stood by and watched as el-Masri was
blindfolded, shackled, sodomized, and severely beaten by the CIA
agents. He was then transferred to a CIA black site in Kabul,
Afghanistan, where he was held without trial or access to a lawyer for
four to five months.
The Court unanimously found a violation of Articles 3, 5, 8, and
13 of the Convention by Macedonia,58 while simultaneously condemning the CIA’s “tactics,” as well as the United States judiciary, for
failing to render justice to el-Masri or other victims of U.S. torture. The
El-Masri precedent will hopefully deter Member States from assisting
others in carrying out future human rights violations.
2. Article 3 Prohibition of Torture
Ireland v. United Kingdom (1978)59
In one of the rare interstate cases, Ireland complained about the
interrogation by UK police authorities of terrorism suspects in the conflict in Northern Ireland, specifically the application of the so-called
“five techniques,” namely:
(a) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods of
some hours in a ‘stress position,’ described by those who underwent it as being ‘spread eagled against the wall, with their fingers
put high above the head against the wall, the legs spread apart and
58. The Court held that Macedonia violated Article 3 for its failure to carry out an effective
investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment and for the inhuman and degrading
treatment to which the applicant was subjected while being held. The Court found a violation of
Article 5 due to the arbitrary detention of the applicant and for the applicant’s subsequent
captivity in Afghanistan. The Court also found a violation of Articles 8 and 13. See id. at 80.
59. Ireland v. United Kingdom, No. 5310/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978).
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the feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight
of the body mainly on the fingers’; (b) hooding: putting a black or
navy coloured colored bag over the detainees’ heads and, at least
initially, keeping it there all the time except during interrogation;
(c) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations, holding the
detainees in a room where there was a continuous loud and hissing
noise; (d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations,
depriving the detainees of sleep; (e) deprivation of food and drink:
subjecting the detainees to a reduced diet during their stay at the
centre and pending interrogations.60

The United Kingdom did not contest the findings of fact but
argued that “the findings in question . . . do not give rise to problems
of interpretation or application of the Convention sufficiently important
to require a decision by the Court,” not least because “the subjectmatter of those findings now belongs to past history in view of the
abandonment of the five techniques . . ., the solemn and unqualified
undertaking not to reintroduce these techniques.”61
The ECtHR, however, held that:
the responsibilities assigned to it within the framework of the
system under the Convention extend to pronouncing on the noncontested allegations of violation of [Art. 3]. The Court’s
judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought
before the Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and
develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by [all] States of the engagements
undertaken by them as Contracting Parties [Art. 19].62

Therefore, the Court:
1. holds unanimously that, although certain violations of [Art. 3]
were not contested, a ruling should nevertheless be given thereon;
2. holds unanimously that it has jurisdiction to take cognisance of
the cases of alleged violation of [Art. 3] to the extent that the

60. Id. at ¶ 96.
61. Id. at ¶ 152.
62. Id. at ¶ 154.
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applicant Government put them forward as establishing the
existence of a practice;
3. holds by sixteen votes to one that the use of the five techniques
in August and October 1971 constituted a practice of inhuman and
degrading treatment, which practice was in breach of [Art. 3]. . .
.63

Soering v. United Kingdom (1989)64
Jens Soering and Elizabeth Haysom were in a relationship
opposed by the parents of the girl. To overcome the opposition and
retain access to the parent’s financial resources, the couple planned to
murder them. During a visit to the parents, Soering picked a fight and
killed both parents with a knife. The couple then fled to the United
Kingdom where they were arrested. A grand jury in the Commonwealth
of Virginia indicted Soering with the murder of the Haysoms and the
United States requested extradition from the United Kingdom. While
awaiting extradition, Soering filed a petition for review and claimed
that he would be sentenced to death if extradited and that the “death
row phenomenon” would subject him to inhuman and degrading
treatment and punishment in violation of Article 3 ECHR.
Although the ECtHR acknowledged that Article 3 “should not be
interpreted so as to impose responsibility on a Contracting State for acts
which occur outside its jurisdiction,”65 the Court held that “the decision
by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue
under [Art. 3], and hence engage the responsibility of that State under
the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for
believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of
being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
63. In particular with regard to the discussion in the United States about waterboarding
and other techniques of interrogation, the reader is reminded of the 1984 UN Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNTS 1465. Not
only is the United States a party to this Convention, its provisions are widely considered to be
part of ius cogens, i.e. peremptory norms of such importance that no derogation is ever
permitted. See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
54-57 (2006).
64. Soering v. United Kingdom, No. 14038/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989).
65. Id. at ¶¶ 83, 86.
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punishment in the requesting country.”66 The Court continued that
Article 3 “. . . [could] not be interpreted as generally prohibiting the
death penalty,”67 and that “[t]he democratic character of the Virginia
legal system in general and the positive features of Virginia trial,
sentencing and appeal procedures in particular are beyond doubt.”68
Nevertheless, the ECtHR decided that:
having regard to the very long period of time spent on death row
in such extreme conditions, with the ever present and mounting
anguish of awaiting execution of the death penalty, and to the
personal circumstances of the applicant, especially his age and
mental state at the time of the offence, the applicant’s extradition
to the United States would expose him to a real risk of treatment
going beyond the threshold set by [Art. 3]. . . . Accordingly, the
Secretary of State’s decision to extradite the applicant to the
United States would, if implemented, give rise to a breach of [Art.
3].69

The Soering doctrine was later expanded and found a recent culmination in the case of Paposhvili v. Belgium.70 The applicant was an
asylum seeker from Georgia who had been arrested on several occasions for shoplifting. In 2000, after his asylum application was refused,
the applicant lodged the first of several requests for leave to remain in
Belgium on account of his health and family. By 2015, he was still
fighting extradition. Inter alia, he claimed that he required very
expensive treatment for his leukemia and hepatitis C that would not be
available to him in Georgia. The Belgian Government argued that
“although it was acknowledged in the Court’s case-law that the
responsibility of a Contracting Party could be engaged under Article 3
on account of the expulsion of an alien and his exposure to a risk of a
breach of his economic and social rights, it nevertheless had to be taken
into consideration that, where the person concerned suffered from an
illness, neither the returning State nor the receiving State could be held
66. Id. at ¶ 91.
67. Id. at ¶ 103.
68. Id. at ¶ 111.
69. Id.
70. Paposhvili v. Belgium, No. 41738/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016).
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directly responsible for the shortcomings of the health-care system and
the repercussions on the health of the individual concerned.”71 In
response, the ECtHR first recalled its judgment in the case of N. v.
United Kingdom,72 pursuant to which the removal of an asylum seeker
to her homeland Uganda where she was unlikely to receive the same
quality of treatment for her AIDS infection did “not disclose very
exceptional circumstances” and “would not give rise to a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention.”73 However, the Court then continued in
Paposhvili as follows:
188. [...W]hat is in issue here is the negative obligation not to
expose persons to a risk of ill-treatment proscribed by Article 3. It
follows that the impact of removal on the person concerned must
be assessed by comparing his or her state of health prior to removal
and how it would evolve after transfer to the receiving State.
189. As regards the factors to be taken into consideration, the
authorities in the returning State must verify on a case-by-case
basis whether the care generally available in the receiving State is
sufficient and appropriate in practice for the treatment of the
applicant’s illness so as to prevent him or her being exposed to
treatment contrary to Article 3 . . . . The benchmark is not the level
of care existing in the returning State; it is not a question of
ascertaining whether the care in the receiving State would be
equivalent or inferior to that provided by the health-care system in
the returning State. Nor is it possible to derive from Article 3 a
right to receive specific treatment in the receiving State which is
not available to the rest of the population.
190. The authorities must also consider the extent to which the
individual in question will actually have access to this care and
these facilities in the receiving State. The Court observes in that
regard that it has previously questioned the accessibility of care . .
. and referred to the need to consider the cost of medication and
treatment, the existence of a social and family network, and the
distance to be travelled in order to have access to the required care
....
191. Where, after the relevant information has been examined,
serious doubts persist regarding the impact of removal on the
persons concerned – on account of the general situation in the
receiving country and/or their individual situation – the returning
71. Id. at ¶ 150.
72. N. v. United Kingdom, No. 26565/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
73. Id. at ¶ 51.
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State must obtain individual and sufficient assurances from the
receiving State, as a precondition for removal, that appropriate
treatment will be available and accessible to the persons concerned
so that they do not find themselves in a situation contrary to Article
3 . . . .74

Since Belgium had not sufficiently assessed “the risk facing the
applicant in the light of the information concerning his state of health
and the existence of appropriate treatment in Georgia”75 the Court
found that there would have been a violation of Article 3 if the applicant
had been forced to return to Georgia.
3. Article 8 Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
López Ostra v. Spain (1994)76
The European Convention does not contain a right to environmental protection, let alone a right to a clean environment. Nevertheless,
the ECtHR accepted the case of the López Ostra family who lived in
Murcia (Spain) in the immediate vicinity of a plant for the treatment of
liquid and solid waste emerging from leather tanning and built with
government subsidies on municipal land. The Spanish courts had found
no violation of the family’s right to physical integrity and the right to
private life and inviolability of the home since the family could have
moved and the impairment of the quality of life of the family by
noxious fumes “was not serious enough to infringe the fundamental
rights recognised in the [Spanish] Constitution.”77 The ECtHR
disagreed. Although the Spanish authorities were not directly
responsible for the emissions, they had allowed the plant to be built on
public land and subsidized the construction. When the emissions
exceeded permitted levels, the local authorities had failed to take the
necessary steps to bring the violations to an end and had resisted
74.
75.
76.
77.

Paposhvili v. Belgium, supra note 70, at ¶¶ 188-91 (emphasis added).
Id. at ¶ 205.
López Ostra v. Spain, No. 16789/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994).
Id. at ¶ 50.
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judicial decisions to that effect.78 As a result, the State “did not succeed
in striking a fair balance between the interests of the town’s economic
well-being – that of having a waste treatment plant – and the applicant’s
effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her home and her private
and family life” as protected by Article 8 of the Convention.79 The
notion that pollution of the immediate environment can cause a
violation of everyone’s “right to respect for his private and family
life, [and] his home . . .” has since been confirmed on multiple
occasions.80
In other cases, the ECtHR used Article 8 to mandate a right to
divorce or at least judicial separation,81 expand the protection of “illegitimate”82 and adopted children,83 non-custodial parents,84 unmarried

78. See id. at ¶ 56.
79. See id. at ¶ 58.
80. See, e.g., Guerra and Others v. Italy, Application No. 116/1996/735/932, Judgment of
19 February 1998; Taşkin and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 46117/99, Judgment of 10
November 2004; Fadeyeva v. Russia, Application No. 55732/00, Judgment of 9 June 2005;
Giacomelli v. Italy, Application No. 59909/00, Judgment of 2 November 2006; Tătar v. Romania, Application No. 67021/01, Judgment of 27 January 2009; and more recently Dzemyuk v.
Ukraine, Application No. 42488/02, Judgment of 4 September 2014. Instructive also the forceful
joint dissent by Judges Costa, Ress, Türmen, Zupančič and Steiner in Hatton v. United Kingdom,
Application No. 36022/97, Judgment of 8 July 2003 (concerning noise emissions near Heathrow
Airport).
81. See Airey v. Ireland, No. 6289/73, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1979), at ¶ 33.
82. The leading case is Marckx v. Belgium, No. 6833/74, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1979). It established the principle that parents of children born out of wedlock cannot be treated differently
under the law compared to married couples with children. See id. at ¶ 31.
83. One of several landmark decisions of the ECtHR held that the best interest of the child
may override the rights of the parents in certain circumstances and that the wishes of the child
have to be taken into account in adoption cases. The Court formulated the principle that
“adoption means providing a child with a family, not a family with a child”. See Pini and Others
v. Romania, No. 78028/01 ¶¶ 149-66 and No. 78030/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), in particular at ¶
156 (referencing to the decision in Fretté v. France, No. 36515/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002)). For
comprehensive analysis see COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN LAW RELATING
TO THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (2015), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook_rights_child_ENG.PDF.
84. See, e.g., Anayo v. Germany, No. 20578/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) at ¶¶ 59-62;
Schneider v. Germany, No. 17080/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) at ¶ 88.
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heterosexual couples,85 same-sex partners,86 transgender persons,87 and
refugees or asylum seekers claiming a right to family reunion.88 Unsurprisingly, not all of these decisions have been universally welcomed in
the Contracting Parties.89
4. Articles 9, 10, 11 ECHR and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 – Political
Activities, Interferences “Necessary in a Democratic Society” and
Meeting a “Pressing Social Need”
Refah Partisi v. Turkey (2003)90
Article 9 protects the freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
Article 10 guarantees the freedom of expression, including the freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and share information and ideas without
interference by the authorities. Article 11 secures the freedom of
peaceful assembly and the freedom of association. Article 3 of the First
Protocol mandates free elections by secret ballot. Refah Partisi or “the
Welfare Party” was founded in Turkey in 1983 and took part in
elections at various levels in Turkey from 1989. As of 1991, it was
represented in the Turkish Parliament and its MPs took part in the work
of parliamentary committees. In the 1995 elections, Refah won more
seats than any other party and on June 28, 1996, it became part of a
coalition government. The rise of the party in Turkish politics seemed
unstoppable. However, on May 21, 1997, an application was filed with
85. In K. and T. v. Finland, the Court held that “that the existence or non-existence of
‘family life’ is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of
close personal ties.” See K and T v. Finland, No. 25702/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
86. See Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, No. 29381/09 and 32684/09, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2013).
87. See B. v. France, No. 13343/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992) (finding a violation of Art. 8 due
to non-recognition a person’s true sexual identity).
88. See, e.g., Abdulazis, Cabales and Balkandali v. UK, No. 9214/80, 9473/81, and
9474/81, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1985); Berrehab v. Netherlands, No. 10730/84, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988).
89. See, e.g., CARMEN DRAGHICI, THE LEGITIMACY OF FAMILY RIGHTS IN STRASBOURG
CASE LAW – ‘LIVING INSTRUMENT’ OR EXTINGUISHED SOVEREIGNTY? (2017).
90. Refah Partisi v. Tukey, No. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, and 41344/98, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2003). For background information and analysis see MICHAEL D. GOLDHABER, A
PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 88-97 (2007).
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the Turkish Constitutional Court to have Refah dissolved because it
promoted Islamic fundamentalism in contradiction to the constitutional
principle of secularism. In its defense before the Constitutional Court,
Refah invoked the ECHR and claimed that its dissolution “was not
prompted by a pressing social need and was not necessary in a
democratic society.”91 This was a reference to the ECtHR judgment of
January 30, 1998 in the case of United Communist Party of Turkey and
Others v. Turkey (1998).92 The TBKP was specifically representing the
interests of the Kurdish people in Turkey and was dissolved
immediately after being formed. This was found to be a violation of
Article 11 since Turkey could not show that the TBKP had sought
anything other than “a peaceful, democratic and fair solution of the
Kurdish problem, so that the Kurdish and Turkish peoples may live
together of their free will within the borders of the Turkish Republic,
on the basis of equal rights and with a view to democratic restructuring
founded on their common interests.”93 In particular, the TBKP had
never advocated violence or an overthrow of the political and
constitutional system of Turkey.
With regard to Refah, however, the ECtHR was presented with a
large number of speeches and statements made by members of the
party, which regularly referred to the legitimacy of using force on the
road toward establishment of an Islamic theocracy. In contrast to its
decision regarding the TBKP, therefore, the Court concluded with
regard to:
the question whether there was a pressing social need for the
interference . . . in the present case, the Court finds that the acts
and speeches of Refah’s members and leaders cited by the
Constitutional Court were imputable to the whole of the party, that
those acts and speeches revealed Refah’s long-term policy of
setting up a regime based on sharia within the framework of a
plurality of legal systems and that Refah did not exclude recourse
to force in order to implement its policy and keep the system it
91. Id. at ¶ 14.
92. United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, No. 19392/92, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1998).
93. See Partisi, supra note 90, at ¶ 56.
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envisaged in place. In view of the fact that these plans were
incompatible with the concept of a ‘democratic society’ and that
the real opportunities Refah had to put them into practice made the
danger to democracy more tangible and more immediate, the
penalty imposed on the applicants by the Constitutional Court,
even in the context of the restricted margin of appreciation left to
Contracting States, may reasonably be considered to have met a
‘pressing social need.’94

5. The Margin of Appreciation
Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976)95
The applicant, Richard Handyside, published The Little Red
Schoolbook on sex education for children of twelve years and older in
the United Kingdom in 1971. It was reviewed with mixed results in the
press and after complaints were received, a warrant was issued under
Section 3 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959/64, the premises of Mr.
Handyside’s publishing house were searched, and some 1,000 copies
of the book were seized. After unsuccessful domestic remedies were
exhausted, the applicant brought the case to Strasbourg and claimed a
violation of Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and belief),
Article 10 (freedom of expression), as well as Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 (peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions).
The ECtHR ruled:
48. . . . [t]hat the machinery of protection established by the
Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding
human rights . . . . The Convention leaves to each Contracting
State, in the first place, the task of securing the rights and liberties
it enshrines. The institutions created by it make their own contribution to this task but they become involved only through
contentious proceedings and once all domestic remedies have been
exhausted [Art. 35(1)]. These observations apply, notably, to [Art.
10(2)]. In particular, it is not possible to find in the domestic law
of the various Contracting States a uniform European conception
of morals. The view taken by their respecttive laws of the
requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to
place, especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and
94. Id. at ¶ 132 (emphasis added).
95. Handyside v. United Kingdom, No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1976).
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far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By reason of
their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position
than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content
of these requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’
or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them. . . . Consequently, [Art. 10(2)]
leaves to the Contracting States a margin of appreciation. This
margin is given both to the domestic legislator (‘prescribed by
law’) and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called
upon to interpret and apply the laws in force . . . .
49. Nevertheless, [Art. 10(2)] does not give the Contracting States
an unlimited power of appreciation. The Court, which . . . is
responsible for ensuring the observance of those States’
engagements (Article 19) . . . is empowered to give the final ruling
on whether a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ is reconcilable with freedom
of expression as protected by [Art. 10]. The domestic margin of
appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision.
Such supervision concerns both the aim of the measure challenged
and its ‘necessity’; it covers not only the basic legislation but also
the decision applying it, even one given by an independent court.96

Although the book was freely available in certain other countries,
the Court in the end followed the majority of the Commission of
Human Rights and found no violation of Article 10 ECHR or Article 1
of the First Protocol by the United Kingdom. A minority of the Commission and one dissenting judge found the measures of the United
Kingdom to be disproportionate.
Handyside illustrates how the ECtHR uses the margin of appreciation to allow for differences in human rights protection between
different Contracting Parties, albeit within limits and under the supervision of the Strasbourg organs. This approach has received both praise
and criticism in the literature.97
96. See id. at ¶¶ 48-49 (emphasis added).
97. Lord Hoffmann complains that:
[t]he Strasbourg court has to a limited extent recognised the fact that while
human rights are universal at the level of abstraction, they are national at the
level of application. It has done so by the doctrine of the ‘margin of appreciation’, an unfortunate Gallicism by which Member States are allowed a certain
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latitude to differ in their application of the same abstract right. Clearly, that is a
step in the right direction. But there is no consistency in the application of this
doctrine and [...] I do not think that there is a proper understanding of the
principle upon which it should be based. In practice, the Court has not taken the
doctrine of the margin of appreciation nearly far enough. It has been unable to
resist the temptation to aggrandise its jurisdiction and to impose uniform rules
on Member States. It considers itself the equivalent of the Supreme Court of the
United States, laying down a federal law of Europe.
See Lord Hoffman, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture: The Universality of Human Rights,
(Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/biij/BIIJ2013/hoffmann.pdf. See also YUTAKA ARAI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (2001); Eyal
Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 NYU J. INT’L L.
& POL. 843 (1998); Marc Bossuyt, Rechterlijk Activisme in Straatsburg, RECHTSKUNDIG
WEEKBLAD 723-33 (2014); Steven Greer, The Interpretation of the European Convention on
Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin of Appreciation?, 3 UCL HUM. RTS. REV. 1
(2010); ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW – DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY (2012); George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin
of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 705, 705-32 (2006); Aileen McHarg: Reconciling
Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 62 MODERN L. REV. 671, 671-96
(1999); Dean Spielmann, Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and
the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?,
14 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 381, 381-418 (2012). Specifically for the view that the
doctrine is giving too much leeway, see Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, COLUM. J.
EUR. L.. 113, 113-50 (2005); Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin: From Discretion to Scrutiny:
Revisiting the Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 625, 625-49 (2001); Loukis G.
Loucaides, Reflections of a Former European Court of Human Rights Judge on his Experiences
as a Judge, ROMA RIGHTS (2010), available at: http://www.errc.org/article/roma-rights-1-2010implementation-of-judgments/3613/8; James A. Sweeney, Margins of Appreciation: Cultural
Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 54 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 459, 459-74 (2005). See also Thomas Willoughby Stone, Note, Margin of
Appreciation Gone Awry: The European Court of Human Rights’ Implicit Use of the
Precautionary Principle in Fretté v. France to Backtrack on Protection from Discrimination on
the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 271 (2003/04) (the Note justly criticizes
the Court for caving into political pressure with regard to unproven risks associated with
adoption by homosexual individuals or same-sex couples); E.B. v. France, No. 43546/02, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2008); see also Jan Kratochvil, The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the
European Court of Human Rights, 29 NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS., 324, 324-57 (2011) (taking a
differentiated approach, accepting the need for a margin of appreciation while being critical of
its use in some instances. He suggests criteria for predictable and consistent use).
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6. The Pilot Judgment Procedure
Broniowski v. Poland (2005)98
During WWII, the eastern provinces of Poland were invaded by
the Soviet Union and later became part of Belarus, Ukraine and
Lithuania. In 1944, Poland entered into agreements with the former
Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, recognizing the
present-day borders and undertaking “to compensate persons who were
‘repatriated’ from the ‘territories beyond the Bug River’ and had to
abandon their property there.”99 It was estimated that about 1.25
million people were “repatriated” from these territories and that the
vast majority of them had been compensated for their loss of property.
However, by the time Poland became a member of the Council of
Europe (November 26, 1991), the ECHR entered into force for Poland
(January 19, 1993), and the First Protocol entered into force for Poland
(October 10, 1994), some 78,000 individuals or families had not been
fully or adequately compensated. Many of them, including the
Broniowski family, were still pursuing their right to compensation in
the Polish courts and some took their cases as far as the ECtHR in
Strasbourg. In January 2004, a law entered into force in Poland pursuant to which individuals who had received at least partial compensation could no longer bring any claims and that any remaining claims
would be capped at 50,000 PLN (about US$12 thousand in 2017). The
Broniowski family was among the excluded parties because they had
received about two percent of the estimated value of the property
formerly owned by them in the respective territories.
The ECtHR first made an important decision about the temporal
application of the Convention: from the entry into force of the ECHR
and any of its protocols for a particular State, the Court has jurisdiction
ratione temporis over all acts and omissions of that State.100 It
continued as follows:
124. While the historical background of the case, including the
post-war delimitations of State borders, the resultant migration of
persons affected by those events and the Republican Agreements,
98. Broniowski v. Poland, No. 31443/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
99. Id. at ¶ 11.
100. See id. at ¶¶ 122-23.
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in which the applicant’s entitlement to compensation originated . .
. is certainly important for the understanding of the complex legal
and factual situation obtaining today, the Court will not consider
any legal, moral, social, financial or other obligations of the Polish
State arising from the fact that owners of property beyond the Bug
River were dispossessed and forced to migrate by the Soviet Union
after the Second World War. In particular, it will not deal with the
issue whether Poland’s obligation under the Republican
Agreements [of 1944] to return to those persons the value of the
property abandoned in the former Soviet republics might have any
bearing on the scope of the applicant’s right under domestic
legislation and under the Convention and whether Poland
honoured the obligations it had taken upon itself by virtue of those
Agreements.
125. The sole issue before the Court is whether Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was violated by reason of the Polish State’s acts and
omissions in relation to the implementation of the applicant’s
entitlement to compensatory property, which was vested in him by
Polish legislation [after] the date of the Protocol’s entry into force
and which subsisted on 12 March 1996, the date on which he
lodged his application with the Commission.101

Having established the applicability of the Convention to the law
of 2004, pursuant to which many claims were either rejected or capped,
the Court acknowledged that the complexity of the matter and the
“significant economic impact for the country as a whole” justify “a
wide margin of appreciation” and “stringent limitations on compensation for the Bug River claimants.”102 Nevertheless, “the Polish State
has not been able to adduce satisfactory grounds justifying, in terms of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the extent to which it has continuously
failed over many years to implement an entitlement conferred on the
applicant, as on thousands of other Bug River claimants, by Polish
legislation.”103
Finally, in an effort of preventing thousands of claims from being
brought to the Strasbourg organs, the Court demanded that Poland
should adopt a new compensation scheme for all remaining individuals
and families:
193. The Court has already noted that the violation which it has
found in the present case has as its cause a situation concerning
101. Id. at ¶¶ 124-25 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at ¶¶ 182-83.
103. Id. at ¶ 183.
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large numbers of people. The failure to implement in a manner
compatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the chosen mechanism
for settling the Bug River claims has affected nearly 80,000 people
[...]. There are moreover already 167 applications pending before
the Court brought by Bug River claimants. This is not only an
aggravating factor as regards the State’s responsibility under the
Convention for an existing or past state of affairs, but also
represents a threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention
machinery. Although it is in principle not for the Court to
determine what remedial measures may be appropriate to satisfy
the respondent State’s obligations under Article 46 of the
Convention, in view of the systemic situation which it has
identified, the Court would observe that general measures at
national level are undoubtedly called for in execution of the
present judgment, measures which must take into account the
many people affected. Above all, the measures adopted must be
such as to remedy the systemic defect underlying the Court’s
finding of a violation so as not to overburden the Convention
system with large numbers of applications deriving from the same
cause.104

After this “pilot” judgment, Poland adopted a new law granting to
all expropriated owners or their heirs compensation up to twenty
percent of the original value of their land. This paved the way for a
friendly settlement with the Broniowski family, entered into before the
ECtHR and included in a second judgment of September 28, 2005.
Commentators differ in their assessment of the extent to which the
pilot judgment procedure can alleviate the caseload of the ECtHR.105

104. Id. at ¶ 193 (emphasis added).
105. See, e.g., Valerio Colandrea, On the Power of the European Court of Human Rights
to Order Specific Non-Monetary Measures: Some Remarks in Light of the Assanidze, Broniowski
and Sejdovic Cases, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 396, 396-411 (2007); Dilek Kurban, Forsaking
Individual Justice: The Implications of the European Court of Human Rights’ Pilot Judgment
Procedure for Victims of Gross and Systematic Violations, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 731, 731-69
(2016); Philip Leach, Helen Hardman & Svetlana Stephenson, Can the European Court’s Pilot
Judgment Procedure Help Resolve Systemic Human Rights Violations? Burdov and the Failure
to Implement Domestic Court Decisions in Russia, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 346, 346-59 (2010);
Costas Paraskeva, Human Rights Protection Begins and Ends at Home: The ‘Pilot Judgment
Procedure’ Developed by the European Court of Human Rights, HUM RTS. COMMENT. (2003),
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However, before we go deeper into questions related to (potential)
reforms at the ECtHR, we will now turn to the European Union and the
protection of human rights provided by the European Court of Justice
in Luxembourg.
III. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION SYSTEM
A. From Treaties to Constitutional Order
European integration as we know it today started in 1951 with the
negotiation and subsequent ratification of the Treaty Establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC-Treaty”).106 By contrast
to many earlier attempts at European integration,107 the model proposed
by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman was based on collaboration of the
European States as equals, including the “arch enemies” France and
Germany. Future wars in Europe were to be made impossible via the
supranationalization of the crucial coal and steel industries and their
submission to the control of a “High Authority” composed of apolitical
technocrats from all participating States. The fact that the ECSC-Treaty
also provided for a parliamentary assembly and a court of justice shows
that the founding fathers did not only have the administration of coal
available
at:
http://beta.nottingham.ac.uk/hrlc/documents/publications/hrlcommentary2007/pilotjudgmentprocedure.pdf.; Stuart Wallace, Much ado about nothing: The Pilot
Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights, 11 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71
(2011); Boštjan M. Zupanĉiĉ, Article 46 Systemic Problems – Application of the ‘Pilot
Judgment’ Procedure, Broniowski v. Poland, in BOŠTJAN M. ZUPANĈIĈ, THE OWLETS OF
MINERVA – HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
501-512 (2012).
106. This Treaty expired after 50 years, as planned, and its provisions were integrated into
the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (“TFEU”). Both of those will be briefly addressed below. The ECSC-Treaty can still be
found at: TREATY CONSTITUTING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY (1951),
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Treaty%20constituting%20the%20European%20Coal%20and%20Steel%20Community.pdf.
107. Foerster documented no fewer than 182 proposals for European integration made
between 1300 and 1946. See ROLF HELLMUT FOERSTER, DIE IDEE EUROPA 1300-1946:
GESCHICHTE EINER POLITISCHEN IDEE, DTV VERLAG (1963). See also Patrick Pasture,
Imagining European Unity Since 1000 AD (2015).
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and steel production in mind.108 In addition to France and Germany, the
Treaty was ratified by Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands.109
While loftier attempts at defense and political cooperation failed
initially,110 the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (“EEC”) and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (“Euratom”) were added in 1957. Although the EECTreaty contained references, inter alia, to the free movement of
workers in the Community,111 prohibited any discrimination on
grounds of nationality,112 mandated “the principle that men and women

108. See, e.g., MERRY BROMBERGER & SERGE BROMBERGER, JEAN MONNET AND THE
UNITED STATES OF EUROPE 95 (1968) (in particular, pages 95 et seq.); JEAN MONNET,
MÉMOIRES 373 (1997).
109. The European Communities operated with six Member States until 1973, when
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined. Greece was admitted in 1981, and Portugal
and Spain in 1986, after a first major overhaul of the founding treaties which created the
possibility of majority voting in certain instances, the so-called Single European Act. In 1995,
Austria, Finland and Sweden joined, bringing the membership up to 15. By then, the perspective
of reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the potential accession of many CEECs to the EU
had become concrete, which necessitated fundamental overhauls in the institutional structure
and decision-making mechanisms of the EU. These were implemented via the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, the 2001 Treaty of Nice, and the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon,
all of which can be accessed at: EU TREATIES (2017), https://europa.eu/europeanunion/law/treaties_en. The reforms paved the way for accession of Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, as well as
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Last but not least, accession of Croatia in 2013 brought the
membership up to the current number of 28 European States. While the UK is potentially
negotiating an exit from the EU, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, The Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, and Turkey are official candidates for accession and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as
well as Kosovo have been recognized as potential candidates. See Emmert & Petrović, supra
note 20, at 1349.
110. See Unofficial English translation of the 1952 European Defense Community Treaty
prepared for the President of the United States, http://aei.pitt.edu/5201/1/5201.pdf. See also
Josef L. Kunz, Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community, 47 Am. J. Int’l L. 275,
275-81 (1953). The draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European [Political] Community
can be accessed via http://www.cvce.eu/obj/draft_treaty_embodying_the_statute_of_the_european_community_strasbourg_10_march_1953-en-807979a3-4147-427e-86b9565a0b917d4f.html. See also Bromberger & Bromberger, op cit., note 108, Chapter IX. The
European Defense Community, pp. 108-121.
111. See Treat Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 48,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
112. See id., arts. 7, 48(2), 65.
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should receive equal pay for equal work,”113 and provided extensive
legislative powers for the Council of Ministers, it did not contain a
general Bill of Rights. This can be explained by the fact that the
Council of Ministers, as the decision-making body of the European
Communities, was composed of delegates from the governments of the
Member States, the latter of which had just ratified and were bound by
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, in addition to their respective national constitutional human
rights provisions.114 Furthermore, the acts adopted by the EC were
considered by the Member States like any other acts of an international
organization and thus without direct applicability and direct effect in
the Member States or, as an American lawyer might call it, they were
not supposed to be self-executing.115
However, the EEC-Treaty provided for a procedure that sets the
European Communities apart from any other international organization. Every other international court in the world, including the International Court of Justice of the UN in the Hague (“ICJ”), and even the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, depends on voluntary
collaboration by the governments of the signatory states for the recognition and implementation of its judgments. A good example how this
works – or rather does not work – is the famous decision of the ICJ in
113. Id., art. 119.
114. As Elizabeth Defeis has pointed out, there was also a perception that human rights
were more appropriately addressed in other fora, such as the United Nations, that had adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention in 1948 and were
working on what was to become the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966. See Elizabeth
Defeis, Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: An Appraisal, 31 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1104, 1105 (2008).
115. The attitude of the Member State governments in this regard is clearly illustrated in
the submissions made to the European Court of Justice in the context of the hearings that led to
the famous judgment in van Gend & Loos, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1. See FRANK EMMERT,
EUROPEAN UNION LAW CASES 14-15 (2007). What is interesting, however, is that the 1953
Draft European Political Community Treaty included the following Article 3: “Les dispositions
du titre I de la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales,
signée à Rome le 4 novembre 1950, ainsi que celles du protocole additionnel, signé à Paris le 20
mars 1952, sont parties intégrantes du présent Statut.” [The provisions of Title I of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . as well as those of the First
Protocol . . . are an integral part of the present Statute.]
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Nicaragua v. United States.116 From 1937 to 1979, Nicaragua was ruled
by the Somoza family, an increasingly corrupt but U.S. friendly
dictatorship. In 1979, a popular uprising brought a socialist movement
to power. The so-called “Sandinistas” took their name from Augusto
César Sandino, the leader of a peasant movement in the 1920s that
opposed the US occupation of Nicaragua and the regime propped up
by it. The Sandinistas were a thorn in the side of the US Government
and a counter-revolutionary force called “the Contras” was first
supported under President Carter and later under President Reagan. In
1984, the Nicaraguan government brought a case against the United
States before the ICJ complaining about financial and other support to
the Contras and direct military involvement by the CIA on its territory.
In 1986, the ICJ ruled that the United States, “by training, arming,
equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise
encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities
in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua,
in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to
intervene in the affairs of another State”.117 The ICJ also found the
United States in breach of various treaty obligations and decided “that
the United States of America is under a duty immediately to cease and
to refrain from all such acts” and “that the United States of America is
under an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua
for all injury caused to Nicaragua”.118
As was to be expected, Nicaragua is waiting to this day for the
reparation payments by the United States. The only tangible outcome
of the judgment was a change in the policy of the US Government
toward the ICJ, which triggered what has been called a general decline
of the World Court.119 Although Article 94(1) of the UN Charter places

116. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), [hereinafter Nicaragua v. US], available at: http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf
117. Id. at ¶ 292(3).
118. Id. at ¶ 292(13).
119. Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice, U Chicago Law &
Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 233 (2004). See also Janina Satzer, Explaining the
Decreased Use of International Courts – The Case of the ICJ, 3 REV. L. ECON. 11 (2007);
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an obligation on all UN member states “to comply with the decisions
of the International Court in any case to which it is a party”, Article
36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice makes it all too
easy for States to ensure that they won’t become parties in a case before
the ICJ in the first place. This provision requires a voluntary declaration
of submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ before a case
can be brought against a State. Prior to the Nicaragua proceedings, the
United States had been subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ via a
declaration of submission from 1946 and a number of bilateral and
multilateral treaties. After 1986, the United States did not renew the
general submission.120
The Nicaragua case is merely an illustration of the general malaise
affecting all international courts and tribunals. Even if they have
jurisdiction and a case cannot be prevented by the defendant state, since
the courts do not have police powers or bailiffs or sheriffs of their own,
their decisions will only be recognized and enforced by a state if the
latter considers it politically opportune to do so. This is not the place to
elaborate on the reasons why states choose to comply with international
court decisions in many cases. Suffice it to say that “tit for tat” and
“naming and shaming” are amongst, if not the most powerful
motivators. Indeed, Louis Henkin coined the famous phrase that most
of the time most of the states actually comply with most of their
obligations. However, this of course also means that every now and
then every state does not. Moreover, the frequency of non-compliance
will be directly correlated to the frequency of embarrassing or costly
decisions being taken by the international courts or tribunals. If a court
only hands down a handful of decisions every year, as it is the case with
the ICJ, non-compliance will not normally be a major issue since the
countries most likely not to comply will already not have deposited a
submission to its jurisdiction in the first place. However, if a court like
the European Court of Justice hands down over 1,000 decisions in a
year, the story could be quite different.
Indeed, the EEC-Treaty did, and its successor, the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) still does provide for a
Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International
Court of Justice, 18 EUR J. INT’L L. 815 (2007).
120. For further analysis see Sean D. Murphy, The United States and the International
Court of Justice: Coping with Antinomies, in THE SWORD AND SCALES: THE UNITED STATES
AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Cesare Romano ed., 2008); Louis B. Sohn,
American Acceptance of the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: Experiences and
Prospects, 19 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 489, 489 (1989).
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number of procedures that result in declaratory judgments like the one
of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. Specifically the procedure by which
Member States can be held accountable, Article 258 TFEU (formerly
Article 169 ECT) can be invoked only by the EU Commission and is
not open to private individuals as plaintiffs. Furthermore, the outcome
is a judgment that is binding but requires voluntary recognition and
enforcement by the Member States. The only remedy for noncompliance is another trip to the European Court of Justice pursuant to
Article 260 TFEU (formerly Article 171 ECT), resulting in another
declaratory judgment which can again be ignored more or less at
will.121 It should be easy to see that repeated problems and resort to the
171/260 procedure will ultimately do more damage to the legitimacy
of the European Court of Justice than to the reputation of the Member
States.122
However, there is another procedure before the European Court
of Justice that functions quite differently. Pursuant to Article 267
TFEU (formerly Article 177 ECT):
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of the Treaties;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions,
bodies, offices or agencies of the Union.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a
Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a
121. Since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the Court has the power
to “specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State” for
non-compliance with the 169/258 decision. This, however, is also just part of a declaratory
judgment and it is not at all clear why a Member State that did not want to comply with its
obligations from the outset and did not comply after a conviction by the Court should now be
willing not only to comply but also to pay a penalty. For further analysis, see L. NEVILLE BROWN
& TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 117-25 (5th ed.)
(2000).
122. The European Parliament receives annual reports about compliance by the Member
States with Arts. 258 and 260 TFEU. The most recent report is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/docs/annual_report_33/com_2016_463_en.pdf. See also FRANK
EMMERT, DER EUROPÄISCHE GERICHTSHOF ALS GARANT DER RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT (1998),
available at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Emmert2.
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decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment,
request the Court to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court
or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no
judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall
bring the matter before the Court . . . 123

The way this so-called preliminary rulings procedure works is as
follows: In any case pending before a national court, either the applicant or the defendant or the court of its own motion raises one or more
question(s) of EU law. For example, if a national of one Member State
(the home state) is living and working in another Member State (the
host state), the question may arise whether she should be able to get tax
benefits from the host state for having a spouse in the home state if the
host state generally grants tax benefits to married couples.124 If the
national court, based on the treaties and secondary legislation of the
European Union and/or well-established case law of the ECJ, is able to
answer the question on its own, it will move ahead and resolve the issue
without involving the European Court. However, if the national court
is unsure or otherwise does not feel able to give judgment without an
authoritative decision by the ECJ on the question(s), it suspends the
proceedings before it and sends the fact files with the question(s) to the
Court in Luxembourg.
At the ECJ, the case is registered much like stand-alone proceedings. The Court opens a round of written proceedings where the
parties submit their briefs, rebuttals and surrebuttals, invites the Commission and the Member States to submit observations, if they wish,
and then schedules an oral hearing. At the hearing, the party representatives present summaries of their arguments, a Commission representative presents the views of the Commission how the case should be
decided in the best interest of the European Union as a whole, and the
judges and the advocate general ask any questions they may have.
Subsequently, the advocate general prepares an opinion suggesting
how the Court should rule and then the judges deliberate and decide
how to answer the question(s). The final decision of the ECJ is handed
down in the form of a judgment but takes a format along the following
lines: “In a case such as this one, the way EU law and specifically
Treaty articles X, Y, and Z and the provisions of Regulation/Directive
123. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267
[hereinafter TFEU] (emphasis added).
124. See Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, Case C-279/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-225.
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. . . should be interpreted is as follows . . . .” This judgment is then sent
back to the national court and the latter resumes its proceedings and
decides the original case in front of it, taking account of the
interpretation of EU law given to it by the ECJ.125
The big and decisive difference to all other international court
procedures is that the final decision on the rights and obligations of the
parties to the dispute is handed down by the national court, i.e. the
national court or judge who made the reference in the first place is now
providing the final remedy or remedies based on the input of the
European Court. While all states can and will ignore an international
court decision from time to time if the political or economic cost is
perceived as too high, no state that claims to follow the rule of law can
afford to ignore a decision of one of its own courts. This would not only
fly in the face of any democratic constitution, it would simply be the
end of the separation of powers and the system of governance and rule
of law as we know it. Since the national judge already voluntarily made
the reference and is generally accustomed to the rule of law and not a
political appointee, she is highly likely to follow the ECJ’s decision in
her own ruling in the case. The only remedy available to the state or
any other opposing party is an appeal to the next higher court in the
respective Member State. That will rarely help, however. After all, the
input from the European Court of Justice is not merely an advisory
opinion or an amicus brief that depends on friendly reception by the
friendly judge who made the reference. The judgment of the ECJ is
binding on the national court and, because it provides an authoritative
interpretation of the relevant EU law for all cases such as the one before
the ECJ, it is also binding on all other courts in that Member State and
in all other Member States of the European Union (erga omnes). This,
of course, also includes the appellate court that might be called upon to
review the decision of the first national judge or court. To be sure, the
appellate court could call upon the ECJ a second time if it does not
125. There are many and many good publications about the European Court of Justice and
the preliminary rulings procedure. See, for example, MORTEN BROBERG & NIELS FENGER:
PRELIMINARY REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (2d ed.) (2014); KOEN
LENAERTS, IGNACE MASELIS & KATHLEEN GUTMAN, EU PROCEDURAL LAW 48-106, 215-49,
456-79, 783-97 (2015).
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agree with the first decision. However, the European Court has
generally taken the approach that a second reference in the same case
is admissible only if new facts are presented and not merely because a
national judge or court did not like the first answer provided by the
ECJ.126
Furthermore, since the ECJ provides an interpretation of the EU
rules and does not decide a particular case or remedy, that interpretation
in principle applies retroactively to the EU rules in question (ex tunc).
A beautiful illustration of this principle was provided by the German
beer dispute.
1. Erga Omnes Effect and Retroactivity of ECJ Judgments
The German Beer Purity Law, Case 178/84127
As some readers may know, Germany has upheld the so-called
Bavarian Beer Purity Law (“Reinheitsgebot”) since it was first adopted
in 1516 to cut down on the widespread adulteration practice at the time
where “beer” was stretched via the addition of other ingredients.
Pursuant to the beer purity law, only water, malt (from barley or wheat),
hops, and yeast must be used in the production of beer. This excludes
both other natural ingredients such as rice or corn, as well as flavor
additives like fruit juice or caramel, and it excludes chemical
ingredients like preservatives.
The French brewery Fischer (Brasserie du Pêcheur), based in
Strasbourg, had traditionally sold some of its products across the Rhine
to German customers. However, as of 1981, the German authorities
enforced the beer purity law and prevented further exports of Fischer
beer to Germany. Whether pursuant to a complaint made by Fischer or
others or of its own motion, the European Commission initiated Article
258 proceedings against Germany for preventing the importation and
distribution of beer from other Member States. Germany,
unsuccessfully, claimed that additions could cause health concerns in a
country where more beer is consumed per capita than, for example, in
France. The argument failed not only because Germany was unable to
126. See Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft GmbH & Co. v Federal Republic of Germany,
Case 69/85, [1986] E.C.R. 947, ¶¶ 10-16.
127. Judgment of 12 March 1987, Case 178/84 Commission v. Federal Republic of
Germany, [1987] E.C.R. 1227.
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demonstrate real health issues with the ingredients in the French beer.
It also did not object to the same ingredients if they were added to other
food or beverages. In the end, the European Court of Justice held that
Germany could require adequate labeling of all ingredients but could
not prevent the importation and sale as “beer” of products lawfully
made and/or marketed as such in other Member States. Hence, after the
1987 judgment, Fischer was able to rebuild its marketing connections
in Germany.
Several years later, in a completely unconnected case, the European Court of Justice held for the first time that “the Member States are
obliged to make good loss and damage caused to individuals by
breaches of Community law for which they can be held responsible.”
This landmark judgment of November 19, 1991 in Joined Cases C-6/90
and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic128 caused quite
a stir in the European Union and has since proven to be one of the most
important enforcement tools for EU law. It also reached the lawyers
who initially represented the Fischer brewery. Aware of the temporal
effects of decisions by the ECJ, they now brought a case against
Germany for damages suffered by their client during the years 1981 to
1987 when no beer could be sold in Germany. The time line here is of
great importance! The Fischer lawyers were bringing a case in 1992 for
damages suffered between 1981 and 1987, using the retroactivity of a
judgment of the European Court of 1991. And they won! In Joined
Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie Pêcheur and Factortame, the
ECJ held on March 5, 1996 that in a case such as this one, the Member
State – Germany – had to compensate a foreign manufacturer or trader
– the Fischer brewery – for losses suffered prior to the Francovich
decision due to the enforcement of national law – the beer purity law –
in contravention to the free movement of goods in the European
Union.129

128. See Fvrancovich and Others v. Italian Republic, Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, [1991]
E.C.R. I-5403. In many respects, the Francovich decision does the opposite of the US Supreme
Court decision in Alden v. Maine 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Based on the Eleventh Amendment of
the US Constitution, the several states enjoy sovereign immunity from being sued in federal
court. Pursuant to their own constitutions, they may also enjoy sovereign immunity from being
sued in their own courts. In Alden v. Maine the Supreme Court held that the US Congress cannot
rely on Article I of the Constitution to subject non-consenting states to private law suits for
damages in their own courts.
129. See Brasserie Pecheur and Factorame, Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, [1996] E.C.R. I1029.
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2. The Direct Effect or Self-Executing Nature of EU Law
Van Gend en Loos, Case 26/62
The importance of the Article 267 preliminary rulings procedure
is hard to over-estimate. Long before the beer and Member State
liability cases, the European Court used references by national courts
to establish supremacy and direct effect of EU law.
As early as 1963, the European Court held in Case 26/62 van
Gend & Loos that:
. . . the Community constitutes a new legal order of international
law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign
rights, albeit with limited fields, and the subjects of which
comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community
law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is
also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of
their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are
expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations
which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon
individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the
institutions of the Community.130

Therefore, provisions of the treaties, as long as they are clear and
precise, unconditional, and objectively suitable to be applied directly
and without implementation by further legislative or administrative
acts of the Member States, “produce direct effects in the legal relationship between Member States and their subjects.”131 The Court later
expanded this to provisions contained in regulations132 and decisions133
of the European Union. The direct effect of provisions in directives is
a bit more complicated because directives are not originally intended
to produce effects without legislative implementation by the Member
130. See Van Gend & Loos, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, at 12-13 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. See Politi, Case 43/71, [1971] E.C.R. 1039, at 1048; see also Marimex, Case 84/71,
[1972] E.C.R. 89, at 96.
133. See Grad, Case 9/70, [1970] E.C.R. 825, at p. 837; Haselhorst, Case 23/70, [1970]
E.C.R. 881, at 893.
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States. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently held since 1974 that
provisions in directives can produce direct effects at least in vertical
cases between a Member State authority and an individual, if the
Member State has failed to implement the directive on time and in a
complete and correct manner into national law and has thus deprived
the individual from the possibility of relying on EU conforming
national law.134
3. Supremacy of EU Law Over National Law
Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64
Having thus established the direct effect or self-executing nature
of almost all provisions of EU law in almost all possible constellations,
the Court was also confronted with the question of hierarchy of norms
if a provision of directly effective EU law should conflict with a
provision of national law. Neither the EU Treaties themselves nor the
constitutions of the original Member States (with the exception of the
Netherlands) contain specific rules for the hierarchy between EU law
and national law in case of conflict. Therefore, at least from the point
of view of the majority of the Member States, the hierarchy would
normally be determined by collision rules contained in national
constitutional law and applicable to international agreements in general. These types of collision rules typically place international agreements on the same level as federal or national legislation, since they are
134. The vertical direct effect of directives in relations between individuals and public
authorities was established in the Judgment of 4 December 1974. See van Duyn, Case 41/74,
[1974] E.C.R. 1337, ¶¶ 9-15; See also Ratti, Case 148/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629, ¶¶ 18-24; Becker,
Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, ¶¶ 17-25. Up to now, the ECJ has denied a similar horizontal effect
of directives in relations between private individuals in order to protect legal certainty and the
good faith reliance of one private party on the outdated national laws. See Marshall, Case 152/84,
[1986] E.C.R. 723, ¶ 48. In such cases, where one private party relies on an unimplemented or
poorly implemented directive and the other private party relies on the outdated national law,
there is an obligation on the Member State courts, whenever the national law is open to
interpretation, to achieve the results mandated by the directive via conforming interpretation of
the national law. See Marleasing, Case C-106/89, [1990] E.C.R. I-4135. Finally, if such an
indirect application of the directive is not possible, the private party claiming rights under an EU
directive that has not been implemented by a Member State on time or in a complete and correct
manner is directed toward liability of that Member State for its failure to transpose the directive.
See, e.g., Faccini Dori, Case C-91/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-3325, ¶ 27. For comprehensive analysis
see Emmert, Horizontale Drittwirkung von Richtlinien? Lieber ein Ende mit Schrecken als ein
Schrecken ohne Ende!, EUROPÄISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERRECHT (1992) at 56-67,
available at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Emmert2.
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normally approved and/or implemented by a legislative act of parliament. In general, therefore, international agreements are below the
national constitution (unless they were ratified via a constitutional
amendment) and in particular the structural core of the national constitution, including the bill of rights. International agreements usually
have priority over older federal or national legislation, according to the
principle lex posterior derogat legi priori. According to the same
principle, however, subsequent federal or national laws have priority
over older international agreements (because they are legi posteriori).
Therefore, newer national laws may regulate an issue differently from
older treaties and cause a breach of the international obligations
towards other signatories of the international agreements. Whether a
collision exists between an international agreement and a provision of
national law is often a matter of interpretation and the interpretation of
international agreements for purposes of domestic application – or the
complete denial of domestic application because a treaty is supposedly
not self-executing, i.e. not directly applicable – is, as a matter of course,
under the exclusive and final authority of the national courts. Finally,
as we have outlined above, international law does not have very good
tools for ensuring compliance and often has to rely on “tit for tat” and
“naming and shaming” to achieve a minimum level of recognition by
states with different national laws and interests.135
The problem in the European Union, whenever the interpretation
or application of a rule is left to the Member States, is the inevitable
divergence of national laws and interpretations and, as a consequence,
differences of application of the law across twenty-eight Member
States. This not only creates legal uncertainty for anyone wishing to
buy or sell goods or services across Member State borders. It also
causes discrimination between nationals from different Member States.
The European Union and its Court of Justice, therefore, had a keen
interest not only to declare EU law directly effective, hence accessible,
in the Member States but also to establish its supremacy over
contradictory national laws. The landmark decision to achieve this
effect was Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, a judgment of July 15, 1964. The
Court ruled that:

135. See FRANK EMMERT, EUROPARECHT 137-65 (1996). A shorter English translation
can be found in a draft chapter of a future English version of my textbook at:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265842413_Chapter_5_Fundamental_Principles_of_EU_Law_Draft.
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[b]y creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and
capacity of representation on the international plane and, more
particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community,
the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit
within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which
binds both their nationals and themselves. The integration into the
laws of each Member State of provisions which derive from the
Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the
Treaty, make it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord
precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal
system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure
cannot therefore be inconsistent with that legal system. The
executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to
another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without
jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty set out
in Article [3 TEU] and giving rise to the discrimination prohibited
by Article [9 TEU and 10 TFEU]. The obligations undertaken
under the Treaty establishing the Community would not be
unconditional, but merely contingent, if they could be called in
question by subsequent legislative acts of the signatories. . . . It
follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the
Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its
special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal
provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its
character as Community law and without the legal basis of the
Community itself being called into question.136

Thus, via the preliminary rulings procedure under Article 267
TFEU, the European Court of Justice co-opts the national courts into
implementing EU law in the Member States. Compliance with the
judgments of the supranational court becomes a question of law instead
of politics.137
136. Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, at 593-94 (emphasis added).
137. To this day, the best analysis of the phenomenon is, at least in the views of the present
authors, a 1991 article by Joe Weiler. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe,
100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991). Careful study of this landmark analysis is highly recommended to
anyone seriously interested in understanding European integration.
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B. A Constitution Without a Bill of Rights
Although Costa v. ENEL initially established the supremacy of
EU law only for a conflict between the founding treaties of the European Union and ordinary subsequent legislation of a Member State, the
Court soon expanded this to a general supremacy of all EU law over all
Member State law.138 Unsurprisingly, this did not go down well with
everyone in the Member States. Resistance did not come primarily
from the governments of the Member States, however. Since EU law,
back in the day, was essentially adopted by the Council of Ministers
with mere “consultation” of the European Parliament, and in the
Council of Ministers the Member States either had to find a consensus
or at least usually did, the governments were not worried about
unwelcome interference by EU law in their domestic business. Quite to
the contrary, it soon became a common strategy for Member State
governments who struggled to accomplish certain legislative projects
at home, often because they did not have a sufficient majority in their
own parliament or because of powerful opposition by national interest
groups, to move the issue to the European level and legislate there
instead. To the extent the Treaties did not provide clear legal bases for
such legislation, the Member States could draw on Article 352 TFEU
(formerly Article 235 EEC-Treaty = Article 308 EC-Treaty), the
competence for unforeseen cases. The only safeguard against abuse in
that Article was the requirement of unanimity or consensus among the
Member States. As long as some Member States wanted to regulate a
matter on the European level and the others were not strongly opposed,
the principle of “you scratch my back [this time] and I’ll scratch yours
[next time]” went surprisingly far in the Council.139 The European
Parliament did not have the power to stop expansive legislation and
138. See, e.g., Simmenthal II, Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629.
139. For additional analysis see Frank Emmert, Auswertung der gesetzgeberischen
Aktivität der EU vom 1. Januar 1992 bis zum 30. Juni 1998, in STAATSRECHTLICHE AUSWIRKUNGEN EINER MITGLIEDSCHAFT IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION 263-305 (Andreas Kellerhals,
Andreas Auer, Bertil Cottier, & Frank Emmert, eds., 1999), available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259893687_Auswertung_der_gesetzgeberischen_Tatigkeit_der_EU_zur_Abschatzung_der_Stellung_der_Schweiz_in_Rat_und_Pa
rlament_der_EU_nach_einem_Beitritt.

1100 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:4

also did not have the interest to do so because it was never meant to
look after Member State prerogatives. And the national parliaments, at
least for a couple of years, barely understood what was going on.140
The resistance against supremacy and direct effect of EU law
came initially and strongly from the national supreme courts. With their
mandate to ensure compliance with national constitutions, and in
particular their respective bills of rights, the national supreme courts
did not at all appreciate the coming to life of a supranational body that
claimed supremacy and direct effect for its legislative work, yet was
not bound to respect specific rights and freedoms of its subjects and
other affected parties. As a reminder, the European Union itself was
not and still is not a member of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the EU Treaties did not at the
time contain a catalog of human rights and fundamental freedoms
either. Thus, at least in theory, the Member State governments could
have used the detour via the European Union not only to avoid political
resistance in their home states but also to avoid legal scrutiny by their
own constitutional guardians. The result was a veritable rebellion by
several national supreme courts against the supremacy and direct effect
of EU law and the monopoly of the European Court of Justice to decide
upon its validity and interpretation.141 The German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) probably delivered the most iconic statement
when it held in a judgment of May 29, 1974 in Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide
und Futtermittel that it would accept complaints alleging a violation of
German constitutional guarantees by EU law, as interpreted by the
European Court of Justice “so long as . . . the Community lacked a bill
of fundamental rights enacted by a parliament, whose substance was
140. The notable exception here is the Danish Folketing. See David Arter, The Folketing
and Denmark’s ‘European Policy’: The Case of an ‘Authorising Assembly’, in NATIONAL
PARLIAMENTS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 110-23 (Philip Norton ed., 1999), as well as the
other contributions in the same volume.
141. See, in particular, the judgment of the French Conseil d’Etat of 1 March 1968 in
Semoules de France (No. 62814, Receuil Lebon); the judgment of the Belgian Cour de Cassation
of 21 May 1971 in Fromagerie “Le Ski” (Journal des Tribunaux 1971, at 460, and [1972] CMLR
330); and the judgment of the Italian Corte Costituzionale of 27 December 1973 in Frontini
([1974] 2 CMLR 372).
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(a) comparable to the catalog of fundamental rights contained in the
Constitution of the Federal Republic and (b) reliably and
unambiguously fixed for the future.”142 The decision gained instant
fame under its German nickname “Solange I” (so long as . . . ).143
The problem with national review of EU law is not so much the
fact that EU law will be subjected to a review of conformity with
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The problem is that such a
review undertaken in twenty-eight different Member States will not
only cast endless uncertainty over the applicability of the rules, until
each and every national supreme court with an interest in the matter has
spoken. It will also, at least potentially, yield twenty-eight different
results.
C. The Invention of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order
1. Human Rights as General Principles of EU Law
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case 11/70144
The European Court of Justice decided to meet the challenge to
its doctrines of supremacy and direct effect head on. As early as November 1969, it held in a case about privacy that EU rules had to be
interpreted in a way that would prevent them from “prejudicing the
fundamental rights enshrined in the general principles of Community
law and protected by the Court.”145 Shortly thereafter, in December
1970, the Court had an occasion to explain the general principles
approach. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft was simultaneously
142. BVerfG BvL 52/71 (emphasis added). The judgment was delivered in German. The
present translation is taken from THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
AND NATIONAL LAW: THE CASES 419-23 (Andrew Oppenheimer ed., 1994).
143. Id.
144. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125.
145. Stauder, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419, at 425. In earlier cases, before the national
challenges to the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, the European Court had not been
nearly as open minded about the protection of fundamental rights. See e.g., Sgarlata v.
Commission, Case 40/64, [1965] E.C.R. 215. The applicant claimed if he would be denied
standing under the old Art. 173 (now Art. 263 TFEU), “individuals would thus be deprived of
all protection by the courts both under Community law and under national law, which would be
contrary to the fundamental principles governing all Member States” (at p. 227, emphasis
added). The answer of the ECJ was curt, however: “these considerations, which will not be
discussed here, cannot be allowed to override the clearly restrictive wording of Article 173” id.
(emphasis added). Since the ECJ did not want to discuss the problem of denial of justice at the
EU and the national level, we will have to return to the matter below.
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moving up in the national court hierarchy and was the same case that
eventually triggered the notorious “Solange I” decision of the German
Constitutional Court mentioned above. The European Court discussed
the question of protection of fundamental rights in the Community
legal system as follows:
(3) Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order
to judge the validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the
Community would have an adverse effect on the uniformity and
efficacy of Community law. The validity of such measures can only
be judged in the light of Community law. In fact, the law stemming
from the Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot because of
its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law
and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called in
question. Therefore the validity of a Community measure or its
effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that
it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the
constitution of that state or the principles of a national
constitutional structure.
(4) However, an examination should be made as to whether or not
any analogous guarantee inherent in Community law has been
disregarded. In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an
integral part of the general principles of law protected by the
Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must
be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of
the Community. It must therefore be ascertained, in the light of the
doubts expressed by the Verwaltungsgericht, whether the system
of deposits has infringed rights of a fundamental nature, respect
for which must be ensured in the Community legal system.146

After analyzing “the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States”, the Court went on to find that the respective EU
regulation had not infringed fundamental rights of EU law. As a result,
the corresponding decision of the German Verwaltungsgericht was
146. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, ¶¶ 3 and 4 (emphasis added). For the fascinating
story of how the French Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Court) dealt in a similar manner
with the lack of a bill of rights in the French Constitution of 1958 during much the same time,
see Bruno de Witte, The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection
of Human Rights, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 859, 865 (Philip Alston, ed., 1999). Although
de Witte does not have direct evidence, his speculation that the French, German, and EU
constitutional courts were acutely aware of each other’s decisions is more than plausible.
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appealed and the case eventually reached the German Constitutional
Court.
2. Human Rights Found in Treaties Ratified by the Member States
Nold, Case 4/73147
Just days before the BVerG ruled, the European Court reinforced
its evolving doctrine of fundamental rights protection with the Nold
decision:
(13) As the court has already stated, fundamental rights form an
integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of
which it ensures.
In safeguarding these rights, the court is bound to draw inspiration
from constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and
it cannot therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with
fundamental rights recognized and protected by the constitutions
of those states.
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights
on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they
are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed
within the framework of Community law.
The submissions of the applicant must be examined in the light of
these principles.148

What is remarkable in Nold is the fact that the Court states that it
cannot uphold EU measures if they are incompatible with fundamental
rights in the Member State constitutions. Also, there is a first hint that
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms may be taken into account when assessing the scope of fundamental rights protection at the level of the EU institutions. Although
the ECHR had entered into force already in 1953 and five out of the six
founding Member States of the European Union were bound as of 1954
or 1955, it was not until May 3, 1974 that the ECHR became binding
for France.
Nevertheless, as we have already seen, the BVerfG, on May 29,
1974, was not (yet) convinced of the system of protection of fundamental rights in EU law. Two things should not be misunderstood about
147. Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491
148. Ibid., ¶ 13 (emphasis added).
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the Solange I decision, however. First, the very language of the German
court left the door open for the possibility that at some point in time,
the system at the EU level would be sufficiently developed so that
(potential) national review would be no longer necessary. Second, the
German court did not disagree with the assessment of fundamental
rights by the European Court in the specific case. It also found that the
rights of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft had not been unduly
infringed upon. It merely stated that it would, for the time being,
reserve the right to review the matter of compatibility with national
guarantees of fundamental rights on a case-by-case basis.
3. Human Rights Protection Inspired by the ECHR
Hauer, Case 44/79149
While the damocles sword of (potential) review at the national
level kept hanging over the European Court of Justice, hence the threat
to the uniformity of EU law across the Member States, and with it the
threat to the unconditional supremacy of this EU law, the Court
soldiered on and kept refining its doctrine of fundamental rights protection. As the decision in Hauer illustrates, the Court also kept
emphasizing the importance of the matter and that it would not yield
its ground:
(14) As the Court declared in its judgment of 17 December 1970,
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, the question
of a possible infringement of fundamental rights by a measure of
the Community institutions can only be judged in the light of
Community law itself. The introduction of special criteria for
assessment stemming from the legislation or constitutional law of
a particular Member State would, by damaging the substantive
unity and efficacy of Community law, lead inevitably to the
destruction of the unity of the Common Market and the
jeopardizing of the cohesion of the Community.
(15) The Court also emphasized in the judgment cited, and later in
the judgment of 14 May 1974, Nold [1974] ECR 491, that
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles
of the law, the observance of which it ensures; that in safeguarding

149. Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727.

2017]

ECHR AND EU CHARTER COMPARED

1105

those rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the Member States, so that measures
which are incompatible with the fundamental rights recognized by
the constitutions of those States are unacceptable in the
Community; and that, similarly, international treaties for the
protection of human rights on which the Member States have
collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law. That conception was later recognized by the joint
declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission of 5 April 1977, which, after recalling the case-law
of the Court, refers on the one hand to the rights guaranteed by the
constitutions of the Member States and on the other hand to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 . . . .
(16) In these circumstances, the doubts evinced by the [national
court] as to the compatibility of the provisions of [EU] Regulation
No 1162/76 with the rules concerning the protection of
fundamental rights must be understood as questioning the validity
of the regulation in the light of Community law.150

4. Acceptance of Supremacy and Direct Effect by the National
Supreme Courts
A number of decisions followed along similar lines,151 with the
result that by 1986, the German Constitutional Court considered the
system of protection of fundamental rights at the level of the European
150. Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, ¶¶ 13-15
(emphasis added).
151. See Rutili v. Ministre de l'intérieur, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219, ¶ 32; Defrenne
III v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, Case 149/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1365;
Testa and Others v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Joined Cases 41, 121 and 796/79, [1980] E.C.R.
1979; National Panasonic v. Commission, Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2035, ¶¶ 17-21; Regina
v. Kirk, Case 63/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2690, ¶ 22; Biovilac v. European Economic Community,
Case 59/83, [1984] E.C.R. 4057; Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
Case 222/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1663, ¶ 18.
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Union to be sufficiently developed, although it was still based entirely
on case law. Neither was there a “bill of fundamental rights enacted by
a parliament” as the BVerG had demanded in Solange I, nor was the
European Union formally bound by the ECHR. Nevertheless, after
careful review of the case law of the ECJ and taking into account both
the evolution of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights,
to which the ECJ made regular references, and the endorsement of the
ECJ’s case law in the Joint Declaration by the European Parliament,
the Council and the Commission of 1977,152 the BVerfG, in a
unanimous decision of October 22, 1986, decided:
In view of [the abovementioned] developments it must be held
that, so long as the European Communities, and in particular the
case law of the European Court, generally ensure an effective
protection of fundamental rights as against sovereign powers of
the Communities which is to be regarded as substantially similar
to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by
the [German] Constitution . . . the Federal Constitutional Court
will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the
applicability of secondary Community legislation . . . within the
sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany, and it
will no longer review such legislation by the standard of the
fundamental rights contained in the [German] Constitution; references to the [BVerfG] . . . for that purpose are therefore
inadmissible.153

The careful reader will appreciate the reversal of the Solange
formula. Although the German court now accepts the level of protection of human rights in the European Union as adequate, it leaves the
door open for a reversal of this assessment, should this level of protection at any time in the future no longer be “substantially similar” to the
level of protection provided by the national constitution. Although the
BVerG later accepted one challenge against provisions of EU law and
laid down some outer guard rails for the interpretation of the Maastricht
152. Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission,
1977 O.J. C 103, at. 1.
153. BVerfGE, 2 BvR 197/83. The judgment was delivered in German. The present
translation is taken from Oppenheimer, supra note 142 at 494 (emphasis added).
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Treaty,154 Solange II stands to this day and has contributed to similar
reversals of earlier decisions in other Member States.155
By the late 1980s, therefore, the supremacy and direct effect of
EU law was generally accepted by the Member States and their constitutional courts, on account of the development by the European Court
of Justice of a catalog of human rights substantially equivalent to the
catalogs in the national constitutions and binding upon the EU
institutions in their development and application of EU law.
5. National Authorities Bound by EU Human Rights?
Wachauf, Case 5/88156
Emboldened by its achievement, the European Court decided to
take another important step. For the first time in its Judgment of July
13, 1989, the Court held that Member State authorities, “when they
implement Community rules,” also have to respect the fundamental
rights guaranteed by EU law.157 While Member State authorities continue to be bound by national human rights provisions when acting
within their own sphere of powers, they have to apply a harmonized
European standard of human rights protection when acting on the basis
of EU laws and powers.158 Even within their own sphere of powers,
154. To be precise, the challenge was directed at the German law approving the ratification
of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and specifically its provisions on monetary union
and the replacement of the national currencies with the Euro. See BVerfG 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92
Oct. 12, 1993. The judgment was delivered in German. The present translation is taken
Oppenheimer, supra note 142 at 526-527..
155. See, in particular, Conseil d’Etat, Oct. 20 1989, Nicolo, RFD Admin 1989, at 824.
By contrast, the Italian Corte Costituzionale already reversed course. See Granital, Corte Cost.
8 gugnio 1984 Foro Italiano 1984, at 2062. This may well have been a factor influencing the
BVerG.
156. See Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, Case 5/88, [1989]
E.C.R. 2633.
157. Ibid., ¶ 19.
158. See, Elliniki Radio v. Dimotiki and Others, Case C-260/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-2925, ¶
42. This principle is also reflected in Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art.
51, 2012 O.J. C 326/391; see, e.g., Angela Ward, Commentary on Article 51, in The EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights - a Commentary, 1413-54 (2014).
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Member States have to “exercise [their] competence consistently with
Community law[,]”159 which means, for example, that they must
respect the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality
and the fundamental freedoms of movement of goods, persons,
services, and capital.
To understand the significance of these decisions, we have to recall that the European Union is essentially a head without limbs.
Although the European Union adopts large numbers of legislative acts
that have direct effects in the Member States, it has very few administrative agents and by and large relies on the Member State authorities
to apply its law. A good example is the area of external trade relations.
The Common Customs Tariff is an EU regulation that not only applies
in the Member States but also displaces and preempts any parallel
national legislation.160 Furthermore, the bulk of the customs revenue
collected at the EU external borders goes directly to the European
Union. Yet, the European Union does not have a single customs agent
and is completely dependent on the national customs services of the
Member States for the application of the Common Customs Tariff and
the collection of any duties. As a consequence, a quest for
comprehensive and uniform protection of fundamental rights under EU
law would be incomplete if it only concerned the legislative activity of
the European Union and its very limited administrative activity in areas
such as competition and antidumping law. If and when EU law is
applied by the Member States or even just touched upon, they should
neither escape from EU guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms
– let alone any and all such guarantees – nor fall back on their national
– and therefore different – systems of protection of fundamental rights.

159. See Marks & Spencer v. David Halsey, Case C-446/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-10866, ¶ 29.
160. The preemption of national implementation of EU regulations was first decreed in
Variola v. Amministrazione italiana delle Finanze. See Variola v. Amministrazione italiana delle
Finanze, Case 34/73, [1973] E.C.R. 981, ¶¶ 9-11.
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D. The Codification of Fundamental Rights in the EU Charter
After the acrimonious procedures required for the adoption of the
1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union,161 the EU mechanism of
negotiating reform treaties was increasingly being criticized. In
practice, the EU negotiated new treaties in intergovernmental conferences (“IGCs”) behind closed doors and then put the resulting formula
compromises to the national parliaments and the occasional public
referendum in an up or down vote. Detailed input from the national
parliaments, let alone any other interest groups, was not part of the
procedure. Although another intergovernmental conference was
convened as early as 1995 to develop reforms of the European Union
that would eventually enable it to admit a large number of new Member
States from Central and Eastern Europe, the negotiations and
ratification procedures were as difficult as with the Maastricht Treaty
in spite of much more modest results in the so-called Amsterdam
Treaty.162 Therefore, the heads of state and government of the Member
161. The treaty was negotiated and finalized in December 1991. It was signed on February
7, 1992, but then subjected to referenda in Denmark and France. French President Mitterrand
had hoped to receive a glorious endorsement of his government but eventually suffered through
a nail-biting experience where the Treaty (and by reflection his government) received a paltry
50.8 percent of support in the referendum. The situation was even more dire in Denmark where
a majority of some 50,000 voters rejected the Treaty. This required re-negotiations and
exceptions for the Danish to secure their approval in a second referendum. Already, the UK had
been granted a number of op-outs to make the Treaty acceptable to the British parliament.
Finally, a number of German politicians brought a case against German ratification in the
German Constitutional Court (BVerfG) that had to be won and triggered a number of conditions
imposed on the interpretation of the Treaty to make it palatable to the Germans. Finally, on 1
November 1993, the Treaty, with all these modifications, exceptions and additional protocols,
was able to enter into force. See generally THE RATIFICATION OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY:
ISSUES, DEBATES AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS (Finn Laursen ed., 1994); COLETTE
MAZZUCELLI, FRANCE AND GERMANY AT MAASTRICHT – POLITICS AND NEGOTIATIONS TO
CREATE THE EUROPEAN UNION (1997). For analysis of the Treaty itself, see DAVID O’KEEFFE
& PATRICK TWOMEY, LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (1994); THOMAS
CHRISTIANSEN & SIMON DUKE, THE MAASTRICHT TREATY: SECOND THOUGHTS AFTER 20
YEARS (2013); see also KENNETH DYSON & KEVIN FEATHERSTONE, THE ROAD TO
MAASTRICHT – NEGOTIATING ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (1999) (analyzing the road
toward European Economic and Monetary Union (“EMU”)).
162. The Amsterdam Treaty was negotiated from June 1995 to October 1997 and
eventually entered into force on May 1, 1999. See LEGAL ISSUES OF THE AMSTERDAM TREATY
(David O’Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999).
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States (the “European Council”) decided on a different approach in
1999 and created a European Convention including not only
government representatives but also delegates from the European and
the national parliaments, to draft a Charter of Fundamental Rights for
the European Union. Under the former German President Roman
Herzog, the Convention rapidly produced the Charter, which was
approved by the European Council in December 2000. However, the
Council, for the time being, did not grant it the force of law.
Since the Convention process had been more successful than
recent IGCs, a Convention on the Future of Europe was created in 2001
and charged with the development of a Constitution for Europe. This
Convention had even wider membership, including from the CEECs
who were at the time negotiating their accession to the European
Union, generally met in public, and was chaired by the former French
President Valery Giscard d’Estaing. The Draft Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe was ready in July 2003 and included the
Charter of Fundamental Rights from the first Convention as its bill of
rights.163 The provisions on the distribution of votes and seats in the
institutions caused some further negotiations and delays but the
Constitution was eventually signed on October 29, 2004 by the heads
of state or government of the twenty-five Member States of the
European Union.164 It went on to be ratified by eighteen of these
twenty-five states and the European Parliament. However, there was
powerful resistance in some of the other Member States. British Prime
Minister Tony Blair had announced a referendum, which was not
constitutionally required, and the outcome was more than uncertain.
However, even before Britain got a chance to shoot down the
Constitution, public referenda in France and the Netherlands in May
and June 2005 resulted in majority votes against the document. This is

163. The original Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was published in OJ
2003 C 169.
164. The final version was published in OJ 2004 C 310 and subsequently went to the
national parliaments for ratification. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
2004 O.J. C 310/1 (never ratified) [hereinafter Draft Constitutional Treaty].
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not the time and place to analyze the reasons for the rejection;165
however, since any treaty revision requires support by all Member
States, the Constitution was effectively defeated and the fate of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights was again in question.
Interestingly, the refusal of the European Council to grant binding
status to the Charter in 2000 and the failure of the constitutional project
in 2005 did not prevent the European Court of Justice from relying on
the Charter in its case law on fundamental rights in the European
Union. The first reference was by Advocate General (AG) Alber in his
Opinion delivered on February 1, 2001 on Case C-340/99 TNT
Traco.166 A second reference was made by AG Tizzano in his opinion
of February 8, 2001 on Case C-173/99 BECTU.167 Although the Court
of Justice did not immediately follow suit and did not make references
to the Charter in the judgments in these cases, it took only a few days
more for the Court of First Instance to make a first reference in the
Judgment of February 20, 2001 in Case T-112/98 MannesmannröhrenWerke to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. While the CFI held that
the applicant could not rely on rights under the Charter since the
contested measures of the Commission were adopted before the
Charter was proclaimed in December 2000, it clearly left open the
possibility that facts occurring after this date could be reviewed in light

165. Suffice it to say that discontent in France with the leadership of President Jacques
Chirac and issues of immigration in the Netherlands played a major role, neither of which really
had much or anything to do with the Constitution. See e.g., Achim Hurrelmann, European
Democracy, the ‘Permissive Consensus’ and the Collapse of the EU Constitution, 13 EUR. L.J.
343 (2007); Henry Milner, “Yes to the Europe I want; No to this one.” Some Reflections on
France’s Rejection of the EU Constitution, 39 POL. SCI. & POL. 257 (2006).; Andrew Moravcsik,
What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?, 47 POLITISCHE
VIERTELJAHRESZEITSCHRIFT 219 (2006).; Andreas R.T. Schuck & Claes H. De Vreese, The
Dutch No to the EU Constitution: Assessing the Role of EU Skepticism and the Campaign, 18 J.
OF ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 101 (2008); Nick Startin & André Krouwel,
Euroscepticism Re-galvanized: The Consequences of the 2005 French and Dutch Rejections of
the EU Constitution, 51 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 65 (2012).
166. TNT Traco SpA v. Poste Italiane SpA, Case C-340/99, Opinion delivered 1 February
2001, [2001] E.C.R. I-4112, at ¶ 94.
167. The Queen v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Broadcasting,
Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU), Case C-173/99 Opinion
delivered 8 February 2001, [2001] E.C.R. I-4883, at ¶¶ 26-28.
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of the fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the Charter.168 In
spite of many more references by the Court of First Instance,169
multiple references in judgments of the European Union Civil Service
Tribunal,170 and numerous references by almost all Advocates
General,171 the European Court itself did not come around until 2006.
Although already in late 2002, President Rodríguez Iglesias had made
a specific reference to the Charter in the Order of the President of
October 18, 2002 in Case C-232/02 P(R) Technische Glaswerke
Ilmenau,172 the Court itself only mentioned the Charter when
summarizing arguments of parties before it that had claimed rights
under the Charter. For example in the Judgment of May 20, 2003 in
168. Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v. Commission of the European Communities,
Case T-112/98, [2001] E.C.R. II-732, ¶ 76.
169. Territorio Histórico de Álava, Case T-77/01, E.C.R. II-83 rec. 19 and 35
(reference to Art. 47 of the Charter next to Arts. 6 and 13 of the ECHR), [2002]; max.mobil,
paras. v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-54/99, [2002] E.C.R. II-313 ¶¶ 48
and 57 (application of the Charter as a confirmation of the constitutional traditions of the
Member States); Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v. Commission of the European Communities,
Order of the President Case T-198/01 R, [2002] E.C.R. II-2153; Jégo-Quéré v. Commissionof
the European Communities, Case T-177/01 2002 E.C.R. II-2368.
170. See Pia Landgren v. European Training Foundation, Case F-1/05, [2006],
ECLI:EU:F:2006:112.
171. See, e.g., Advocate General (AG) Mischo in his Opinion in P D v. Council, Case
C-122/99, [2002]; AG Jacobs in his Opinion in P Z v. Parliament, Case C-270/99; AG Jacobs in
his Opinion in Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, Case C-377/98, [2001]; AG Geelhoed in
his Opinion in Baumbast v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C-413/99, [2001];
AG Léger in Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten and Others,
Case C-309/99, [2001]; AG Léger in his Opinion in P Council v. Hautala, Case C-353/99,
[2001]; AG Geelhoed in his Opinion in Mulligan, Case C-313/99, [2001]; AG Stix-Hackl in her
Opinion in Nilsson, Case C-131/00, [2001]; AG Stix-Hackl in her Opinion in MRAX v. Belgian
State, Case C-459/99, [2001]; AG Stix-Hackl in her Opinion in Carpenter v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, Case C-60/00, [2001]; AG Mischo in his Opinion in Joined Cases C20 and C-64/00 Booker Acquaculture [2001]; AG Stix-Hackl in her Opinion in Käserei
Champignon Case C-210/00, [2001]; AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his Opinion in Überseering,
Case C-210/00, [2001]; AG Stix-Hackl in her Opinion in Commission v. Italy, Case C-224/00,
[2001]; AG Geelhoed in his Opinion D’Hoop, Case C-224/98, [2002]; AG Jacobs in his Opinion
in P Unión de Pequenõs Agricultores (UPA), Case C-50/00, [2002]; AG Jacobs in his Opinion
in Gemo, Case C-126/01, [2002]; AG Jacobs in his Opinion in Schmidberger, Case C-112/00,
[2002]; AG Geelhoed in his Opinion in British American Tobacco, Case C-491/01, [2002]; AG
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his Opinion in P Volkswagen AG v. Commission, Case C-338/00,
[2002].
172. Commission of the European Communities v. Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau,
Case C-232/02 P(R), [2002] E.C.R. I-8980, at ¶ 85.
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Case C-465/00 Österreichischer Rundfunk, there is such a reference,
but the Court eventually relied on the ECHR for the decision, including
specific case law of the ECtHR.173 Even when the Court was confronted
with a direct question about the Charter in a request for a preliminary
ruling,174 the ECJ still avoided an answer in May 2005. Similarly, in
October 2005, the ECJ declined to answer a request for a preliminary
ruling whether national restrictions against the use of totalitarian
symbols violated Article 10, Article 11 and Article 12 of the Charter
because the situation was entirely internal to the Member State in
question, hence did not fall under the scope of application of EU law.175
The first real discussion of the Charter as a source of fundamental
rights occurred, perhaps unsurprisingly, in an inter-institutional case,
namely the Judgment of June 27, 2006 in Case C-540/03 Parliament v.
Council (Family Reunification Directive).176 In this case, the Council
argued that “various instruments of public international law invoked by
the [European] Parliament” could not create rights to family
reunification since the Community itself was not party to these
instruments. The Council also argued against any reliance by the ECJ
173. Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, Case C-465/00, [2003]
ECLI:EU:C:2003:294. In paragraph 56, the Court merely recalls the UK’s submission that “the
provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union . . . to which the
Verfassungsgericht [which made the request for a preliminary ruling] briefly refers, are of no
relevance.” Id. at ¶ 56. Subsequently, in paragraph 73, the ECJ makes reference to several
judgments of the ECtHR on privacy rights. Id. at ¶ 73. Further on, there are additional references
to specific judgments of the ECtHR regarding justifications for breaches of fundamental rights.
Id. at ¶ 83. Whether or not the Charter should be taken into account is not addressed directly by
the Court.
174. Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Agenzia regionale per lo sviluppo
rurale v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali, Case C-347/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-3820.
The Italian Tribunale amministrativo regionale del Lazio asked:
Does the right of ownership set out in Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . and taken up in Article
17 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union . . . also cover
intellectual property in the names of the places of origin of wines and the exploitation
thereof . . . .
Id. at ¶ 58.
175. Order of 6 October 2005 in Case C-328/04 Attila Vajnai, 2005,
ECLI:EU:C:2005:596.
176. Parliament v. Council (Family Reunification Directive), Case C-540/03, [2006]
E.C.R. I-5809.
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on the Charter of Fundamental Rights “given that the Charter does not
constitute a source of Community law.”177 In response, the ECJ not
only affirmed the “special significance” of the ECHR in the
determination of the general principles of EU law, it continued as
follows:
(37) The Court has already had occasion to point out that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one of the
international instruments for the protection of human rights of
which it takes account in applying the general principles of
Community law . . . . That is also true of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child referred to above which, like the Covenant,
binds each of the Member States.178

The Court then went on to justify why it would also begin to draw
inspiration from the Charter, in spite of the fact that it was not formally
binding (yet):
(38) The Charter was solemnly proclaimed by the Parliament, the
Council and the Commission in Nice on 7 December 2000. While
the Charter is not a legally binding instrument, the Community
legislature did, however, acknowledge its importance by stating,
in the . . . preamble to the Directive [at issue], that the Directive
observes the principles recognised not only by Article 8 of the
ECHR but also in the Charter. Furthermore, the principal aim of
the Charter, as is apparent from its preamble, is to reaffirm ‘rights
as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and
international obligations common to the Member States, the
Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the [ECHR],
the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council
of Europe and the case-law of the Court . . . and of the European
Court of Human Rights’.179

As it had already done on a number of previous occasions, the
Court also made reference to a number of specific decisions of the
ECtHR, rather than just the ECHR in general.180
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at ¶ 34.
Id. at ¶ 37 (emphasis added).
Id. at ¶ 38.
See id. at ¶¶ 54-56, 65.
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Even after this decision, it was not like the dam was finally
broken. It took until the Judgment of March 13, 2007 in Case C-432/05
Unibet that the Court relied on the Charter again, and always in
connection with the ECHR.181 But after that, the pace picked up and
reference to the Charter became a regular feature of judgments of the
ECJ, at least as an expression of human rights guaranteed in the EU via
general principles of law and the constitutional traditions of the
Member States as expressed also in the ECHR.182 In many ways, the
Member States once again merely endorsed what the Court was already
doing when, by way of the Lisbon Treaty, they declared the Charter
“legally binding on the EU institutions and on national governments,
just like the EU Treaties themselves”183 as of December 1, 2009.
Once the Charter achieved formal binding status, the European
Court of Justice started applying it – at least occasionally – without
simultaneous reference to the ECHR. For example, in WebMindLicenses (WML), a Hungarian businessman, with the use of shell companies
in Portugal, had achieved a substantial reduction of his tax bills in
Hungary for services provided via internet. The Court interpreted the
relevant EU regulations and directives restrictively and confirmed the
right of the Member State to intercept e-mails and other electronic
communications in the course of an investigation of potential tax
evasion. However, the Court also held that:
by virtue of Articles 7, 47 and 52(1) of the Charter it is incumbent
upon the national court which reviews the legality of the decision
founded on such evidence adjusting VAT to verify, first, whether
the interception of telecommunications and seizure of emails were
means of investigation provided for by law and were necessary in
the context of the criminal procedure and, secondly, whether the
use by the tax authorities of the evidence obtained by those means
was also authorised by law and necessary. It is incumbent upon
that court, furthermore, to verify whether, in accordance with the
general principle of observance of the rights of the defence, the
taxable person had the opportunity, in the context of the administrative procedure, of gaining access to that evidence and of being
heard concerning it. If the national court finds that the taxable
181. Unibet v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007] ECR. I-2301.
182. See Gráinne de Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Court of
Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 168-84 (2013).
183. This particular formula can be found on the website of the European Commission.
See EU CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2017).

1116 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:4

person did not have that opportunity or that that evidence was
obtained in the context of the criminal procedure, or used in the
context of the administrative procedure, in breach of Article 7 of
the Charter, it must disregard that evidence and annul that
decision if, as a result, the latter has no basis. That evidence must
also be disregarded if the national court is not empowered to check
that it was obtained in the context of the criminal procedure in
accordance with EU law or cannot at least satisfy itself, on the
basis of a review already carried out by a criminal court in an inter
partes procedure, that it was obtained in accordance with EU
law.184

IV. MY DREAMS ARE YOUR NIGHTMARES – THE STRENGTHS
AND WEAKNESSES OF EACH OF THE TWO SUPRANATIONAL
SYSTEMS OF PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE
The introduction of a supranational system of human rights protection, in particular if it comes with some degree of effectiveness and
enforceability, is bound to trigger criticism from different sides.
Invariably, there will be those for whom the protection can hardly go
far enough and who wish for wide access to and strict scrutiny by the
supranational court(s). For others, no matter how timid the supranational review may be, any such interference with national sovereignty is
an anathema. In order to provide a meaningful and critical analysis of
the issues within a limited frame of time and space, we will summarize
the most important criticism leveled by previous commentators at both
systems and also try to add some of our own. Subsequently, in the final
part, we will try to outline our own preferences for “the ideal” scenario
how human rights and fundamental freedoms should be protected in
the triangle between national constitutions and courts, the European
Union with its ECJ, and the ECHR with its ECtHR, and some proposals
how we might get there.

184. Judgment of 17 December 2015 in Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses Kft. v. Nemzeti
Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó- és Vám Fõigazgatóság, ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, ¶ 91
(emphasis added).
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A. Criticism of the ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights
The way things should work under the ECHR is that a person who
is “claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the
protocols thereto”185 can bring an individual application to the ECtHR
“after all domestic remedies have been exhausted . . . and within a
period of six months from the date on which the final decision was
taken.”186 If these formal criteria are fulfilled, the Court can only reject
a case as inadmissible if:
. . . it considers that
a. the application is incompatible with the provisions of the
Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded,
or an abuse of the right of individual application; or
b. the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage,
unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention
and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the
application on the merits.187

If a case goes ahead and “if the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal
law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”188 In such cases, the decision of the Court is by
judgment, which has to be reasoned and comes with binding force on
the Contracting Parties.189 The execution of the judgment by the
Contracting Party concerned is monitored by the Committee of
Ministers.190
Although there will always be a number of applications by individuals who do not understand the system or who feel violated in their
human rights or fundamental freedoms although this perception may
be “manifestly ill-founded”, there should really not be a large number
of complaints to the ECtHR if the national legal systems and the
national courts are doing their job. After all, no case can be brought to
Strasbourg unless “all domestic remedies have been exhausted”, which
185. ECHR, supra note 8, art. 34.
186. Id., art. 35(1).
187. Id., art. 35(3). Subparagraph (b) was added by Protocol 14 and entered into effect on
1 June 2010.
188. Id., art. 41.
189. See id., arts. 45-46.
190. See id., art. 46.
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would normally require a case to be brought to trial court, the judgment
of the trial court to be appealed, and quite often even a further appeal
to the highest or supreme court of the respective country. Somehow one
would assume that 99.9% of all complaints about violations of human
rights or fundamental freedoms should be taken care of in an adequate
and satisfactory way at the national level. Fortunately, this is indeed
what happens with many of the Contracting Parties. Unfortunately, it
is not happening in all of them. For the rare and unusual cases from the
Contracting Parties with the best human rights record and for the more
common and even repetitive cases from those with not so stellar
records, the supranational system becomes crucial. However,
Barkhuysen and van Emmerik have noted:
Effective protection of human rights first of all requires the
availability to an individual of an accessible, fast and professional
procedure. The Strasbourg supervisory procedure does not comply
completely with these criteria. It is relatively inaccessible, rather
slow and burdensome. […] Added to this is the fact not everyone
can afford the time and money to go to Strasbourg. A second
requirement of crucial importance to any procedure for the
effective protection of human rights is that actual redress be
guaranteed in case a fundamental right has been violated. The
Strasbourg procedure cannot sufficiently meet this requirement.
This is because judgments of the Court do not automatically
nullify actions of contracting states that constitute violations of the
Convention. In case a state does not honour a positive obligation
deriving from the Convention, a Strasbourg judgment does not
automatically provide an applicant with a claim to the state's
(belated) action. The judgment has a declaratory character only: it
merely contains a binding statement of a violation. States are
obliged to provide redress, but it is left to their discretion how to
honour this obligation. The Court lacks the authority to declare
legislation or measures conflicting with the Convention void, nor
can it review irrevocable verdicts of domestic courts. The Court is
also not authorised to order the relevant contracting state to act.
The Committee of Ministers however supervises the enforcement
of Strasbourg judgments. Still, a complaint frequently heard is that
a Strasbourg ‘victory’ brings the applicant little or no gain. In
many contracting states […], applicants have few or no options to
claim redress based on a judgment of the Court. So far, case-law
has not established whether an individual can complain in
Strasbourg of a violation of Article 46 paragraph 1 ECHR (the
obligation of a state to conform to judgments of the Court) when a
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contracting state does not implement a judgment. Nonetheless,
based on Article 41 ECHR the Court has the authority to award the
victim ‘just satisfaction’.191

We will address the different elements of criticism in turn.
1. The Case-Load Problem
“It is in the interests of European citizens that, as it stands, the caseload
of the European Court of Human Rights be acknowledged as an obstacle
to the effective protection of human rights in Europe.”
– Sir Francis Jacobs 192

From 1959 to the end of 2016, the ECtHR examined about 712,600
applications.193 This enormous number does not even include
applications that were dealt with by the European Commission of
Human Rights when it still had a pre-screening function prior to the
entry into force of Protocol 11 on November 1, 1998. The 712,600
applications that made it to the Court resulted in about 19,500
judgments,194 i.e. about 2.74% of examined applications make it on to
a judgment. Once a case does get through, however, the Court finds a
violation of one or more Convention rights in some eighty-four percent
of the cases.195 Pretty much all of the other applications, i.e. some
97.26%, are declared “manifestly inadmissible” since this was the
ECtHR’s only mechanism of docket control prior to the entry into force
of Protocol 14 on June 1, 2010. Most recently, presumably, the Court
is also refusing some cases because the applicant has not suffered a
significant disadvantage. Unfortunately, whether or not a case is
manifestly ill-founded, or whether or not it should be examined out of
“respect for human rights” in spite of relatively insignificant
191. Tom Barkhuysen & Michiel L. van Emmerik, Legal Protection Against Violations of
the European Convention on Human Rights: Improving (Co-)operation of Strasbourg and
Domestic Institutions, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 833, 834-35 (1999).
192. Sir Francis Jacobs, Foreword to Statement on Case-Overload at the European Court
of Human Rights (2012).
193. See EUR. CT. HUM. RTS./COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ECHR OVERVIEW 1959-2016, 4
(2017), available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592016_ENG.pdf.
194. Id. at 3.
195. Id.
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disadvantage, is at least as much determined by the Court’s effort to
reduce back-log and case load as it is by the actual facts of the matter.
A short look at the back-log of pending applications referred to a
judicial body, that means meeting the formal criteria of admissibility,
illustrates the problem:
Year

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Cases pending before a judicial formation on January 1 196

7,800
12,600
15,900
19,800
29,400
38,500
50,000
56,800
66,500
79,500
97,300
119,300
139,650
151,600
128,100
99,900
69,900
64,850
79,750

The fact that the ECtHR was able to bring down the back-log from
over 150,000 to some 65,000 from 2012 to 2016 was celebrated by
some as if the problem of the overload of the Court has already been
solved.197 This seems highly problematic to the present authors. First,
the fact that more cases have been disposed of says little about the
196. See STATISTICAL REPORTS, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2017),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=reports&c=.
197. In REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (CDDH), THE
LONGER-TERM FUTURE OF THE SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(Dec. 11, 2015) [hereinafter STEERING COMMITTEE REPORT], we find the following optimistic
passage: “Concerning the challenge of the caseload, no further measures appear necessary
regarding the clearance of the backlog of clearly inadmissible and repetitive cases. The former
has now been cleared and it is expected that the backlog of the latter will be cleared within two
or three years. Thus the report focuses on the measures needed to respond to the main remaining
challenges: the clearing of the backlog of non-repetitive pending cases, both priority and nonpriority ones, the reduction and the handling of the annual influx of cases in general, large-scale
violations as well as systemic issues. In view of the positive results of the Court’s reforms so far,
the challenge of clearing the backlog of non-repetitive priority and non-priority cases may entail
allocating additional resources and more efficient working methods rather than introducing a
major reform.” Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
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quality of the accelerated processing. An illustration will be given
below. Second, the most recent numbers show an increase of pending
cases, which could be a sign that measures taken at the Court after June
2010 have brought only temporary relief. Third, a new wave of cases
may be building up on the horizon if and when Protocol 16 enters into
force and allows the highest courts of the Contracting Parties to request
“advisory opinions on questions of principle relating to the
interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the
Convention or the protocols thereto” (Article 1(1)). Although this
option will only be available to the highest courts of the countries that
ratify the Protocol and only in the context of an actual case pending
before the national court (Article 1(2)), the ECtHR will have to commit
resources above average to these kind of inquiries since it will want to
provide the highest courts of the Contracting Parties only with wellreasoned and broadly supported feedback.198
2. Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied
While a high number of pending cases does not have to be a
problem per se, the consequences are manifold. First, there are the
delays. Second, there are the concerns about the quality of the workmanship, both in the pre-screening and in the actual adjudication of
admissible cases. Third, there is the problem of signal vs. noise, and
the absorption capacity of the interlocutors of the Court in the
national legal system and global academia.
With regard to the delays, the Court says that it “endeavours to
deal with cases within three years after they are brought.”199 The reality
198. See STEVEN GREER, EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS 192 (2006). Steven Greer makes another point against the introduction of the
advisory opinion procedure. He argues that “since advisory opinions can only be expressed in
vague and general terms, they are unlikely to add anything of substance to the future of the
Convention system.” Id. The supporters of the procedure argue that it will stimulate a dialogue
between the national supreme courts and the ECtHR and promote collaboration.
199. See The ECHR in 50 Questions, EUR. CT. H.R., at 9 (Feb. 2014). Indeed, the Brighton
Declaration of 19/20 April 2012 envisages a time-limit of one year for the first communication
and another two years until the final decision, i.e. an overall time-limit of three years, for
proceedings before the ECtHR. HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BRIGHTON DECLARATION (2012), at ¶ 21h.
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is a bit different, however. Although the ECtHR does not publish
statistics on the average duration of cases before it, some conclusions
can be drawn from its annual reports and other sources of information
on the backlog at the Court. These reveal that it usually takes well over
one year for the decision on admissibility to be taken. A decision on
the merits may take five years and sometimes more. Most recently, the
Court has given priority to so-called meritorious cases that raise
important or urgent issues.200 By necessity, this further delays
meritorious cases considered routine, repetitive, or otherwise of
little (legal) interest. In addition, what must be taken into account is
also the duration of the implementation of the ECtHR judgments at the
national level. Even in the Western countries, the execution of the
judgments takes several years, with an average around three and a half
years. In some of the CEECs, it takes considerably longer. For example,
the average duration of the execution in leading cases against Ukraine
was seven years and four months when looking at cases that were
before the Committee of Ministers as of December 31, 2014.201 This
means that it can easily take five to ten years for a meritorious case to
be finally resolved.
This puts the ECtHR in a somewhat awkward situation when
criticizing the length of proceedings at the national law. Indeed, the
ECtHR is confronted with hundreds of applications every year claiming a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, the right to a fair trial,
because of unduly lengthy proceedings before the national courts. It
has even been said that “[t]his single issue still accounts for more judgments of the Court than any other”202 and some years ago the so-called
“Italian length of proceedings cases” contributed no less than twentyfive percent of the total workload of the Court.203 The flood of cases
from Italy became so untenable that the ECtHR took the extreme step
of reversing the burden of proof, essentially stipulating that
applications from Italy citing unduly lengthy proceedings would
200. The priority criteria applied by the ECtHR are outlined in the CDDH report. See
STEERING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 197, at ¶ 76(v) and corresponding n.99.
201. See ALICE DONALD & PHILIP LEACH, PARLIAMENTS AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 17, t.1.3 (2016).
202. See Martin Kuijer, The Right to a Fair Trial: Effective Remedy for Excessively
Lengthy Proceedings (Articles 6 and 13 ECHR), presented at the conference on “Effective
Remedies, Lengthy Proceedings and Access to Justice in the EU” in Cracow, Poland, Feb 28
2013, http://www.ejtn.eu/Documents/About%20EJTN/Independent%20Seminars/Human%20Rights,%20and%20Access%20to%20Justice%20Seminar/KUIJER_Martin_Presentation_Krakow_2013.pdf, at 1.
203. Id.
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automatically be upheld because of a systemic failure in the
administration of justice in Italy. What was on trial was no longer the
duration of an individual case but an entire judicial system:
21. The Court notes at the outset that Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention imposes on the Contracting States the duty to organise
their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet the
[requirement of providing a hearing within a reasonable time by a
tribunal]. It wishes to reaffirm the importance of administering
justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and
credibility [...]. It points out, moreover, that the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, in its Resolution DH (97) 336
of 11 July 1997 (Length of civil proceedings in Italy: supplementary measures of a general character), considered that
“excessive delays in the administration of justice constitute an
important danger, in particular for the respect of the rule of law.
The Court next draws attention to the fact that since 25 June 1987,
the date of the Capuano v. Italy judgment (Series A no. 119), it has
already delivered sixty-five judgments in which it has found
violations of Article 6 Section 1 in proceedings exceeding a
“reasonable time” in the civil courts of the various regions of Italy.
Similarly, under former Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention,
more than 1,400 reports of the Commission resulted in resolutions
by the Committee of Ministers finding Italy in breach of Article 6
of the Convention for the same reason.
The frequency with which violations are found shows that there is
an accumulation of identical breaches which are sufficiently
numerous to amount not merely to isolated incidents. Such
breaches reflect a continuing situation that has not yet been remedied and in respect of which litigants have no domestic remedy.
This accumulation of breaches accordingly constitutes a practice
that is incompatible with the Convention.204

In this way, Italy was regularly convicted to pay compensation for
undue length of proceedings. The “solution” was classic. Instead of a
structural reform of the judicial system, Italy introduced a law allowing
204. See Ferrari v. Italy, No. 33440/96 EUR. CT. H.R. (July 28, 1999), at ¶ 21 (emphasis
added).
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for domestic compensation for undue length of proceedings. As a
consequence, the violations of the right to a fair trial continue largely
unabated but the cases being brought to Strasbourg are now no longer
about the question whether there should be compensation for the undue
length of the proceedings but about “the amount of compensation
offered domestically and the fact that the compensation proceedings in
themselves were taking too long.”205
As mentioned earlier, it is a bit disingenuous for the European
Court to set standards for the national courts for the reasonable length
of proceedings,206 if the European Court itself is unable to abide by
these standards. We shall return to this issue when looking at potential
remedies below.
3. Docket Control, Strasbourg Style
Until recently, the only instrument available to the ECtHR to
avoid hearing a formally admissible case was to declare it “manifestly
ill-founded” pursuant to Article 35(3) of the Convention. With the entry
into force of Protocol No. 14, the Court can now also refuse to hear a
case if “the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless
respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols
thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and
provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not
been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.”207 In practice, an
incoming application is first allocated to lawyers in the legal division
or Registry of the Court who are from the country against which the
application is filed. If the application seems legitimate, it is given a case
number, including the date, and the clock is stopped on the six-month
deadline in Article 35(1) ECHR. The legal division may communicate
with the applicant(s) to obtain additional information or documents.
Once the case is complete, it is allocated to a judicial formation and
205. Kuijer, supra note 202, at 2-3. In particular for background information on the
problem and the solution in Italy, see Sonja Wolf, Trial Within a Reasonable Time: The Recent
Reforms of the Italian Justice System in Response to the Conflict with Article 6(1) of the ECHR,
9 EUR. PUB. L. 189-209 (2003).
206. See CEPEJ, LENGTH OF COURT PROCEEDINGS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE BASED ON THE CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(2006) (finding the ECtHR generally held that up to two years in normal, i.e. not particularly
complex cases, is a reasonable length of proceedings. However, if a case suggested urgency—
often referred to as a priority case—a violation could be found even if the proceedings lasted
less than two years. On the other hand, in particularly complex cases, the Court accepted
proceedings of up to five years but almost never more than eight years of total duration).
207. ECHR, supra note 8, art. 35(3).
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comes before a judge. If the legal division considers the application to
be inadmissible, it is presented to a single judge. The inadmissibility
decision of that judge is final pursuant to Article 27. Before the entry
into force of Protocol No. 14, only a chamber of three judges had the
power to declare an application inadmissible. The introduction of the
single judge procedure in 2010 was the single most important change
in the procedure that brought about the reduction of the backlog of
cases outlined above.
Should the single judge disagree with the assessment of the legal
division and consider a case admissible, she will forward it to a Committee of three judges, if the case is considered to be a “repetitive case”,
or to a Chamber of seven judges, if the case is not repetitive but unique.
The same happens from the outset, if the legal division considers the
case admissible and, therefore, does not send it to a single judge.
Although even the Committee of three and the Chamber of seven can
still reverse the earlier assessment and declare a case inadmissible, this
does not happen very often in practice. If the Committee or the
Chamber considers that a case raises “a serious question affecting the
interpretation of the Convention or if there is a risk of inconsistency
with a previous decision of the Court”,208 it may refer the case to the
Grand Chamber of seventeen judges.
Given the fact that the Court receives more than 50,000 applications every year and is under great pressure from many sides to bring
down its backlog and reduce the processing time of cases before it, the
quality of the screening procedure whether a case should be admissible
or not is an obvious concern. As explained above, the vast majority of
these cases is declared inadmissible. With forty-seven judges on the
Court, each judge has to look at more than 1,000 cases per year to
decide on the admissibility, or about five per working day. Obviously,
this comes on top of the actual work of the judges, namely to evaluate
and decide those 900 or so cases that end up with a judgment every
year. Given the sheer numbers, we may safely assume that the judges
will rarely question the assignment of a case by the Registry to a single
judge, i.e. the pre-qualification as inadmissible. This is problematic in
two respects. First, the Convention itself guarantees the right of
individuals to have access to court. This is generally understood as a
right to be heard by an independent and impartial judge, not just an
208. See EUR. CT. H.R., YOUR APPLICATION TO THE ECHR: HOW TO APPLY AND HOW
YOUR APPLICATION IS PROCESSED, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Your_Application_ENG.pdf, at 5.
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official in the court administration. Second, the pre-screening is done
by lawyers from the state against which the application is directed. We
believe that this can cause an inherent bias against the admissibility of
certain types of cases. The point shall be illustrated by a case we have
already described elsewhere.209 It provides an illustration of what are
probably not infrequent casualties at the ECtHR in the quest to dispose
of the enormous case load within reasonable time and by reliance on
lawyers who may – consciously or not – want to spare “their” country
an embarrassment or a costly conviction.
In March 2001, the new law on bailiffs entered into force in
Estonia. On the one hand, this new law brought important changes to
the institution of the bailiff by privatizing this former public function.
On the other hand, it did not provide sufficiently detailed rules on how
the bailiffs have to go about their business.210
One of the functions of the bailiffs is to enforce financial penalties
in cases of administrative offences. If the accused does not pay the fine
after notification by the administration, the matter is handed over to the
bailiff. The latter is obliged to notify the accused (again) and warn him
or her of enforcement measures. If the fine is still not paid, the bailiff
has the possibility of seizing assets of the accused in order to enforce
the fine plus a fee for his or her own services. So far, this is standard
procedure, common in many countries. However, the rules of
procedure for the bailiffs in Estonia were not specific enough and
invited abuse. In particular, it was not specified how the bailiff has to
notify the accused of the alleged offence.211
A widely known problem demonstrates what happens when state
authority is transferred to private, profit-seeking institutions without
sufficiently clear rules of conduct and without proper supervision: A
large number of Estonian drivers saw sums of up to EU€75 taken from
their bank accounts in 2001. Those who inquired from the bank were
informed that the one or the other bailiff had ordered the transfer for an
unpaid parking ticket. Those who inquired from the respective bailiff
were informed of the date of the alleged offence, which may have been
as far back as 1999, when a general prohibition of unpaid parking in
the center of Tallinn was introduced, albeit without much explanation
what belonged or did not belong to the “center” of town. Supposedly,
209. See Frank Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform in Central and Eastern Europe,
9 EUR. L.J. 288, 292-94 (2003).
210. See id.
211. See id.
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the offenders should have received a notification from the police on
their windshields. Later, if they did not pay, they should have received
a letter from the bailiff. If they still did not pay, they should have seen
a public announcement in the newspapers. Only after they ignored even
that, the bailiff should have taken the money from the bank accounts.
Again, in theory this sounds good. However, in practice it was quite
common that drivers took parking tickets from the windshields of other
cars in order to create the impression for subsequent police patrols that
their car was already taken care of. Thus, the original offender may
well not have received the police notice.212
As far as written notification by the bailiff was concerned, this did
not have to be by registered mail. Even though a simple violation of the
parking rules, for example by exceeding the pre-paid time by just a few
minutes, was punishable by a fine of about EU€40 – very high given
the relatively low average income in Estonia at the time – the bailiffs’
claimed that it would be too expensive to send even one registered letter
to each offender. Interestingly, the non-registered mail seemed to get
lost in literally thousands of cases, at least in part explainable by the
communal mailboxes in many parts of the country, a legacy of Soviet
times. That left the public announcement in the newspapers as the main
source of information for the accused. However, this was organized in
such a way that it was made as difficult as possible for a person to find
his or her name. First of all, nobody knows when to expect such an
announcement and will, thus, not specifically look for it. Secondly, the
publication of hundreds of names regularly covered a whole page in
what must have been about font size 4 and was not in alphabetical
order. Consequently, the chances of an accused to find out about the
alleged offence and defend herself or pay the original fine were
marginal at best. And this is exactly what the bailiffs were interested
in, since they were allowed to add about fifty percent to the fine if they
had to take it directly from the bank accounts.213

212. See id.
213. See id.
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Although there was an obvious conflict of interest for the bailiffs
between adherence to standards of due process and personal gain,214 it
was not very interesting for the victims to start court procedures for
repayment of their money. First of all, the individual sums were relatively small. Secondly, the accused would never be able to prove that
the bailiff did not in fact send a letter of notification and that they did
not in fact receive the ticket from the police. Finally, given the very
long time between the alleged violation of the parking rules and the
taking of the money, they would hardly be able to prove that they might
not even have been in town with their car on the respective day.215
The “withdrawal” by the bailiffs of thousands of fines from the
bank accounts of Estonian drivers was taken to court and, after exhaustion of domestic remedies, an application was filed to the ECtHR.
Unfortunately, the European Court only saw that by the time it
examined the case Estonia had already changed the law and that the
amounts in each individual case were relatively small – although this
was well before the entry into force of Protocol No. 14 and the
introduction of the option of declaring a case inadmissible because the
applicant(s) may not have suffered “a significant disadvantage”.216
Thus, the case was declared manifestly ill-founded and the ECtHR
missed an opportunity at explaining some fundamental principles of
good administration, the non-retroactive application of sanctions, and

214. Supervision was in the hands of the Ministry of Justice, which in fact started criminal
proceedings against more than 15 out of 77 Estonian bailiffs after the change of the law in 2001.
See Ilona Urb, The Reformed Institution of Bailiffs in Estonia and the Position of a Bailiff in the
System of Public Administration, Tallinn 2002, unpublished thesis, available in the library of
Concordia International University Estonia, as well as interview on 28 June 2002 with Angelika
Järg, in charge of supervision of the bailiffs at the Estonian Ministry of Justice.
See also AGE VÄRV, COUNTRY REPORT ESTONIA, EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE
EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE (CEPEJ), PILOT SCHEME FOR EVALUATING JUDICIAL SYSTEMS,
available
at
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/coopera¬tion/cepej/evaluation/2002Estonia.pdf.
Pursuant to this Report, 18 out of 58 Estonian bailiffs were subject to disciplinary proceedings
in the year 2004 alone. This compares to 14 out of about 917 lawyers, 3 out of 189 prosecutors,
and 4 proceedings against judges, although it is not clear whether these include only the 237
professional judges or also the 1785 lay judges. See, in particular, id. at 9 and 18-23.
215. See Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, supra
note 210.
216. ECHR, supra note 8, art. 35(3) (as revised by Protocol No. 14).
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respect for private property, for the benefit not only of the Estonian but
all governments in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond.217
4. Discouraging Applications via Low-Balling of Compensation
If an application does get examined and the Court finds a violation
of the Convention or one or more of the Protocols, it cannot set aside
or overrule the (final) decision(s) of the national court, it cannot remand
the case to the national court for a different decision, and it cannot order
the state to otherwise undo what was done to the applicant, even if that
was possible in a given case. While the Contracting Parties are
obligated under Art. 46(1) “to abide by the final judgment of the Court
in any case to which they are parties” and this may require all kinds of
reactions, including changes in law and practice, the ECtHR can only
“afford just satisfaction to the injured party” pursuant to Article 41
ECHR, i.e. it can order the state to pay compensation for the violation
of the victim’s rights, “if the internal law of the High Contracting Party
concerned allows only partial reparation to be made.”218
Given the fact that the judgments of the ECtHR—by contrast to
the judgments of the ECJ—do not formally bind all Contracting Parties
as erga omnes interpretations of the rights and obligations under the
Convention,219 and given the fact that the ECtHR does not have the
power to overrule the national decisions or remand a case for a different
national decision, it is surprising that the ECtHR does not take more of
an interest in the issue of just satisfaction. Indeed, in Salah v. The
Netherlands, a Chamber of seven judges held unanimously as follows:
70. Under Article 41 of the Convention, the Court may afford just
satisfaction to a party injured by a violation of the Convention or
its Protocols if the internal law of the High Contracting Party
concerned does not allow complete reparation to be made.
However, the Court is enjoined to do so only “if necessary”.
Consequently, although the Court is sensitive to the effect which
217. See Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, supra
note 210.
218. See EHCR, supra note 8, arts. 46(1) and 41.
219. See EHCR, supra note 8, art. 46(1) (“The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide
by the final judgment of the Court in cases to which they are parties.” (emphasis added)).
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its awards under Article 41 may have and makes use of its powers
under that Article accordingly . . . the awarding of sums of money
to applicants by way of just satisfaction is not one of the Court’s
main duties but is incidental to its task of ensuring the observance
by States of their obligations under the Convention.220

This may explain why the ECtHR—quite possibly also in an effort
at disincentivizing applications for financial gain—quite regularly
affords compensation that does not even cover the legal expenses of the
parties and cannot seriously be considered “just satisfaction”.221 This
may be a reflection of the attitude of some judges seeing their task more
in the delivery of constitutional justice, rather than individual justice.222
Indeed, the Court in Salah v. The Netherlands continued as follows:
71. Seen in this light, there can be no doubt of the greater
importance of Article 46 of the Convention in comparison with
Article 41. Under Article 46, the High Contracting Parties
undertake to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case
to which they are parties, the execution being supervised by the
220. Salah v. The Netherlands, No. 8196/02, EUR. CT. H.R. (2006) at ¶ 70 (emphasis
added).
221. For example, in Guincho v. Portugal, No. 8990/80, the applicant was awarded the
modern day equivalent of 750 Euros or US Dollars as compensation for a violation of Article
6(1), undue length of civil proceedings. The applicant had been injured in a car accident resulting
in partial disability. His case lingered in front of the Portuguese trial court for almost four years.
Half of the time was wasted on account of complete inaction of the court. Although 750 Euros
was a lot more back then than it is today, we may safely assume that it barely paid for the legal
and travel expenses of the applicant. In another example, Alekseyev v. Russia, Nos. 4916/07,
25924/08 and 14599/09, the Court had to deal with the systematic and persistent refusal of Mr.
Luzhkov, the Mayor of Moscow, to allow gay pride parades. The ECtHR found violations of
Articles 11, 13, and 14 ECHR and awarded about 4,000 Euros in non-pecuniary damages per
year of the prohibition. This elicited the comment from Alexander Khinstein, a member of the
Russian Parliament, that Moscow would happily pay 4,000 Euros per year for not having gay
pride parades ever. See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Alan Greene, Legitimacy and the Future of
the European Court of Human Rights: Critical Perspectives from Academia and Practitioners,
12 German L.J. 1707, 1709 (2011). For comprehensive analysis see OCTAVIAN ICHIM, JUST
SATISFACTION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTs 18-23, 29-42 (2015).
222. Alastair Mowbray, Faltering Steps on the Path to Reform of the Strasbourg
Enforcement System, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 609, 609-618 (2007) (discussing the views of former
Presidents Rolv Ryssdall and Luzius Wildhaber on the one side and former President Jean-Paul
Costa on the other). See also Steven Greer & Andrew Williams, Human Rights in the Council
of Europe and the EU: Toward ‘Individual’, ‘Constitutional’ or ‘Institutional’ Justice?, EUR.
L.J. 462-81 (2009).
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Committee of Ministers. One of the effects of this is that where the
Court finds a violation, the respondent State has a legal obligation
not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just
satisfaction under Article 41, but also to select, subject to
supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if
appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic
legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to
redress as far as possible the effects thereof. . . . Furthermore,
under the Convention, particularly Article 1, in ratifying the
Convention the Contracting States undertake to ensure that their
domestic law is compatible with the Convention . . . .223

This is a beautiful ideal, at least in theory. The huge number of
so-called “repetitive” cases shows that the practice in the Contracting
Parties is quite different. Therefore, it would seem desirable for the
Court to reconsider its approach to “just satisfaction”, in particular if a
Contracting Party is already known for its lack of interest in terminating
a systemic issue and/or in executing the Strasbourg decisions in a
timely manner.
B. Criticism of the EU System of Human Rights Protection and the
European Court of Justice
1. Too Much Protection? Accusations of Judicial Activism
It is a time honored tradition among various politicians and even
academics in the Member States of the European Union to accuse the
European Court of Justice of judicial activism, i.e. of going beyond the
statutory language of the Treaties and/or the real or perceived intentions of the founding fathers.224 Although the accusation is correct, the
criticism is largely misplaced.
223. Salah v. The Netherlands, No. 8196/02, EUR. CT. H.R. (2006) at ¶ 71.
224. See, e.g., HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE (1986); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Court of Justice on Trial: A Review of H. Rasmussen:
On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 555, 555-89
(1987). See also Karen Alter, Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments
and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121, 121-147 (1998); Clifford J. Carrubba,
Matthew Gabel & Charles Hankla, Judicial Behavior Under Political Constraints: Evidence
from the European Court of Justice, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 435, 435-52 (2008); David Edward,
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First, the European integration process, from the beginning, was
conceived as “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,”225
hence a dynamic rather than a static entity. The approach to the interpretation of the Treaties taken by the European Court of Justice is
neatly summarized in the following passage from the famous CILFIT
decision:
(20) Finally, every provision of Community law must be placed in
its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of
Community law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives
thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the
provision in question is to be applied.226

Moreover, the ECJ has generally shown a willingness to fill gaps
in the Treaties by reference to “general principles common to the laws
of the Member States,”227 for example in the development of human
rights and fundamental freedoms as inherent in the EU legal order, as
outlined above. The alternative would often have been a denial of
justice, if the Court had simply responded to a reference by a national
judge that European law, as it stands, does not contain a provision
dealing with the matter, and the individual concerned would have to

Judicial Activism – Myth or Reality?, in LEGAL REASONING AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETING OF
EUROPEAN LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MACKENZIE-STUART 29-67 (1996); James L.
Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions:
Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459, 459-89
(1995); Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Revisiting the European Court of Justice, 52
INT’L ORG. 177, 177-209 (1998); Takis Tridimas: The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism,
21 EUR. L. REV. 199-210 (1996); Fabio Wasserfallen: The Judiciary as Legislator? How the
European Court of Justice Shapes Policy-Making in the European Union, 17 J. EUR. PUB.
POL’Y. 1128, 1128-46 (2010); Joseph H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution, The European Court of
Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510-34 (1994); Joseph H.H. Weiler,
Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice
in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European
Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (1986).
225. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community preamble 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. For the theoretical
background see BEN ROSAMOND, THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2000).
226. Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, Case 283/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 3415, at ¶ 20 (emphasis added).
227. See TFEU, supra note 123.
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wait and see whether and when the Member States would change the
Treaties to provide for the kind of case at hand.
Second, and more importantly, the dynamic interpretation of
existing rules in the Treaties by the Court, and the readiness of the ECJ
to develop innovative yet grounded solutions for cases where the
Treaties offered none, was regularly endorsed after the fact by Treaty
changes instituted by the Member States. Examples include standing of
the European Parliament in proceedings before the Court228 and, of
course, the entire saga of the introduction of human rights and fundamental freedoms via case law and its subsequent endorsement in the
form of the European Charter. In that sense, criticism like the one
hurled at the Court by Sir Patrick Neill QC is quite unfair since it lumps
together all examples of “judicial activism,”229 including those that
expand the powers of the European Union,230 place obligations on the
Member States,231 and those that actually rein in the powers of the
European Union.232
Unfortunately, there is also the criticism that is based on a misunderstanding of EU law. For example, John Murray complained about
the Akrich decision as being a sign “of the Court of Justice’s increasing
willingness to ‘interfere,’ in the name of fundamental rights, in areas

228. Compare EEC Treaty, supra note 111, art. 173, with TFEU, supra note 123, art. 263.
The Treaty change endorses decisions like the judgment of April 23, 1986, in Les Verts v.
Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339; Parliament v. Council (Chernobyl), Case C-70/88,
[1990] E.C.R. I-204.
229. See SIR PATRICK NEILL QC, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY IN
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1995). See also EMMERT, DER EUROPÄISCHE GERICHTSHOF ALS GARANT
DER RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT, supra note 122, at 270-322.
230. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European
Communities, Case 22/70 ERTA, [1971] E.C.R. 263 (establishing the principle that powers
granted to the EU by the Member States in internal relations automatically create parallel powers
of the EU in external relations).
231. See, e.g., The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and
Others (Factortame I), Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. I-2433 (requiring that English courts must
have the power to grant interim relief and suspend the application of laws of parliament which
might be in conflict with EU law, even if such a power was not previously granted in national
law).
232. See, in particular, the case law developing EU human rights and freedoms cited
above. See supra notes 144-160 and accompanying text.
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which have traditionally been the preserve of the Member States.”233
Although the case, on superficial reading, concerned the right of a
British national to have her non-EU spouse with her in Britain, it was
by no means a so-called purely internal situation. The interference by
the ECJ and the instruction to the national court to ensure respect for
family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR was based on the fact
that, as the national court had itself determined, the British national had
exercised her right of free movement by moving to Ireland for genuine
employment. Consequently, she was entitled to EU free movement
rights upon return.234 Of course, if the yardstick to be applied is what
has traditionally been the preserve of the Member States, there will
never be a movement toward supranational human rights protection, or
any movement at all.
In the end, we agree with Peter Biering who argues that the
Member States have the ultimate power to rein in a runaway Court via
a Treaty amendment. However, the Member States have not only never
done that, they have quite regularly confirmed developments in case
law by affirmative Treaty changes, in particular in the field of
protection of human rights. Thus, Biering concludes “[b]y this standard, the Court of Justice has never gone too far.”235
2. Too Little Protection? Accusations of Denial of Justice
There are three types of scenarios where the ECJ has been accused
of not going far enough in the protection of individual rights. One of
these scenarios happens rather seldom and the accusation is justified.
The second scenario has become quite frequent but the accusation is
unjustified. The third scenario was resolved by a Treaty change, hence
the Member States obligating the ECJ to go beyond where it was
previously willing to go.
233. See John Murray, Fundamental Rights in the European Community Legal Order, 32
FORDHAM INT’L L. J., 531, 548 (2009).
234. See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Akrich, Case C-109/01, [2003]
E.C.R. I-9665, at ¶ 39, 46 et seq. The Court held, in essence, that as long as the marriage and the
employment are genuine, the motives for an EU citizen to work for a while in another Member
State are irrelevant. The Court did acknowledge that a right under Art. 10 of Regulation 1612/68
could not be acquired if the third-country spouse was not lawfully in the EU, but fundamental
rights of the EU spouse still had to be respected.
235. Peter Biering, Has the Court of Justice Ever Taken Integration Too Far?, in EUROPE
– THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HJALTE RASMUSSEN 57, 79 (Henning
Koch et al., ed., 2010). See also DORTE SINDBJERG MARTINSEN, AN EVER MORE POWERFUL
COURT? THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS OF LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2015).
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We will briefly start with the third scenario, the right of individuals to address themselves directly to the European Court of Justice.
In general, EU law is implemented by national authorities and individuals should assert their EU rights before the national courts against
the acts or omissions of the national authorities. However, occasionally, an individual may claim that one or more of the EU institutions
have acted or failed to act in an unlawful way and have directly violated
the rights or financial interests of the individual, without intervention
of the national authorities.
As a reminder, although the EU Member States created a supranational entity with broad legislative and even some administrative
powers, they did not opt for the creation of an entire network of
“federal” courts—like in the United States, for example—to directly
review the application and interpretation of EU law across the Member
States. Instead, the national judges and courts were co-opted to apply
and enforce EU law and the normal way for an individual to bring a
case against an act based on EU law is to bring it before the national
courts. This is also justified by the fact that the European Union itself,
for the most part, does not have administrative agencies and powers to
directly apply its laws and rules in the Member States. Thus, the
European Union relies on national authorities, such as customs
authorities or the authorities issuing residence and work permits for
migrant workers, for the implementation of its laws. Hence, it was not
only cost effective to rely on the existing national judges and courts, it
is also easier and cheaper for the individuals to address themselves to
the national courts, which are nearby, work in the language of the
Member State, and have rules and procedures with which any lawyer
is familiar. The national judges, of course, had to learn how to apply
EU law but they were given the option, if they were struggling with the
correct interpretation of the relevant EU law or considered it potentially
invalid, to bring a request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article
267 TFEU to the ECJ. In this way, the European Union was able to
manage its affairs rather successfully with just one single federal court
for over half a century.
There is one exception to the rule that cases turning on EU law
have to be brought in national court, however. The European Union
does have and always had some very specific administrative powers.
For example, if a case has a certain magnitude and cross-border implications, antitrust supervision—the enforcement of EU competition law
in EU jargon—is handled directly by the EU Commission. In such
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cases, the Commission will issue decisions directly to enterprises
chiding them for (potential) violations of antitrust provisions and ruling
on sanctions that may include the prohibition of certain conduct and/or
financial penalties up to ten percent of the annual turnover of the enterprise(s).236 Another example is the power of the Commission and the
Council to issue decisions in antidumping cases. Consequently, Article
173 of the original EEC-Treaty about the review of the legality of acts
of EU institutions contained the following paragraph 4:
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions [as
apply to the institutions and the Member States], institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a
decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision
addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to
the former.237

The cases where a decision is addressed to an individual person
or enterprise have never caused much trouble and since there are not
too many of those decisions, the ECJ was able to handle the caseload
reasonably well. However, the Court struggled for many years with
decisions or regulatory acts that were not addressed to an individual
who nevertheless felt violated in his or her rights and interests. The
general approach taken by the Court was to handle the latter cases
restrictively and basically ask the individuals to wait for national
implementation measures and then challenge those in national court so
that only a few novel problems would have to come to the ECJ via the
preliminary rulings procedure. The most emblematic of these decisions
was Plaumann.238 In 1962, in the course of the introduction of the
Common Customs Tariff, the duty rate on certain citrus fruit coming
into Germany was increased from ten percent to thirteen percent.
Plaumann was an importer who had already committed to delivery of
several shipments at a given price and was not able to pass the higher
duty rate on to his clients. When Plaumann brought proceedings in
Luxembourg claiming that the EU regulation was of direct and
236. An example is the recent decision by the EU Commission that Google has abused its
market dominance by giving priority to its own services, such as the comparison shopping
service, in the display of search results. Google was ordered to stop its illegal conduct within 90
days and pay a record fine of 2.42 billion Euros, about 2.7 billion US$. See EU Commission,
decision of 27 June 2017, Case no. 39740, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39740
237. EEC Treaty, supra note 111, art. 173(4) (emphasis added).
238. See Plaumann & Co. v. Commission of the European Economic Community
(Plaumann), Case 25/62, [1963] E.C.R. 95.
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individual concern to him, the Court coined the notorious “Plaumann
Formula”:
(8) Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may
only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects
them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or
by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from
all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them
individually just as in the case of the person addressed. In the
present case the applicant is affected by the disputed decision as
an importer of clementines, that is to say, by reason of a commercial activity which may at any time be practised by any person and
is not therefore such as to distinguish the applicant in relation to
the contested decision as in the case of the addressee.239

On the basis of this narrow interpretation of Article 173, the Court
consistently refused to admit cases brought by individuals who could
not show that they were in a group of one.240 Arguably, Plaumann could
have waited for his import duty bill and then challenged that in front of
the national courts but this option is not always available or
satisfactory, as the following cases show.
In 2001, the Commission adopted Regulation 1162/2001 mandating larger mesh sizes for certain fishing vessels to prevent the collapse
of the stock of hake.241 Jégo-Quéré challenged the Regulation because
it would have to change the nets it was using for its fishing operations.
The Commission claimed that the regulation was “a measure of general
application”242 and that Jégo-Quéré was not individually concerned.
The company, however, argued that it was not in the business of hake
fishing and should have been granted an exception allowing it to carry
239. Id. at ¶ 8 (emphasis added).
240. See Ami Barav, Direct and Individual Concern: An Almost Insurmountable Barrier
to the Admissibility of Individual Appeal to the EEC Court, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 191,
191-98 (1974); Hjalte Rasmussen, Why Is Article 173 Interpreted Against Private Plaintiffs?, 5
ELREV 112 (1980).
241. See Commission Regulation (EC) No 1162/2001 of 14 June 2001 establishing
measures for the recovery of the stock of hake in ICES sub-areas III, IV, V, VI and VII and ICES
divisions VIII a, b, d, e and associated conditions for the control of activities of fishing vessels,
OJ 2001 L 159, at 4-9.
242. See Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v. Commission of the European Communities (JégoQuéré), Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.R. II-236, ¶ 14.
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nets with smaller mesh size on board of its vessels for the legitimate
fishing of whiting. Specifically, Jégo-Quéré argued “that a finding that
its action for annulment is inadmissible would leave it without any
remedy, since no act has been adopted at national level against which
legal proceedings can be brought.”243 Although the Court of First
Instance did not consider Jégo-Quéré to be individually concerned,244
it agreed with the plaintiff that a decision of inadmissibility would leave
it without a realistic remedy. Since the Court of First Instance had been
specifically created to increase the European Court’s capacity to handle
individual complaints, it decided to deviate from the long-standing
Plaumann formula and not require that “an individual applicant seeking
to challenge a general measure must be differentiated from all others
affected by it in the same way as an addressee.”245 The Court of First
Instance went on to rule:
in order to ensure effective judicial protection for individuals, a
natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned
by a Community measure of general application that concerns him
directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a
manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his
rights or by imposing obligations on him. The number and position
of other persons who are likewise affected by the measure, or who
may be so, are of no relevance in that regard.246

With its revolutionary approach, the Court of First Instance was
actually following a proposal by Advocate General Jacobs in a somewhat similar case—Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)—pending
at the same time before the Court of Justice.247 However, the Court of
Justice did not want any of it. It rejected the arguments of AG Jacobs,
claimed that it cannot be for the European Court to examine in every
such case whether or not an applicant had an effective remedy in the
national courts,248 and reaffirmed the Plaumann formula, effectively
rejecting not only the proposal by AG Jacobs but also the attempt of
the Court of First Instance in Jégo-Quéré at opening the admissibility
criteria.
243. Id. at ¶ 21.
244. See id. at ¶ 38.
245. Id. at ¶ 49 (emphasis added).
246. Id. at ¶ 51.
247. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v.
Council, Case C-50/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-6681, ¶¶ 31-103
248. See Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, Case C-50/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-6677,
¶ 43.
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However, like every good crime story, this one had a final twist.
When revising the EU Treaties by way of the Treaty of Lisbon, the
Member States saw it fit to change the wording of what is now Article
263(4) TFEU, the former Article 173(4) EEC, to the following:
Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down
in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an
act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual
concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct
concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.249

As can be seen very clearly, the Member States wanted to compel
the Court of Justice to accept cases where the individual concerned
does not have a realistic option of waiting for implementing measures
and challenging those in the national courts. As Masters of the Treaties,
they overruled the Court’s restrictive interpretation of the language of
the Treaty and endorsed judicial activism suggested by AG Jacobs and
attempted by the Court of First Instance.250
Having largely resolved this issue, it remains to be seen whether
the more pragmatic approach, imposing an obligation on the European
Court of Justice to accept a case if it seems that the individual
concerned will not find an effective remedy elsewhere, will carry over
into another scenario, which is fortunately quite rare. In 1988, the
Italian company Oleificio Borelli applied for a subsidy under an EU
agricultural support scheme. After the Italian region of Liguria issued
an unfavorable opinion on the application, the Commission issued a
decision rejecting it. The company then brought proceedings in Italy
against the “decision” of the region and in Luxembourg against the
decision of the Commission. However, the Italian courts in effect decided that the opinion of the region could not be challenged as it was
merely an internal step in the procedure, and the European Court in
effect decided that the Commission’s decision could not be challenged
since it was bound by the unfavorable opinion of the national
authorities. Oleificio Borelli was left with no effective remedy and
could, presumably, take only limited consolation from the pertinent
passage of the European Court’s judgment:
13 . . . [i]t is for the national courts, where appropriate after
obtaining a preliminary ruling from the Court, to rule on the
249. TFEU, supra note 123, art. 173(4) (emphasis added).
250. See e.g., Steve Peers & Marios Costa, Case Note, Court of Justice of the European
Union (General Chamber), Judicial Review of EU Acts After the Treaty of Lisbon, 8 EUR.
CONST. L. REV. 82, 82-104 (2012).
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lawfulness of the national measure at issue on the same terms on
which they review any definitive measure adopted by the same
national authority which is capable of adversely affecting third
parties and, consequently, to regard an action brought for that
purpose as admissible even if the domestic rules of procedure do
not provide for this in such a case.
14 . . . [T]he requirement of judicial control of any decision of a
national authority reflects a general principle of Community law
stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States and has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. . . .
15 Since the opinion of the Member State on whose territory the
project is to be carried out forms part of a procedure which leads
to the adoption of a Community decision, that Member State is
obliged to comply with the aforesaid requirement of judicial
control.251

The aforementioned case provides another example of a decision
that is nice in theory and not quite so nice in practice.252 Moreover, this
is not the only case where problems have arisen regarding judicial
protection of individuals caught in so-called mixed administration
cases. We can only hope that the European Court, after the changes
made to Article 263 TFEU by the Lisbon Treaty, will cherish the
arguments of AG Jacobs presented in UPA, and agree to be the court
of last resort whenever necessary.
The Plaumann scenario and the Borelli scenario have to be distinguished from purely internal situations of a single Member State, our
final scenario, where the Court refuses to get involved. This time,
however, the Court’s reluctance is perfectly justified. An example is
provided by the matter underlying the Order of December 14, 2011 in
Case C-462/11 Victor Cozman v. Teatrul Municipal Târgovişte.253 An
251. See Oleificio Borelli SpA v. Commission of the European Communities, Case C97/91, [1992] E.C.R. I-6330 (emphasis added).
252. See EMMERT, DER EUROPÄISCHE GERICHTSHOF ALS GARANT DER RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT, supra note 122, at 234-36.
253. See Victor Cozman v. Teatrul Municipal Târgovişte, Case C-426/11, [2011]
ECLI:EU:C:2011:831. This is not the only case of its kind. See also, Ministerul Administraţiei
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employee of a municipal theater in Romania complained to the local
court against a twenty-five percent cut in his contractual salary. Since
he argued, inter alia, that this was a violation of the ECHR, the
Tribunalul Dâmboviţa sent a preliminary reference to the European
Court of Justice asking whether Article 1 of the First Protocol to the
ECHR, the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions, was
violated by the salary cut. The fact that such a reference was still made
to the ECJ four years after Romania’s accession to the European Union
sheds new light on the persistent problems in that country. Naturally,
the ECJ declined to answer the question.254
V. SOME MODEST AND SOME NOT SO MODEST PROPOSALS
FOR REFORM
The most important consideration to be remembered when talking
about the strengthening of the one or the other supranational system for
the protection of human rights is the principle of subsidiarity. Effective
protection of human rights always has to be provided first and foremost
by the national authorities; moreover, it has to be provided by all three
branches of government.255 Existing legislation and drafts of future
legislation have to be in conformity with the supranational requirements, not only with national constitutional mandates. Administrative
authorities at all levels have to be required to respect the supranational
guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms, not only as they are
stipulated in the respective treaties but also as they are being interpreted
and developed by the respective courts. Most importantly, this requires
şi Internelor (MAI) et al. v. Corpul National al Poliţiştilor – Biroul Executiv Central, Case C134/12, [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:288. Since the second case was sent by a different national
court but with the same question after the ECJ issued the order in the first case, one cannot but
wonder whether the Romanian judges are conspiring to bring down the preliminary reference
procedure or whether they want to rub in their indifference to and ignorance of EU law.
254. Since the Charter of Fundamental Rights became binding on “the institutions and
bodies of the EU . . . and the national authorities only when they are implementing EU law,”
with the exception of the national authorities of the UK and Poland, both of which opted out of
the binding effects of the Charter, there has been an increasing flood of such purely internal
cases brought to the ECJ See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 51,
2012 O.J. C 326/391, at 406, [hereinafter Charter of Rights].
255. This is reflected in Art. 1 of the ECHR: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms . . . of this Convention” (emphasis
added). Although the Preamble of the Charter refers to both “the courts of the Union and the
Member States,” EU law also follows the principle of subsidiarity by generally requiring
individuals to bring their cases to the national courts who are charged with the application of EU
law and will only exceptionally refer questions to the European Court of Justice about its validity
and interpretation pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU.
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a general awareness of the supranational standards on behalf of all
national administrators, whether they are responsible for policy making
at the level of the cabinet of ministers or whether they are in charge of
policy implementation at the level of the police, prison service, and all
other administrative units and officers that regularly interact with
citizens or have the power of taking decisions that affect them. Finally,
the national courts are always the first responders if something has gone
wrong or somebody claims, with or without cause, that her fundamental
rights have been infringed. Thus, the national judges have to be willing
and able to enforce the national and the supranational guarantees of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
If these safeguards are in place at the level of the Member States
and Contracting Parties, references to the European Court of Justice
over matters of human rights as well as individual applications to the
European Court of Human Rights should be quite rare and occur mainly
when a situation is novel or pre-existing guarantees otherwise seem out
of touch with the evolving expectations and standards of society. By
contrast, if supranational institutions are regularly and repeatedly
called upon to intervene in situations where the national institutions
have not provided satisfactory solutions, the system is either broken or
bound to break down. The supranational institutions neither have the
capacity nor the legitimacy to interfere regularly in the national legal
order and do the job the national institutions are either unwilling or
unable to do. This should be kept firmly in mind, as we will now take
a look at some old and some new proposals for reforms that aim at
preserving and strengthening the supranational systems of the
European Union and the Council of Europe.
A. Strengthening the European Convention System
The need for reforms at the European Court of Human Rights has
become ever more apparent since the expansion of its membership into
Central and Eastern Europe. Over the years, many official, semiofficial, and private working groups have studied the options and come
up with a variety of proposals. This is not the time and place to try to
summarize all of their findings. However, some of the most important
studies shall be named and a few of their most important proposals shall
be discussed at least briefly before we will add some proposals of our
own.
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1. Ongoing Discussions and Existing Proposals
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the ECHR, a European
Ministerial Conference on Human Rights was convened in Rome and
adopted the Declaration The European Convention on Human Rights
at 50: What Future for the Protection of Human Rights in Europe? In
the Declaration, the Ministerial Conference:
Recalls that it falls in the first place to the member states to ensure
that human rights are respected, in full implementation of their
international commitments;
Calls upon all member states, to this end, to ensure constantly that
their law and practice conform to the Convention and to execute
the judgments of the Court;
Believes that it is indispensable, having regard to the everincreasing number of applications, that urgent measures be taken
to assist the Court in carrying out its functions and that an in-depth
reflection be started as soon as possible on the various possibilities
and options with a view to ensuring the effectiveness of the Court
in the light of this new situation.256

Many well-intended official declarations and recommendations
have followed. Their most important topics shall be briefly recited:
Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 on the re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of
the European Court of Human Rights
. . . I. Invites, in the light of these considerations the Contracting
Parties to ensure that there exist at national level adequate
possibilities to achieve, as far as possible, restitutio in integrum;
II. Encourages the Contracting Parties, in particular, to examine
their national legal systems with a view to ensuring that there exist
adequate possibilities of re-examination of the case, including
reopening of proceedings, in instances where the Court has found
a violation of the Convention, especially where:
i. the injured party continues to suffer very serious negative
consequences because of the outcome of the domestic
decision at issue, which are not adequately remedied by the
256. DECLARATION, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT 50 : WHAT
FUTURE FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE ? (2000), available at:
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/dh_gdr/Declaration-Rome_en.pdf.
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just satisfaction and cannot be rectified except by reexamination or reopening, and
ii. the judgement of the Court leads to the conclusion that a.
the impugned domestic decision is on the merits contrary to
the Convention, or b. the violation found is based on
procedural errors or shortcomings of such gravity that a
serious doubt is cast on the outcome of the domestic
proceedings complained of.257

Resolution ResDH(2001)66 States’ obligation to co-operate with
the European Court of Human Rights
. . . Deploring that violations have been established in recent
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in respect of
the obligation incumbent on the authorities of the Contracting
States to furnish all necessary facilities to the Convention organs
in their investigation with a view to establishing the facts
(violations of . . . Article 38, paragraph 1.a of the Convention);258

Recommendation Rec(2002)13 on the publication and dissemination in the Member States of the text of the European
Convention on Human Rights and of the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights
. . . It is important that the governments of member states:
i. ensure that the text of the Convention, in the language(s)
of the country, is published and disseminated in such a
manner that it can be effectively known and that the national
authorities, notably the courts, can apply it;
ii. ensure that judgments and decisions which constitute
relevant case-law developments, or which require special
implementation measures on their part as respondent states,
257. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 on the re-examination or
re-opening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the European Court of
Human
Rights,
(Jan.
19,
2000),
available
at:
wwwold.justice.sk/a/dwn/l8/VMCS_odp_2000_02.rtf.
258. Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Member states duty to co-operate
with the European Court of Human Rights, 2001 ResDH(2001)66. Unfortunately, the lack of
cooperation on behalf of some of the Contracting Parties did not stop and the Committee of
Ministers had to adopt a reminder in the form of Resolution ResDH(2006)45 States’ obligation
to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights on July 4, 2006.
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are rapidly and widely published, through state or private
initiatives, in their entirety or at least in the form of substantial summaries or excerpts (together with appropriate
references to the original texts) in the language(s) of the
country, in particular in official gazettes, information bulletins from competent ministries, law journals and other media
generally used by the legal community, including, where
appropriate, the Internet sites;
iii. encourage where necessary the regular production of
textbooks and other publications, in the language(s) of the
country, in paper and/or electronic form, facilitating knowledge of the Convention system and the main case-law of the
Court;
iv. publicise the Internet address of the Court’s site
(http://www.echr.coe.int), notably by ensuring that links to
this site exist in the national sites commonly used for legal
research;
v. ensure that the judiciary has copies of relevant case-law in
paper and/or electronic form (CD-Rom, DVD, etc.), or the
necessary equipment to access case-law through the Internet;
vi. ensure, where necessary, the rapid dissemination to
public bodies such as courts, police authorities, prison
administrations or social authorities, as well as, where appropriate, to non-state entities such as bar associations,
professional associations etc., of those judgments and decisions which may be of specific relevance for their activeties,
where appropriate together with an explanatory note or a
circular;
vii. ensure that the domestic authorities or other bodies
directly involved in a specific case are rapidly informed of
the Court’s judgment or decision, for example by receiving
copies thereof;259

259. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2002)13 on the publication and
dissemination in the member states of the text of the European Convention on Human Rights
and of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, (Dec. 18, 2002), available at:
http://wwwold.justice.sk/a/dwn/l8/VMCS_odp_2002_13.pdf.
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Resolution Res(2002)58 on the publication and dissemination of
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights
. . . Invites the Court to review its practice as regards the
publication and dissemination of its judgments and decisions. It
stresses in this respect the importance for the Court that:
i. its judgments and decisions are made available immediately in an electronic database on the Internet;
ii. its main judgments, important decisions on admissibility
and information notes on case-law are made accessible
rapidly, in both paper and electronic form (CD-Rom, DVD,
etc.);
iii. it indicates rapidly and in an appropriate manner, in
particular in its electronic database, the judgments and
decisions which constitute significant developments of its
case-law.260

Resolution Res(2002)59 concerning the practice in respect of
friendly settlements
. . . Considering that the conclusion of a friendly settlement . . .
may constitute a means of alleviating the workload of the Court,
as well as a means of providing a rapid and satisfactory solution
for the parties, Underlines the importance: of giving further consideration in all cases to the possibilities of concluding friendly
settlements and, if any such friendly settlement is concluded, of
ensuring that its terms are duly fulfilled.261

Resolution res(2004)3 on judgments revealing an underlying
systemic problem
. . . Invites the Court:

260. Committee of Ministers, Resolution Res(2002)58 on the publication and
dissemination of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, (Dec. 18, 2002),
available
at:
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016804ddd60.
261. Committee of Ministers, Resolution Res(2002)59 concerning the practice in respect
of
friendly
settlements,
(Dec.
18,
2002),
available
at:
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016804de98a.
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I. as far as possible, to identify, in its judgments finding a
violation of the Convention, what it considers to be an underlying systemic problem and the source of this problem, in
particular when it is likely to give rise to numerous
applications, so as to assist states in finding the appropriate
solution and the Committee of Ministers in supervising the
execution of judgments;
II. to specially notify any judgment containing indications of
the existence of a systemic problem and of the source of this
problem not only to the state concerned and to the Committee of Ministers, but also to the Parliamentary Assembly,
to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and to the
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, and to
highlight such judgments in an appropriate manner in the
database of the Court.262

Recommendation Rec(2004)4 on the European Convention on
Human Rights in university education and professional training
. . . Recommends that member states:
I. ascertain that adequate university education and professional training concerning the Convention and the case-law
of the Court exist at national level and that such education
and training are included, in particular: as a component of
the common core curriculum of law and, as appropriate,
political and administrative science degrees and, in addition,
that they are offered as optional disciplines to those who
wish to specialise; as a component of the preparation
programmes of national or local examinations for access to
the various legal professions and of the initial and continuous training provided to judges, prosecutors and lawyers;
in the initial and continuous professional training offered to
personnel in other sectors responsible for law enforcement
and/or to personnel dealing with persons deprived of their
262. Committee of Ministers, Resolution Res(2004)3 on judgments revealing an underlying
systemic problem, (May 12, 2004), available at: https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805dd128.
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liberty (for example, members of the police and the security
forces, the personnel of penitentiary institutions and that of
hospitals), as well as to personnel of immigration services,
in a manner that takes account of their specific needs;263

Recommendation Rec(2004)5 on the verification of the compatibility of draft laws, existing laws and administrative practice
with the standards laid down in the European Convention on
Human Rights
. . . Recommends that member states, taking into account the
examples of good practice appearing in the appendix:
I. ensure that there are appropriate and effective mechanisms
for systematically verifying the compatibility of draft laws
with the Convention in the light of the case-law of the Court;
II. ensure that there are such mechanisms for verifying,
whenever necessary, the compatibility of existing laws and
administrative practice, including as expressed in regulations, orders and circulars;
III. ensure the adaptation, as quickly as possible, of laws and
administrative practice in order to prevent violations of the
Convention;264

Recommendation Rec(2004)6 on the improvement of domestic
remedies
. . . Recommends that member states, taking into account the
examples of good practice appearing in the appendix:
I. ascertain, through constant review, in the light of case-law
of the Court, that domestic remedies exist for anyone with
an arguable complaint of a violation of the Convention, and

263. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2004)4 on the European Convention
on Human Rights in university education and professional training, (May 12, 2004), available
at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Education/Training/Compilation/Pages/20CommitteeofMinistersRecommendationRec(2004)4tomemberstatesontheEuropeanConventiononHumanRig
htsinuniversityeducationandpro.aspx.
264. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2004)5 on the verification of the
compatibility of draft laws, existing laws and administrative practice with the standards laid
down in the European Convention on Human Rights, (May 12, 2004), available at:
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805dd194.
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that these remedies are effective, in that they can result in a
decision on the merits of the complaint and adequate redress
for any violation found;
II. review, following Court judgments which point to structural or general deficiencies in national law or practice, the
effectiveness of the existing domestic remedies and, where
necessary, set up effective remedies, in order to avoid
repetitive cases being brought before the Court;
III. pay particular attention, in respect of aforementioned
items I and II, to the existence of effective remedies in cases
of an arguable complaint concerning the excessive length of
judicial proceedings;265

Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)2 of the Committee of Ministers
to member states on efficient domestic capacity for rapid
execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
. . . RECOMMENDS that member states:
1. designate a co-ordinator – individual or body – of
execution of judgments at the national level, with reference
contacts in the relevant national authorities involved in the
execution process. This co-ordinator should have the necessary powers and authority to: acquire relevant information;
liaise with persons or bodies responsible at the national level
for deciding on the measures necessary to execute the
judgment; and if need be, take or initiate relevant measures
to accelerate the execution process;
2. ensure, whether through their Permanent Representation
or otherwise, the existence of appropriate mechanisms for
effective dialogue and transmission of relevant information
between the co-ordinator and the Committee of Ministers;
3. take the necessary steps to ensure that all judgments to be
executed, as well as all relevant decisions and resolutions of
the Committee of Ministers related to those judgments, are
duly and rapidly disseminated, where necessary in
translation, to relevant actors in the execution process;

265. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2004)6 on the improvement of
domestic remedies, (May 12, 2004), available at: https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805dd18e.
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4. identify as early as possible the measures which may be
required in order to ensure rapid execution;
5. facilitate the adoption of any useful measures to develop
effective synergies between relevant actors in the execution
process at the national level either generally or in response
to a specific judgment, and to identify their respective competences;
6. rapidly prepare, where appropriate, action plans on the
measures envisaged to execute judgments, if possible including an indicative timetable;
7. take the necessary steps to ensure that relevant actors in
the execution process are sufficiently acquainted with the
Court’s case law as well as with the relevant Committee of
Ministers’ recommendations and practice;
8. disseminate the vademecum prepared by the Council of
Europe on the execution process to relevant actors and encourage its use, as well as that of the database of the Council
of Europe with information on the state of execution in all
cases pending before the Committee of Ministers;
9. as appropriate, keep their parliaments informed of the
situation concerning execution of judgments and the measures being taken in this regard;
10. where required by a significant persistent problem in the
execution process, ensure that all necessary remedial action
be taken at high level, political if need be.266

Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)3 of the Committee of Ministers
to member states on effective remedies for excessive length of
proceedings
. . . Recommends that the governments of the member states:
1. take all necessary steps to ensure that all stages of domestic proceedings, irrespective of their domestic characterisation, in which there may be determination of civil rights

266. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)2 on efficient domestic
capacity for rapid execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, (Feb. 6,
2008), available at: wwwold.justice.sk/a/dwn/l8/VMCS_odp_2008_02.rtf.
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within a reasonable time;
2. to this end, ensure that mechanisms exist to identify
proceedings that risk becoming excessively lengthy as well
as the underlying causes, with a view also to preventing
future violations of Article 6;
3. recognise that when an underlying systemic problem is
causing excessive length of proceedings, measures are required to address this problem, as well as its effects in
individual cases;
4. ensure that there are means to expedite proceedings that
risk becoming excessively lengthy in order to prevent them
from becoming so;
5. take all necessary steps to ensure that effective remedies
before national authorities exist for all arguable claims of
violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time;
6. ascertain that such remedies exist in respect of all stages
of proceedings in which there may be determination of civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge;
7. to this end, where proceedings have become excessively
lengthy, ensure that the violation is acknowledged either
expressly or in substance and that: a. the proceedings are
expedited, where possible; or b. redress is afforded to the
victims for any disadvantage they have suffered; or, preferably, c. allowance is made for a combination of the two
measures;
8. ensure that requests for expediting proceedings or
affording redress will be dealt with rapidly by the competent
authority and that they represent an effective, adequate and
accessible remedy;
9. ensure that amounts of compensation that may be awarded
are reasonable and compatible with the case law of the Court
and recognise, in this context, a strong but rebuttable
presumption that excessively long proceedings will occasion
non-pecuniary damage;
10. consider providing for specific forms of non-monetary
redress, such as reduction of sanctions or discontinuance of
proceedings, as appropriate, in criminal or administrative
proceedings that have been excessively lengthy;
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11. where appropriate, provide for the retroactivity of new
measures taken to address the problem of excessive length
of proceedings, so that applications pending before the Court
may be resolved at national level;
12. take inspiration and guidance from the Guide to Good
Practice accompanying this recommendation when implementing its provisions and, to this end, ensure that the text
of this recommendation and of the Guide to Good Practice,
where necessary in the language(s) of the country, is published and disseminated in such a manner that it can be
effectively known and that the national authorities can take
account of it.267

Resolution CM/Res(2010)25 on member states’ duty to respect
and protect the right of individual application to the European
Court of Human Rights
. . . Calls upon the States Parties to:
1. refrain from putting pressure on applicants or persons who
have indicated an intention to apply to the Court, members
of their families, their lawyers and other representatives and
witnesses aimed at deterring applications to the Court,
having applications which have already been submitted
withdrawn or having proceedings before the Court not
pursued;
2. fulfil their positive obligations to protect applicants or
persons who have indicated an intention to apply to the
Court, members of their families, their lawyers and other representatives and witnesses from reprisals by individuals or
groups including, where appropriate, by allowing applicants
and witnesses to participate in witness protection
programmes and providing appropriate forms of effective
protection, including at international level; …
4. identify and appropriately investigate all cases of alleged
interference with the right of individual application . . . ;

267. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)3 on effective remedies for
excessive length of proceedings, (Feb. 24, 2010), available at: https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805cf8e9.
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5. take any appropriate further action, in accordance with
domestic law, against persons suspected of being the perpetrators and instigators of such interference, including, where
justified, by seeking their prosecution and the punishment of
those found guilty;
6. if they have not already done so, ratify the 1996 European
Agreement relating to persons participating in proceedings
of the European Court of Human Rights . . .268

When reviewing the central issues addressed in these documents,
one cannot but admit that virtually every problem in the effective
implementation of the ECHR in the Contracting Parties has already
been addressed. Many of them were also summarized in the Report of
the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers of November
15, 2016 about an overall strategy to ensure the long-term effectiveness
of the Convention.269 The question to be answered is why the caseload
continues to grow and why even the number of repetitive cases is not
in serious decline. More importantly, one has to wonder why even longstanding problems with the execution of judgments of the ECtHR
continue to persist. How can it be that the share of judgments that have
not been executed within five years has grown from twenty percent in
2011 to fifty-five percent in 2015?270 Possibly out of a certain degree
of disillusionment with the effectiveness—or rather lack thereof—of
the many beautiful resolutions and declarations, the Council of Europe
has more recently pursued a different approach. In response to the
Brighton Declaration of April 20, 2012 on the Future of the European
268. Committee of Ministers, Resolution CM/Res(2010)25 on member states’ duty to
respect and protect the right of individual application to the European Court of Human Rights,
(Nov. 10, 2010), available at: http://www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/Res_2010_
25_eng.pdf. The reader could be forgiven for asking why it is not in any case required for a state
wishing to join the Council of Europe not only to ratify the ECHR but also the 1996 Agreement
Relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights.
269. See REPORT TO THE GROUP OF WISE PERSONS TO THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
CM(2006)203, (Nov. 15, 2006), available at: https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016805d7893.
270. See COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, 9TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
MINISTERS ON THE SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (2015), available at: https://rm.coe.int/168062fe2d.
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Court of Human Rights,271 the Steering Committee for Human Rights
(“CDDH”) was charged with the compilation of a report on The
Longer-Term Future of the System of the European Convention on
Human Rights. In this report the CDDH gathered and discussed a wide
range of measures already taken or newly proposed. Some of the
discussion points may be surprising, for example that the CDDH
considered it necessary to remind the Contracting Parties that they
“have undertaken to abide by final judgments of the Court to which
they are parties.”272 However, the truth is that “[i]nadequate national
implementation of the Convention remains among the principal
challenges or is even the biggest challenge confronting the Convention
system.”273 The CDDH Report identified a number of reasons, why this
remains such a challenge:
– The Court’s case law is “voluminous” and “subject to
constant enrichment,”274

a reference to the problem of signal and noise and the importance
for the Court of signaling clearly which decisions are the most
important and should make it into textbooks and university
curricula.
– Effective implementation of European human rights at the
national level requires “effective involvement of and interaction
between a wide range of actors (members of government,
parliamentarians, and the judiciary as well as national human
rights institutions, civil society and representatives of the legal
professions) . . . .275

To this we should absolutely add the other members of the public
administration who interact with citizens, in particular but not
limited to the law enforcement agencies! As we have already
postulated in 2012:
Human rights and fundamental freedoms will not be effectively
guaranteed until every person who is potentially going to be a
victim or a perpetrator has been educated about his or her rights
and obligations. Just like every person has to have a basic sense of
271. See EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROCOURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf.
272. See STEERING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 197, at ¶ 24 (with a reference to Art.
46 of the Convention).
273. STEERING COMMITTEE REPORT, at ¶ 34.
274. Id. at ¶ 36
275. Id. at ¶ 35
PEAN
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what is required and what is prohibited under the laws on crimes
and misdemeanors, and just like every person needs to understand
the basic traffic rules, each Member State should educate the
public at large about human rights and the guarantees provided by
the ECHR. This does not require sending every person into law
school courses. Short TV spots, along the lines of public interest
commercials, and other forms of information dissemination, can
already make a big difference. More importantly, government
officials who are not legally trained but part of law enforcement,
in particular prison wardens and police officers, have to receive
systematic training on (European) human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Model codes of conduct, best practice standards, and
similar tools for these professionals would also help if made
available in the respective languages and endorsed either by the
governments themselves or by the relevant professional
organizations. Every problem that can be avoided at the level of
these professionals will already not burden the domestic, let alone
the international judicial review procedures. . . . [T]he lack of
suitable CLE requirements and the absence or insufficiency of
training opportunities for private practitioners not only contributes
to the poor record of these countries in the application of the
ECHR, which in turn is reflected both in the high number of cases
going to Strasbourg, the relatively high percentage of judgments
finding a violation, and the serious problems these countries seem
to have with the execution of the judgments of the EuCrtHR. . . .
Where a significant percentage of practitioners are regularly
providing mediocre legal services and/or are unable or unwilling
to keep up to date about developments on the international level
with relevance to their area(s) of practice, the rule of law is compromised at its core.276

Above all, effective implementation at the national level also
requires the availability of the Court’s case law in the official languages
of the Contracting Parties. The limitation of the Council of Europe’s
working languages to English and French seemed like a stroke of
genius when the official languages of the European Union proliferated
to twenty-four in the wake of the Eastern European enlargements.

276. See Frank Emmert, The Implementation of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in New Member States of the Council of Europe –
Conclusions Drawn and Lessons Learned, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 597, 609-12 (Leonard
Hammer & Frank Emmert, eds., 2012), [hereinafter Emmert, Implementation] (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
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However, as Ole Due, then President of the European Court of Justice
in Luxembourg, pointed out to us many years ago, one can’t very well
tell individuals and government officials in the member states that they
are bound by supranational judgments and other supranational rules if
one does not even have them available in their respective languages.
Thus, we already noted in 2012 that the decisions of the ECtHR— at
least to the extent that they are not just dealing with repetitive cases—
need to be translated systematically into all official languages of the
Contracting Parties.277 To be fair, the Council of Europe has made
significant progress in this direction. At least some of the case law is
nowadays available also in Albanian, Arabic, Armenian, Azerbaijani,
Bulgarian, Chinese, Czech, Hungarian, Italian, Macedonian, Polish,
Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian.278 Given its resource constraints, the
Court has focused on translations into languages where problems exist
and persist. Thus, for example, the first and so far only case law guide
available in Italian deals with the right to a fair trial in criminal cases.
– To prevent human rights violations from happening in the
first place, it is important to start with existing and new legislation
and to ensure its compatibility with Convention standards.279 The
CDDH specifically encourages that parliamentary committees or
sub-committees are formed for the assessment of conformity of
draft legislation and that reports by these committees should be
required before a draft can go to the full parliament for a vote.

We agree that all Contracting Parties should have parliamentary
commissions or, even better, joint commissions composed of members
of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, to oversee and sign
off on the ECHR compatibility of all draft legislation before it is
finalized and voted on by parliament. Ideally, the commissions would
also work backward and identify problems in existing legislation, in
particular after decisions by the ECtHR mandate a new understanding
of a particular right or freedom in the ever evolving European system.
In this regard, Contracting Parties need to be encouraged to look at the
entire body of case law of the ECtHR, not only their own cases.
Furthermore, primacy clauses along the lines of the example in the next
section could also be inserted in key national laws, such as the criminal
277. Id., at 609.
278. See generally Case Law Analysis, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=caselaw/analysis&c=#n1347528850996_pointer. Information for persons
wishing to apply to the Court is provided in a total of 36 languages.
279. STEERING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 197, at ¶¶ 52-57.
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code, the code on criminal procedure, the administrative procedure
code, the law on courts, laws dealing with police powers and national
security, as well as substantive norms like the media law, the law on
political parties, etc. to remind not only those applying the law but also
those subjected to it of the ECHR guarantees. All of this makes eminent
sense and it remains a mystery why so few of the Contracting Parties
are taking up these suggestions since it would seem to be in their best
interest at least to know if and when a conflict with Convention
standards might exist.
The CDDH contemplated whether to recommend the creation of
“new domestic remedies provided by a special judicial organ or a
special chamber dealing exclusively with Convention matters.”280 The
idea here is a kind of national filter mechanism doing what would
otherwise be requested of the ECtHR. In the end, the CDDH decided
to leave it up to the Contracting Parties which remedies or combination
of remedies they want to provide.281 The CDDH shows a lot of
deference here, specifically stating “that the Contracting Parties are
afforded a margin of discretion in conforming to their obligations under
Article 13 [the right to an effective remedy]”.282 The unfortunate reality
is, however, that too many of the Contracting Parties have become quite
comfortable with not conforming to their obligations! Therefore, we
would argue that the time for extensive deference is over and that
Contracting Parties generating a disproportionate number of admissible
and meritorious complaints have to implement one or more of a range
of measures to address their evident problems.
2. Some Additional Proposals for Consideration
Already in 2012, we strongly endorsed the idea that the Contracting Parties should insert a supportive clause in their respective constitutions and that such insertion should in fact be required from a
country that wishes to join the Council of Europe.283 Of course, this
280. STEERING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 197, at ¶ 66.
281. Id.
282. Id. at ¶ 67 (footnotes omitted).
283. See Emmert, Implementation, supra note 278, at 601-04. The Council of Europe, in
particular its Parliamentary Assembly, did apply a flexible approach and did provide different
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should have become mandatory before the CEECs were admitted284
and one could argue that we are trying to close the barn door after the
horses have bolted. However, if the one or the other country were
willing to insert something along the following lines when next
updating their constitution, nothing would be lost and much could be
gained:
All branches of government, including the legislature, executive,
and judiciary, are committed to the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms pursuant to the standards enshrined in the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights.285 In case national guarantees differ from European
standards, the most advantageous interpretation for the individual
shall prevail.
The legislature shall review existing legislation to ensure
conformity with European standards for the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms and shall refrain from adopting
new legislation that falls short of these guarantees.
The executive branch, on all levels, shall protect and promote
human rights and fundamental freedoms at all times. Derogations
shall be permitted only to the extent necessary in a democratic
society, conforming to the principle of proportionality, and
otherwise in conformity with the European Convention and the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
The judiciary, including all courts on all levels and all proceedings,
shall oversee and enforce respect of human rights and fundamental
freedoms pursuant to these standards both by the other branches of
government and by private parties against each other. The
Member States with different accession requirements. For example, Moldova was told to amend
its constitution within a year of accession to guarantee judicial independence. See, STEVEN
GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS - ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS 108 (2006). Therefore, the present proposal would not seem outside of the powers
and possibilities of the Council.
284. The only European countries currently not yet in the system of the Council of Europe
and the Convention are Belarus and Kosovo.
285. See generally, Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional
Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1 J. GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 53, 53-90
(2012) (promoting a similar obligation as a central pillar of his appeal).

2017]

ECHR AND EU CHARTER COMPARED

1159

judiciary is firmly committed to providing adequate remedies
against possible infringements of human rights and fundamental
freedoms on the national level to eliminate, as much as possible,
the need of parties to call upon the European Court of Human
Rights.286

Even if a Contracting Party cannot be moved to insert such a
clause into its constitution, it may be possible to insert more limited
clauses into specific laws, such as the criminal code, the code on
criminal procedure, etc. as suggested above. The Council of Europe
could support such efforts with model clauses or, even better, entire
model laws for modern and human rights compatible laws dealing with
police powers and national security, prison services, political parties
and other civil society associations, the internet and the media, etc.
To the extent the legislative branches are not willing or able to
provide clear endorsements for the ECHR, much the same results could
still be achieved if national supreme or constitutional courts would
commit to systematically squashing and remanding lower court
decisions that fall short of the standards of the ECHR as interpreted in
the case law of the ECtHR. On the basis of the ratification and direct
effect of the ECHR, most supreme or constitutional courts of the
Member States would have the power to do just this. The question
remains whether they have the willingness and the technical skills as
well.
To give but one example, Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution
stipulates that “[i]n the case of a conflict between international
agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly put
into effect and the domestic laws due to differences in provisions on
the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall
prevail.”287 On this basis, the Constitutional Court has held that provisions of Turkish law openly in conflict with the ECHR cannot be
applied any more, they “have been implicitly repealed”.288 Against this
background, it is not surprising that President Erdogan, after the real or
staged coup attempt of July 15, 2016, went specifically after judges he
286. See Emmert, Implementation, supra note 276, at 602-03.
287. Constitution of Turkey, Chapter D. Ratification of International Treaties, Article
90(4), as last amended on May 22, 2004.
288. See the decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court in B. No. 2013/2187,
19/12/2013, ¶¶ 45-46; Application No. 2013/4439, 6/3/2014, cited in YAMAN AKDENIZ &
KEREM ALTIPARMAK, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF
ARTUN AND GÜVENER V. TURKEY, MONITORING REPORT FOR IHOP HUMAN RIGHTS JOINT
PLATFORM (Dec. 2016).
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considered inconvenient or disloyal. The fallout from Erdogan’s
increasingly totalitarian rule has yet to hit the Convention organs in
Strasbourg.
Another thing the suggested constitutional amendment would
clarify is the erga omnes nature of decisions of the ECtHR. This is
currently widely under-appreciated. To the extent the Contracting
Parties have commissions to review national laws for ECHR compatibility and to the extent they require continuing education of lawyers,
judges, and administrative officials in matters related to human rights,
they tend to focus on judgments of the ECtHR handed down against
their own state and ignore cases against other countries that are just as
important, if not more, for the correct interpretation of the ECHR and
the evolution of human rights protection in Europe.289 The justification
for this myopic approach is the general mantra that ECtHR
judgments—by contrast to the decisions of the ECJ in the preliminary
ruling procedure—do not have erga omnes effect. Thus, as the CDDH
not only admits but also supports, the Contracting Parties are under no
obligation “to abide by final judgments of the Court in cases to which
they are not parties.”290 We would argue, however, that a statement as
this one should never stand alone since it encourages the widespread
practice by all three branches of government in many Contracting
Parties to ignore any and all decisions of the ECtHR except the ones
directly addressed to the respective country. While it is true that the
Contracting Parties only “undertake to abide by the final judgment of
the Court in any case to which they are parties”,291 hence are not
formally bound by the other judgments, they have also promised to
“secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in . . . this Convention.”292 Since the rights and freedoms in the
ECHR cannot be understood without reference to the case law of the
ECtHR, the Contracting Parties cannot possibly fulfill their obligations
without a deep level of understanding of and engagement with all
important judgments of the ECtHR. The former Vice-President of the
289. See generally STEERING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 197, at ¶ 24.
290. See id. at ¶ 64.
291. ECHR, supra note 8, art. 46(1) (emphasis added).
292. Id., art. 1.
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ECtHR, Judge Zupančič explained the binding effect of the judgments
of the Court as follows:
The interpretation of a judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights is no different from the interpretation of any other precedent judgment delivered by any other court. In the last analysis,
the only difference obtains from the perception of the binding
nature of the superior court judgments.293 …
Because the judges of the lower courts know that the judgments of
the higher courts are at least de facto binding on them, these judges
. . . read and interpret judgments delivered by the higher (supreme
and constitutional) courts. They know that effectively their
independence vis-à-vis the higher courts is an ideological fiction.
If they did not believe this, they would be reversed over and over
again.294

The large number of so-called repetitive applications, even from
the same Contracting Parties, are a stark reminder that the ECtHR is
not sufficiently perceived by the national judges as a superior court
issuing important precedents they should better take into account, lest
they be reversed over and over again. Arguably, the ECtHR, in spite of
serious resource constraints, had done its share in signaling to the
national judges the important judgments, in particular by allocating
these cases to the Grand Chamber. Also, as mentioned earlier, the Court
has been producing translations of important cases into a number of
additional languages and provides links to external sites and
organizations for additional language versions.295 The ball is, therefore,
largely in the court of the Contracting Parties.296 They have to do more
to signal to their judges—and ultimately their civil servants in all three
branches of government—that knowledge of and compliance with the
ECHR matters, not least for those who want to be promoted and/or
enjoy other benefits in the future. And they have to provide their judges
293. Boštjan M. Zupančič, Chapter 12: On the Interpretation of Legal Precedents and of
the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, § 3.3: The Erga Omnes Effect of ECHR
Law, in THE OWL OF MINERVA 380 (2008) (emphasis added).
294. Id. (emphasis in original). See also the language used by the Court itself in Ireland v.
United Kingdom (1978), above note 62 and accompanying text.
295. See EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., CASE-LAW: LANGUAGE VERSIONS (2017), available at:
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=caselaw/HUDOC/translations#n1357202442922_
pointer.
296. The CDDH Report also contains a number of suggestions how the Contracting Parties
should improve national compliance. See STEERING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 197, at
30-42 and 73-87. Unfortunately, the language is sometimes too reserved, given the urgency of
the matter.
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and other civil servants with the training and other tools to enable them
to implement all human rights guarantees under the Convention as
interpreted by the ECtHR in their daily work every time an issue comes
up where a conflict between the ECHR and national law or practice
might arise.
B. Strengthening the EU System
Since the EU is not primarily perceived as a guardian of human
rights and fundamental freedoms and the European Court of Justice has
been better able to control its case load and the procedural delays, there
are far fewer proposals on EU human rights protection reform. We
don’t know whether the founding fathers who came up with the
preliminary ruling procedure fully understood the powerful tool they
handed to the ECJ but the combination of co-opting the national judges
as agents of EU law and of giving the decisions of the ECJ erga omnes
effect is quite probably the single most important secret of success of
the European Union and its legal system. The primary deficiency of the
EU in the realm of human rights protection, the lack of a catalog or bill
of rights, has been corrected, first via the practice of the ECJ and more
recently by the adoption of the European Charter. This leaves us only
two points for the final part of this analysis: Should the EU still accede
to the ECHR as well? And should the European Charter, regardless of
the answer to the first question, become the bill of rights not only of the
EU but also for the Member States in all their acts and omissions?
1. Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms?
The idea of EU accession to the ECHR has been around for
decades. At first, it did not seem possible, since only Contracting States
of the Council of Europe were entitled to ratify the ECHR. However,
at least since the entry into force of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR on
June 1, 2010, and with it the addition of a new paragraph 2 to Article
59, “[t]he European Union may accede to this Convention.” The idea
also seems to be supported by the Member States of the European
Union. Not only did the Member States endorse the case law of the ECJ
by including Article 6(3) in the Treaty on European Union pursuant to
which:
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
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and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s
law.297

They also wrote specifically in Article 6(2) TEU that “[t]he Union
shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. . . .”298
As a consequence, it has been said that pretty much everyone
agrees that the European Union should accede to the ECHR. Well, not
quite everyone.299 The European Court of Justice, for one, did not
agree. When the EU Commission made use of the procedure outlined
in Article 218(11) TFEU and asked the ECJ whether accession of the
EU to the ECHR would be compatible with the EU Treaties, the Full
Court, in its Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, decided as follows:
157. As the Court of Justice has repeatedly held, the founding
treaties of the EU, unlike ordinary international treaties,
established a new legal order, possessing its own institutions, for
the benefit of which the Member States thereof have limited their
sovereign rights, in ever wider fields, and the subjects of which
comprise not only those States but also their nationals (see, in
particular, judgments in van Gend & Loos, 26/62, EU:C:1963:1,
p. 12, and Costa, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66, p. 593, and Opinion 1/09,
EU:C:2011:123, paragraph 65).
158. The fact that the EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature
of which is peculiar to the EU, its own constitutional framework
and founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional
structure and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation, has
consequences as regards the procedure for and conditions of
accession to the ECHR. …

297. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C 340/1
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
298. Id., art. 6(2).
299. See Defeis, supra note 114. See also PAUL GRAGL, THE ACCESSION OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2013); Francis G.
Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
and the European Court of Justice: The Impact of European Union Accession to the European
Convention on Human Rights, in THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 291 (Ingolf Pernice, Juliane Kokott, & Cheryl Saunders eds.,
2006); Xavier Groussot & Eric Stavefeldt, Accession of the EU to the ECHR: A Legally Complex
Situation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPRARY EUROPEAN LAW, SWEDISH STUDIES IN
EUROPEAN LAW, VOL. 6, (Joakim Nergelius & Eleonor Kristoffersson eds., 2015).
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167. These essential characteristics of EU law have given rise to a
structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU and its Member States,
and its Member States with each other, which are now engaged, as
is recalled in the second paragraph of Article 1 TEU, in a ‘process
of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’.
168. This legal structure is based on the fundamental premiss that
each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and
recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which
the EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU. That premiss
implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the
Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore,
that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected.
169. Also at the heart of that legal structure are the fundamental
rights recognised by the Charter (which, under Article 6(1) TEU,
has the same legal value as the Treaties), respect for those rights
being a condition of the lawfulness of EU acts, so that measures
incompatible with those rights are not acceptable in the EU (see
judgments in ERT, C-260/89, EU:C:1991:254, paragraph 41;
Kremzow, C-299/95, EU:C:1997:254, paragraph 14; Schmidberger, C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333, paragraph 73; and Kadi and Al
Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission,
EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 283 and 284).
170. The autonomy enjoyed by EU law in relation to the laws of
the Member States and in relation to international law requires that
the interpretation of those fundamental rights be ensured within
the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU (see, to
that effect, judgments in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,
EU:C:1970:114, paragraph 4, and Kadi and Al Barakaat
International Foundation v Council and Commission,
EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 281 to 285).
171. As regards the structure of the EU, it must be emphasised that
not only are the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU
required to respect the Charter but so too are the Member States
when they are implementing EU law (see, to that effect, judgment
in Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 17
to 21). …
174. In order to ensure that the specific characteristics and the
autonomy of that legal order are preserved, the Treaties have
established a judicial system intended to ensure consistency and
uniformity in the interpretation of EU law.
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175. In that context, it is for the national courts and tribunals and
for the Court of Justice to ensure the full application of EU law in
all Member States and to ensure judicial protection of an
individual’s rights under that law (Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123,
paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).
176. In particular, the judicial system as thus conceived has as its
keystone the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in
Article 267 TFEU, which, by setting up a dialogue between one
court and another, specifically between the Court of Justice and
the courts and tribunals of the Member States, has the object of
securing uniform interpretation of EU law (see, to that effect,
judgment in van Gend & Loos, EU:C:1963:1, p. 12), thereby
serving to ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy
as well as, ultimately, the particular nature of the law established
by the Treaties (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123,
paragraphs 67 and 83).
177. Fundamental rights, as recognised in particular by the
Charter, must therefore be interpreted and applied within the EU
in accordance with the constitutional framework referred to in
paragraphs 155 to 176 above. . . .
182. The Court of Justice has . . . already stated in that regard that
an international agreement providing for the creation of a court
responsible for the interpretation of its provisions and whose
decisions are binding on the institutions, including the Court of
Justice, is not, in principle, incompatible with EU law; that is
particularly the case where, as in this instance, the conclusion of
such an agreement is provided for by the Treaties themselves. The
competence of the EU in the field of international relations and its
capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entail
the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created or
designated by such agreements as regards the interpretation and
application of their provisions (see Opinions 1/91,
EU:C:1991:490, paragraphs 40 and 70, and 1/09, EU:C:2011: 123,
paragraph 74).
183. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice has also declared that an
international agreement may affect its own powers only if the
indispensable conditions for safeguarding the essential character
of those powers are satisfied and, consequently, there is no adverse
effect on the autonomy of the EU legal order (see Opinions 1/00,
EU:C:2002:231, paragraphs 21, 23 and 26, and 1/09,
EU:C:2011:123, paragraph 76; see also, to that effect, judgment in
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Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and
Commission, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 282).
184. In particular, any action by the bodies given decision-making
powers by the ECHR, as provided for in the agreement envisaged,
must not have the effect of binding the EU and its institutions, in
the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation
of the rules of EU law (see Opinions 1/91, EU:C:1991:490,
paragraphs 30 to 35, and 1/00, EU:C:2002:231, paragraph 13).300

Ultimately, the ECJ concluded that the EU could not accede to the
ECHR because oversight by the ECtHR would be “liable to adversely
affect the specific characteristics of EU law and its autonomy”,301
would be “liable in itself to undermine the objective of Article 344
TFEU and, moreover, goes against the very nature of EU law, which,
as noted in paragraph 193 of this Opinion, requires that relations
between the Member States be governed by EU law to the exclusion, if
EU law so requires, of any other law”302 and finally “would be liable to
interfere with the division of powers between the EU and its Member
States.”303 And while the European Court could be accused of having a
bit of a personal interest in the matter, since it was clearly not eager to
see its decisions “appealed” to the Strasbourg Court, it is not at all
obvious what the added value of an accession to the ECHR would be.
First, the human rights guarantees under the Charter generally go
further in substance than the guarantees under the much older Convention, even when the evolution of the Convention via the case law of the
ECtHR is taken into account. Thus, it is certainly not impossible but
still quite unlikely that Convention oversight of the EU would provide
substantially better human rights protection in any given case. The
main situations where differences would play out are likely to be the
highly contentious and open ended debates in modern societies, such
as the conflict between pro-life and pro-choice proponents in the debate
over abortion or the conflict between those who want to prioritize
security over privacy in the war on terror and those who seek to
safeguard a larger measure of privacy even if it comes at a cost to
security. In the end, the differences would be the (personal) judgment
of a group of judges in Strasbourg versus the (personal) judgment of a
300. Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014, Opinion pursuant to Article
218(11) TFEU, Case Opinion 2/13, [2014], ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
301. Id. at ¶ 200.
302. Id. at ¶ 212.
303. Id. at ¶ 225.
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group of judges in Luxembourg in a case that does not have clear legal
guidelines one way or another.
Moreover, any additional benefit one might gain from ECtHR
oversight would come at steep cost: The procedure in the ECJ already
takes about two years, and that is after any preliminary procedures
before the Commission or in the national courts. An “appeal” to the
ECtHR would add several more years to the overall duration of the
dispute and we may safely assume that parties who are willing and able
to take a case all the way to Luxembourg would not stop there if another
level of review was (potentially) available in Strasbourg. Therefore,
many of the crucial and open-ended decisions of the European Court
of Justice would be “appealed” to the European Court of Human Rights
and further clog up the system there. Last but not least, if it is true that
the most important cases would be the open ended value decisions, it
is not at all clear that human rights would ultimately be better protected
in a court where a significant number of judges are from Eastern and
South Eastern Europe, hence from countries where respect for the rule
of law, freedom, democracy, and human rights is still not always
secured at a level comparable to the EU.
Even without a formal ratification of the ECHR by the European
Union, the ECtHR has some ways and means, albeit limited, to oversee
activities of the European Union. This was illustrated in the Bosphorus
decision of the ECtHR of June 30, 2005.304 The applicant, Bosphorus
Hava Yollari Turizm, a Turkish charter airline company, had leased
several aircraft from Yugoslav Airlines right before the UN adopted
and the European Union implemented sanctions against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. In May 1993, one of the aircraft was
sent to Ireland for maintenance and was impounded pursuant to EU
Regulation 990/93 Concerning Trade Between the European Economic
Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro).305 Legal remedies in the Irish courts and in the European

304. Judgment of the ECtHR (Grand Chamber) of 30 June 2005 in the Case of Bosphorus
Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, Application no. 45036/98.
305. OJ 1993 L 102, at 14.

1168 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:4

Court of Justice306 were unsuccessful and the airline finally brought the
case to Strasbourg. Although the case was brought against Ireland, it
was clear that Ireland had merely acted upon instructions from the
European Union. In a brief submitted to the ECtHR, the EU
Commission argued that Ireland had no discretion in the matter and
should not be held responsible for an EU act and that EU acts
themselves should not be reviewed as long as the European Union had
not acceded to the ECHR.307 The European Court of Human Rights
disagreed, however, and held that Ireland was responsible for acts of
the Irish Minister of Transport even if the latter acted in the
implementation of EU law and without discretion of his own.308
Ultimately, the ECtHR crafted a highly differentiated approach:
151. The question is therefore whether, and if so to what extent,
that important general interest of compliance with Community
obligations can justify the impugned interference by the Irish State
with the applicant company’s property rights.
152. The Convention does not, on the one hand, prohibit Contracting Parties from transferring sovereign power to an international (including a supranational) organisation in order to pursue
cooperation in certain fields of activity . . . . Moreover, even as the
holder of such transferred sovereign power, that organisation is not
itself held responsible under the Convention for proceedings
before, or decisions of, its organs as long as it is not a Contracting
Party . . . .
153. On the other hand, it has also been accepted that a Contracting
Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts
and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or
omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the
necessity to comply with international legal obligations. Article 1
makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned
and does not exclude any part of a Contracting Party’s
‘jurisdiction’ from scrutiny under the Convention . . . .
154. In reconciling both these positions and thereby establishing
the extent to which a State’s action can be justified by its
compliance with obligations flowing from its membership of an
international organisation to which it has transferred part of its
306. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy and
Communications, Case C-84/95, [1996] E.C.R. I-3953.
307. Judgment of the ECtHR (Grand Chamber) of 30 June 2005 in the Case of Bosphorus
Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, Application no. 45036/98, ¶ 122.
308. Id. at ¶¶ 137 and 148.
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sovereignty, the Court has recognised that absolving Contracting
States completely from their Convention responsibility in the areas
covered by such a transfer would be incompatible with the purpose
and object of the Convention; the guarantees of the Convention
could be limited or excluded at will, thereby depriving it of its
peremptory character and undermining the practical and effective
nature of its safeguards . . . . The State is considered to retain
Convention liability in respect of treaty commitments subsequent
to the entry into force of the Convention . . . .
155. In the Court’s view, State action taken in compliance with
such legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both
the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms
controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered
at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides . . . .
However, any such finding of equivalence could not be final and
would be susceptible to review in the light of any relevant change
in fundamental rights protection.
156. If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by
the organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not
departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no
more than implement legal obligations flowing from its
membership of the organisation.
However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of
Convention rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the
interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the
Convention’s role as a ‘constitutional instrument of European
public order’ in the field of human rights . . . .309

The careful reader will not only smile at the recurrence of the
famous “so long as” formula of the German Constitutional Court310 in
para. 155 of the present judgment. She will also note that the ECtHR
relies not only on the general level of protection provided by the
European Union but also mandates a safeguard for the particular
case.311
Given the fact that the vast majority of EU law is made operational
via legislative and administrative acts of the Member States, as outlined

309. Id. at ¶¶ 151-56 (emphasis added).
310. See supra notes 143 and 153 and accompanying text.
311. See id. at ¶ 156.
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above, this decision is potentially far reaching, even if the ECtHR did
ultimately not find a violation of the property rights of the airline either.
In conclusion, we suggest that a systematic oversight by the European Court of Human Rights over the institutions of the EU is
unnecessary and would do more harm than good. Already, the ECtHR
is able to pull the emergency break via oversight of the Member States
in their implementation of EU law, should any real deficits in the
protection of human rights emerge at the EU level.
2. Application of the Charter to All Acts of the Member States?
The European Charter is not only a reflection of the shared values
of the entire European Union, hence transcends the more particular
values of the individual Member States. As a very recent codification,
it is also distinctly modern, even progressive, at least for the most part.
Article 8, Protection of Personal Data; Article 13, Freedom of Arts and
Sciences; Article 14, Right to Education; Article 16, Freedom to
Conduct a Business; Article 18, Right to Asylum; Article 24, Rights of
the Child; Article 25, Rights of the Elderly; Article 31, Fair and Just
Working Conditions; Article 34, Social Security and Social Assistance;
Article 35, Health Care; Article 37, Environmental Protection; as well
as Article 38, Consumer Protection, are guarantees one does not always
find in national constitutions of the European Member States and
certainly not in older bills of rights like in the US Constitution. The
prohibition of discrimination in Article 21 of the Charter is also more
inclusive than most with its specific references to disability, age, and
sexual orientation. For all these reasons, we would naturally wish for
the guarantees of the Charter to be applicable as widely as possible.
As we have outlined above, at the present time, the Charter is binding primarily on the institutions of the European Union themselves.
The Member States and their various institutions and bodies are bound
only if and when they are implementing EU law.312 Within their own
sphere of authority, the Member States remain accountable under their
312. See Koen Lenaerts, Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
8 EUR. CONST.’L L. REV. 3, 375-403 (2012); Allan Rosas, When is the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights applicable at national Level?, 19 JURISPRUDENCE 4, 1271 (2012).
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own constitutional provisions, as well as the European Convention.
However, to the extent the Charter might provide substantially better
protection, the Member States are not bound by it when adopting or
implementing their own law outside of the sphere of application of EU
law. This begs the question whether we should argue and hope for a
reform, however accomplished, that would “secure to everyone” in the
EU at all times “the rights and freedoms” provided in the Charter,313
regardless whether they are confronted with an act or an omission at
the local, regional, national, or European level.
On the one hand, EU law already covers or at least touches upon
a broad range of subjects, leaving relatively few areas that remain
entirely under the control of the Member States.314 Thus, one might be
tempted to say that an expansion of the application of the Charter to all
activities of the Member States would not necessarily be a huge step.
This would be a fallacy, however. In particular acts and omissions of
the Member States that directly affect the personal rights and freedoms
of their own citizens, such as the bulk of what is nowadays known as
police powers and homeland security, as well as areas including
taxation, family matters, and many more, largely remain outside of EU
law and, therefore, outside of the area of application of the Charter.
Thus, the comprehensive application of the Charter to all acts and
omissions of the Member States would invariably generate many
additional claims by individuals who are looking for a remedy
wherever they may find one, be it the national constitution, the
European Convention, or the EU Charter.
On the other hand, the ECJ has been reasonably successful in the
management of its caseload and has largely kept the procedural delays
to under two years. Thus, it has been spared the traumatic experience
313. The quoted passages are from Article 1 of the European Convention. That provision
obligates “The High Contracting Parties”. By contrast, the corresponding provision in the
Preamble of the Charter stipulates that “The Union . . . recognizes the rights, freedoms and
principles” set out in the document (emphasis added).
314. Jacques Delors, in 1988, when he was president of the EU Commission, coined the
famous phrase that “in ten years 80 per cent of the legislation [of the Member States] related to
economics, maybe also taxes and social affairs, will be of Community origin.” See Annette
Elisabeth Toeller, Claims that 80 per cent of Laws Adopted in the EU Member States Originate
in Brussels Actually Tell Us Very Little About the Impact of EU Policy-Making, LSE (2012),
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/06/13/europeanization-of-public-policy/. A study of
Member State legislation adopted between 2002 and 2005 found more differentiated numbers:
81.3% of national environmental policy was determined by EU law, but only 12.9% of homeland
security measures and around 40% of economic legislation, for an overall average closer to 50%.
See Das Ende vom Mythos 80 Prozent, DIE ZEIT (Jun. 4, 2009),
http://www.zeit.de/online/2009/24/studie-eu-gesetze-deutschland.
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of the ECtHR, in particular after the accession of the Central and
Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007. Thus, one might be
tempted to say that the ECJ, the final arbiter of EU law and its
interpretation, is better able to handle cases coming from the Member
States than the ECtHR and should not shy away from a larger role in
the protection of human rights. After all, this argument might go, there
are no direct complaints for individuals to Luxembourg. The ECJ has
the national courts as first responders and will only be reached via the
preliminary rulings procedure of Article 267 TFEU in cases where the
national courts are at their wits end.
Again, such an argument would be a fallacy. In an ideal world,
the national courts would indeed carry the vast majority of the burden
and bring to the European Court only those cases where a novel
problem arises or where an older interpretation of EU law is begging
for review. The reality is quite different, however. Not unlike the large
number of repetitive cases brought to the ECtHR, the ECJ is confronted
with its own deluge of unnecessary requests for preliminary rulings.
First, there are many requests where the national judges could have
found the answer in very similar or identical precedents of the
European Court and could have avoided (another) reference, in
particular if they would have researched also those cases that were
previously brought from other Member States. Second, in many cases
the national judges could have come up with a reasonable interpretation
of EU law of their own by researching more broadly the values and
principles already developed in EU statutory and case law. Instead,
they often find it easier to ship their files to Luxembourg, where the
ECJ, if truth be told, has neither the capacity nor the legitimacy to
handle too many of these avoidable procedures.
In the final analysis, we would argue that an expansion of the
scope of application of the EU Charter to all acts and omissions of the
Member States would largely risk a replication of the problems at the
European Court of Human Rights, namely a flood going to the
European Court of Justice that would overwhelm the institution in
quantitative terms and subsequently lead to a decline in qualitative
terms, both in the output of the Court and in the national compliance.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Having described and compared the strengths and weaknesses of
human rights protection under the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and under the EU Charter on
Fundamental Rights, we hope that we were able to demonstrate that the
success enjoyed by the European Court of Justice is not built on any
particular internal procedures or reforms but on the cooptation of the
national judges via the preliminary rulings procedure. In much the same
way, any reforms of the inner workings of the European Court of
Human Rights, whether they involve single-judge procedures, pilot
judgments, or any other efforts at streamlining the work, will have their
narrow limits. Without a qualitatively different collaboration by the
first responders in the Contracting Parties, i.e. the national legislatures,
executives, and judiciaries, any internal measures in Strasbourg can
only bring temporary relief and will not deliver the ultimate result,
namely a focus at the supranational level on the truly novel and
important questions. Along the same lines, the ECJ in Luxembourg
needs to resist mission creep, and the EU Member States, in particular
the newer ones, need to strengthen the capacity at the national level so
that we may all be able to continue to enjoy the full benefits of the
preliminary rulings procedure.
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